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To reduce local air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from the transporta-
tion sector, governments in the U.S. and elsewhere have introduced various
policy instruments including taxes, subsidies, and technology standards to re-
duce oil consumption from passenger transport. My dissertation aims to em-
pirically evaluate the cost-effectiveness of certain programs that intend to in-
crease the fleet fuel economy including consumer subsidies for adopting alter-
native fuel vehicles (AVFs) and the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
Standards imposed on manufacturers. The dissertation is comprised of three
chapters. Chapter 1 studies the impact of income tax credit for electric vehi-
cle (EV) purchases and compare its cost-effectiveness with an alternative pol-
icy that subsidies charging stations when indirect network effects exist in the
market. Chapter 2 estimates consumer vehicle demand using random coeffi-
cient discrete choice model and examines the substitution pattern of EVs with
other fuel types, which helps assessing the environmental benefits of policies
that subsidize EVs. Chapter 3 investigates the differential treatment between
light trucks and passenger cars in CAFE standards and estimates to what extent
does the standard split undermine the policy goal of increasing the average fleet
fuel economy while achieving the redistributional goals.
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CHAPTER 1
INDIRECT NETWORK EFFECTS AND SUBSIDIES FOR ELECTRIC
VEHICLES
1.1 Introduction
The electrification of the transportation sector through the diffusion of plug-in
electric vehicles (EVs), coupled with cleaner electricity generation, is consid-
ered a promising pathway to reduce air pollution from on-road vehicles and to
strengthen energy security. The U.S. transportation sector contributes to nearly
30% of U.S. total greenhouse gas emissions, over half of carbon monoxide and
nitrogen oxides emissions, and about a quarter of hydrocarbons emissions in
recent years. It also accounts for about three-quarters of U.S. petroleum con-
sumption. Different from conventional gasoline vehicles with internal combus-
tion engines, plug-in electric vehicles (EVs) use electricity stored in recharge-
able batteries to power the motor and the electricity comes from external power
sources. When operated in all-electric mode, EVs consume no gasoline and pro-
duce zero tailpipe emissions. But emissions shift from on-road vehicles to elec-
tricity generation, which uses domestic fuel source. The environmental benefit
critically depends on the fuel source of electricity generation.1
Since the introduction of the mass-market models into the U.S. in late 2010,
monthly sales of EVs have increased from 345 in December 2010 to 13,388 in
December 2015.2 Despite the rapid growth, the market share of electric cars is
1Holland et al.(2015) [48] find considerable heterogeneity in environmental benefits of EV
adoption depending on the location and argue for regionally differentiated EV policy.
2From 1996 to 1998, GM introduced over 1000 first-generation EVs (EV1) in California,
mostly made available through leases. In 2003, GM crushed their EVs upon the expiration of
the leases.
1
still small: the total EV sales only made up 0.82% of the new vehicle market in
2015. In the 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama set up a goal
of having one million EVs on the road by 2015. Based on the actual market
penetration, the goal was met less than halfway.3
As a new technology, EVs face several significant barriers to wider adoption
including the high purchase cost, limited driving range, the lack of charging in-
frastructure and long charging time. Although EV owners can charge their ve-
hicles overnight at home, given the limited driving range, consumers may still
worry about running out of electricity before reaching their destination. This
issue of range anxiety could lead to reluctance to adopt EVs especially when
public charging stations are scarce. At the same time, private investors have
less incentive to build charging stations if the size of the EV fleet and the market
potential are small. The interdependence between the two sides of the market
(EVs and charging stations) can be characterized as indirect network effects (or
the chicken-and-egg problem): the benefit of adoption/investment on one side
of the market increases with the network size of the other side of the market.
The objective of this study is to empirically quantify the importance of indi-
rect network effects on both sides of the EV market and examine their policy
implications. This is important for at least two reasons. First, while indus-
try practitioners and policy makers often use the chicken-and-egg metaphor
to characterize the challenge faced by this technology, we are not aware of any
empirical analysis on this issue. Examining the presence and the magnitude of
indirect network effects is important in understanding the development of the
EV market. If indirect network effects exist on both sides of the market, feed-
3Similar national goals exist in many other countries: Chinese government set up a goal of
half a million EVs on the road by 2015 and five million by 2020. German government developed
an initiative to reach one million EVs by 2020.
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back loops arise. The feedback loops could exacerbate shocks, whether positive
or negative, on either side of the market (e.g., gasoline price changes or govern-
ment interventions) and alter the diffusion path. Ignoring feedback loops could
lead to under-estimation of the impacts of policy and non-policy shocks in this
market.
Second, indirect network effects could have important policy implications.
As we describe below, policy makers in the U.S. and other countries are employ-
ing a variety of policies to support the EV market. When promoting consumer
adoption of this technology, they can subsidize EV buyers or charging station in-
vestors or a combination of the two. Both our theoretical and empirical analysis
show that the nature of indirect network effects largely determines the effec-
tiveness of different policies. Therefore, understanding indirect network effects
could help develop more effective policies to promote EV adoption.
Taking advantage of a rich data set of quarterly new EV sales by model and
detailed information on public charging stations in 353 Metropolitan Statisti-
cal Areas (MSAs) from 2011 to 2013, we quantify indirect network effects on
both sides of the market by estimating two equations: a demand equation for
EVs that quantifies the effect of the availability of public charging stations on
EV sales; and a charging station equation that quantifies the effect of the EV
stock on the deployment of charging stations. Recognizing the endogeneity is-
sue due to simultaneity in both equations, we employ an instrumental variable
strategy to identify indirect network effects. To estimate the network effects of
charging stations on EV adoption, we use Bartik (1991)-style instrument [7] for
the endogenous number of electric charging stations, which interacts national
charging station deployment shock with local market conditions: number of
3
grocery stores and supermarkets. To estimate the network effects of EV stock
on charging station deployment, we use current and historic gasoline prices
to instrument for the endogenous cumulative EV sales. Across various spec-
ifications, our analysis finds statistically and economically significant indirect
network effects on both sides of the market. The estimates from our preferred
specifications show that a 10% increase in the number of public charging sta-
tions would increase EV sales by about 8% while a 10% growth in EV stock
would lead to a 6% increase in charging station deployment.
With the parameter estimates, we examine the effectiveness of the federal
income tax credit program which provides new EV buyers a federal income tax
credit of up to $7,500.4 Our simulations show that the $924.2 million subsidy
program contributed to 40.4% of the total EV sales during this period. Impor-
tantly, our analysis shows that feedback loops resulting from indirect network
effects in the market accounted for 40% of that sales increase, a significant por-
tion. Our simulations further show that if the $924.2 million tax incentives were
used to build charging stations instead of subsidizing EV purchase, the increase
in EV sales would have been twice as large. The better cost-effectiveness of
the subsidy on charging stations relative to the income tax credit for EV buyers
is due to (1) strong indirect network effects on EV demand; and (2) low price
sensitivity of early adopters.
This study directly contributes to the following three strands of literature.
First, our study adds to the emerging literature on consumer demand for elec-
tric vehicles. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) [21] estimates the effect of
4Throughout our analysis, we treat the tax credit as a full-amount rebate due to the lack of
household-level data in our analysis. EV buyers are more affluent than average vehicle buyers
and their tax liability is likely to be over $7,500. According to California Plug-in Electric Vehicle
Owner Survey (2014), among buyers of conventional new vehicles, 15% of households have
annual household income over $150,000 while among EV buyers, that share is 54%.
4
income tax credits for EV buyers based on previous research on the effects of
similar tax credits on traditional hybrid vehicles and finds that the tax credit
could contribute to nearly 30% of future EV sales. DeShazo et al. (2014) [29] use
a state-wide survey of new car buyers in California to estimate price elasticities
and willingness to pay for different vehicles and then simulate the effect of dif-
ferent rebate designs. They estimate that the current rebate policy in California
that offers all income classes the same rebate of $2,500 for BEVs and $1,500 for
PHEVs lead to a 7% increase in EV sales. Using market-level sales data, our
study offers a first analysis to quantify the role of indirect network effects in the
market and their implications on government subsidies.
Second, our study fits into the rich literature on indirect network effects. Pre-
vious work on indirect network effects dates back to early theoretical studies
such as Rohlfs (1974)[85], Katz and Shapiro (1985)[57] and Farrell and Saloner
(1985) [36]. Our paper is also related to the emerging literature on two-sided
markets that exhibit indirect network effects5. Theoretical work includes Ro-
chet and Tirole (2006) [84], Caillaud and Jullien (2003) [20], Armstrong (2006)[5],
Hagiu (2006) [45], and Weyl (2010) [96], and empirical work includes the PDA
and compatible software market by Nair et al. (2004) [76], the market of CD ti-
tles and CD players by Gandal et el.(2000) [40], the yellow page industry by Rys-
man (2004) [87], and the video game industry by Clements and Ohashi (2005)
[24], Corts and Lederman (2009) [26], Lee (2013) [65], and Zhou (2014) [100]. In
this strand of literature, our study is closest to Corts (2010) [25] in topic which
extends the literature to the automobile market and studies the effect of the
5Although exhibiting indirect networks, the EV market differs from the canonical two-sided
markets in that there is no well-defined platform for buyers and sellers to interact. The au-
tomakers sell EVs to consumers directly. Public charging stations serve as a backup to home
charging (e.g., a complementary good). The automakers do not charge charging stations loyalty
fees or membership fees as is often the case in a two-sided market.
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installed base of flexible-fuel vehicles (FFV) on the deployment of E85 fueling
stations. Corts (2010) [25] only focuses on indirect network effects on one side
of the market and does not look at that the effect of E85 fueling stations on FFV
adoption.
Third, our analysis contributes to the rich literature on the diffusion of vehi-
cles with advance fuel technologies (e.g., hybrid vehicles) and alternative fuels
(e.g., FFVs). Kahn (2007) [55], Kahn and Vaughn (2009) [56], and Sexton and
Sexton (2014) [89] examine the role of consumer environmental awareness and
signaling in the market for traditional hybrid vehicles. Heutel and Muehlegger
(2012) [47] study the effect of consumer learning in hybrid vehicle adoption fo-
cusing on different diffusion paths of Honda Insight and Toyota Prius. Several
recent studies have examined the impacts of government programs both at the
federal and state levels in promoting the adoption of hybrid vehicles including
Beresteanu and Li (2011) [11], Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) [39] and Sallee
(2011) [88]. Both hybrid vehicles and EVs represent important steps in fuel
economy technology. Environmental preference, consumer learning and gov-
ernment policies are likely to be all relevant in the EV market. Our paper focuses
on the key difference between these two technologies: indirect network effects
in the EV market. Huse (2014) [50] examines the impact of government subsidy
in Sweden on consumer adoption of FFVs and the environmental impacts when
consumers subsequently choose to use gasoline instead of ethanol due to low
gasoline prices. Based on naturalistic driving data, Langer and McRae (2014)
[62] show that a larger network of E85 fueling stations would reduce the time
cost of fueling and hence increase the adoption of FFVs.
Section 1.2 briefly describes the industry and policy background of the study
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and the data. Section 1.3 presents a simple model of indirect network effects
and uses simulations to show how feedback loops amplify shocks. Section 1.4
lays out the empirical model. Section 1.5 presents the estimation results. In
section 1.6, we present the policy simulations and compare the existing income
tax credit policy with an alternative policy. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Industry and Policy Background and Data
In this section, we first present industry background focusing on important bar-
riers to EV adoption and then discuss current government policies. Next we
present the data used in the empirical analysis.
1.2.1 Industry Background
Tesla Motors played a significant role in the come-back of electric vehicles by in-
troducing Tesla Roadster, an all-electric sport car in 2006 and beginning general
production in March 2008. However, the model had a price tag of over $120,000,
out of the price range for average buyers. Nissan Leaf ($33,000) and Chevrolet
Volt ($41,000) were introduced into the U.S. market in December 2010, marking
the beginning of the mass market for EVs.
There are currently two types of EVs: battery electric vehicles (BEVs) which
run exclusively on high-capacity batteries (e.g., Nissan LEAF), and plug-in hy-
brid vehicles (PHEVs) which use batteries to power an electric motor and use
another fuel (gasoline) to power a combustion engine (e.g., Chevrolet Volt). As
depicted in Figure 1.1, quarterly EV sales increased from less than 2,000 in the
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first quarter of 2011 to nearly 30,000 in the last quarter of 2013 while the number
of public charging stations has increased from about 800 to over 6,000. Nev-
ertheless, the EV market is still very small: EV sales only made up 0.82% (or
113,889) of the total new vehicle sales in the U.S. in 2015 and there are only about
12,500 public charging stations as of March 2016, compared to over 120,000
gasoline stations.
There are several commonly-cited barriers to EV adoption. First, EVs are
more expensive than their conventional gasoline vehicle counterparts. The
manufacturer’s suggested retail prices (MSRP) for the 2015 model of Nissan
Leaf and Chevrolet Volt are $29,010 and $34,345, respectively, while the aver-
age price for a comparable conventional vehicle (e.g., Nissan Sentra, Chevrolet
Cruze, Ford Focus and Honda Civic) is between $16,000 and $18,000. A major
reason behind the cost differential is the cost of battery. As the battery technol-
ogy improves, the cost should come down. In addition, lower operating costs
of EVs can significantly offset the high initial purchase costs.6 A recent study
by EPRI (2013) compares the lifetime costs (including purchase cost less incen-
tives, maintenance, and operation) of vehicles of different fuel types and finds
that under reasonable assumptions, higher capital costs are well balanced by
savings in operation costs: EVs are typically within 10% of comparable hybrid
and conventional gasoline vehicles.
The second notable barrier to EV adoption is the limited driving range. BEVs
have a shorter range per charge than conventional vehicles have per tank of gas,
contributing to consumer anxiety of running out of electricity before reaching a
6For a regular EV such as Nissan Leaf, the fuel cost of traveling 100 miles is about $3.6
assuming that it takes 30 kWh to drive the distance and the electricity price is 12 cents per kWh.
For a conventional gasoline vehicle, the fuel cost is about $14 assuming the fuel economy of 25
MPG and gasoline price at $3.5 per gallon.
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charging station. Nissan LEAF, the most popular BEV in the U.S. has an EPA-
rated range of 84 miles on a fully charged battery in 2015. Chevrolet Volt has an
all-electric range of 38 miles, beyond which it will operate under gasoline mode.
This range is sufficient for daily household vehicle trips but may not be enough
for longer distance travels.
The third barrier, closely related to the second, is the lack of charging infras-
tructure. A large network of charging stations can reduce range anxiety and al-
low PHEVs to operate more under the all-electric mode to save gasoline.7 There
are two types of public charging stations: 240 volt AC charging (Level 2 charg-
ing) and 500 volt DC high-current charging (DC fast charging), with the former
being the dominant type. The installation of charging stations involves a variety
of costs including charging station hardware, other materials, labor and permit.
A typical Level 2 charging station for public use has 3-4 charging units and
costs about $ 27,000 while a DC fast charging station costs over $50,000.8 Charg-
ing stations can be found at workplace parking lots, shopping centers, grocery
stores, restaurants, dealers and existing gasoline stations, a point that we will
come back to when constructing the instrument for the number of charging
stations in the EV demand estimation. Owners of charging stations are often
motivated by a variety of considerations such as boosting their sustainability
credentials, attracting customers for their main business, and providing a ser-
vice for employees. Charging stations are often managed by one of the major
7According to California Plug-in Electric Vehicle Owner Survey (2014), 71% of EV owners
expressed dissatisfaction with public charging infrastructure, coming down from 83% in 2012.
8According to the charging station cost report by U.S. Department of Energy Vehicle Tech-
nologies Office (2015), the cost of a level-2 EV charging unit for public use is between $3,000
and $6,000, and the installation fee is from $600 to $12,700 per unit. Use the average equipment
cost ($ 4,500) and installation fee ($3,000) per unit, the total cost of installing a charging station
of an average size (3.6 charging units) comes at $27,000. This estimate does not include future
maintenance and operating cost and is therefore a lower bound estimate. Footnote 28 provides
a upper bound estimate which includes those costs.
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national operators such as Blink, ChargePoint, and eVgo.
The fourth barrier is the long charging time. It takes much longer to charge
EVs than to fill up gasoline vehicles. A BEV may not be able to get fully charged
overnight if just using a regular 120 Volt electric plug (e.g., it takes 21 hours for
Nissan LEAF to get fully charged). To get faster charging, BEV drivers either
need to install a charging station at home or go to public charging stations. It
takes 6-8 hours to fully charge a Nissan Leaf at a Level 2 charging station and
only 10-30 minutes at a DC fast charging station.9 Unlike BEVs, PHEV batteries
can be charged not only by an outside electric power source, but by the internal
combustion engine as well. Having the second source of power may alleviate
range anxiety but the shorter electric range limits the fuel cost savings from EVs.
1.2.2 Government Policy
The diffusion of electric vehicles together with a clean electricity grid can be an
effective combination in reducing local air pollution, greenhouse gas emissions
and oil dependency. The EV technology is widely considered as representing
the future of passenger vehicles. The International Energy Agency projects that
by 2050, EVs have the potential to account for 50% of the light duty vehicle
sales.10 Many countries around the world have developed goals to develop the
EV market and provide support to promote the diffusion of this technology
9Consumers do not need to wait for the battery to get fully charged before operating their
vehicles again. They can recharge batteries by a certain amount depending on the duration
of their stay at the charging locations while working, shopping or running errands. Public
charging stations mainly serve as a backup or complementary charging option to alleviate EV
drivers’ range anxiety. A concern towards DC fast charging is that it can reduce battery life
due to the nature of charging. In addition, DC fast charging on a large scale can create demand
spikes on the local electricity grid and exacerbate peak demand.
10Hydrogen vehicles (not yet mass-produced) will account for the majority of the remainder.
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[74].11
To reduce the price gap between EVs and their gasoline counterparts, the En-
ergy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, and later the American Clean En-
ergy and Security Act of 2009 grant federal income tax credit for new qualified
EVs. The minimum credit is $2,500 and the credit may be up to $7,500, based
on each vehicle’s battery capacity and the gross vehicle weight rating. More-
over, several states have established additional state-level incentives to further
promote EV adoption such as tax exemptions and rebates for EVs and non-
monetary incentives such as HOV lane access, toll reduction and free parking.
California through the Clean Vehicle Rebate Project offers $2,500 rebate to BEV
buyers and $1,500 rebate to PHEV buyers. In addition, federal, state and local
governments provide funding to support charging station deployment. For ex-
ample, the Department of Energy provided ECOtality Inc. $115 million grant to
build residential and public charging stations in 22 U.S. cities in collaboration
with local project partners.
Government intervention in this market could be justified from the follow-
ing perspectives. First, indirect network effects in the EV market represent a
source of market failure since the marginal consumer/investor only consider
the private benefit in their decision and the network size on both sides is less
than optimal [71] [23]. In addition, given the nature of the market, each side of
the market is unlikely to internalize the external effect on the other side through
market transactions. If EVs are produced by one automaker, the automaker
would have incentive to offer a charging station network to increase EV adop-
tion. Nissan and GM are the two early producers of EVs but more and more
11The Chinese government provides rebate of over $9,000 to BEV buyers and nearly $8,000
for PHEV buyers. The UK government offers a grant of up to $7,800 to EV buyers. In Japan, EV
buyers were eligible for a subsidy of up to $10,000 in 2013 and $8,500 in 2014.
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auto makers are entering the competition. Nissan is a large owner of charging
stations but GM is not.12
Second, the external costs from gasoline consumption in the U.S. and many
countries around the world are not properly reflected by the gasoline tax [80]
[79]. Compared to conventional gasoline vehicles, EVs offer environmental ben-
efits when the electricity comes from clean generation such as renewables. In re-
gions that depend heavily on coal or oil for electricity generation, EVs may not
demonstrate an environmental advantage over gasoline vehicles.13 The electric-
ity generation continues to become cleaner around the world due to the adop-
tion of abatement technologies (e.g., scrubbers), the deployment of renewable
generation and the switch from coal to natural gas. In addition, technologies
are being developed to integrate EVs and renewable electricity generation such
as solar and wind. The integration of the intermittent energy source with EV
charging not only can help EVs fully realize its environmental benefits but also
can leverage EV batteries as a storage facility to address the issue of intermit-
tency and serve as energy buffer [72].
Third, technology spillovers among firms often exist especially in the early
stage of new technology diffusion [93]. The development of the EV technol-
ogy requires significant costs but the technology knowhow once developed can
spread through many channels including worker migration and the product
12Tesla is building its own proprietary network for Telsa owners only. This suggests that they
recognize the importance of charging stations in EV adoption but this would create duplicate
systems.
13Zivin et al. (2014) [101] estimate marginal CO2 emissions of electricity production that vary
by location and time of the day and they find that charging EVs in some regions (the upper Mid-
west) during the recommended off-peak hours of midnight to 4am even generates more carbon
emissions than the average conventional gasoline vehicle on the road. The environmental ben-
efit of EVs under different fuel mix of electricity generation is still an active research topic and
a critical element that has not been well understood in the literature is what types of vehicles
(hybrid or gasoline vehicles) EVs replace.
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market. Bloom et al.(2013) [16] estimate that the social returns to R&D are larger
than the private returns due to positive technology spillovers, implying under-
investment in R&D. In addition, the social returns to R&D by larger firms are
larger due to stronger spillovers.
1.2.3 Data
We construct a panel dataset consisting of quarterly EV sales by vehicle model
and the number of charging stations available at 353 MSAs from 2011 to 2013.
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics of the variables used in our regression
analysis. Data on quarterly vehicle sales of each EV model in each MSA is pur-
chased from IHS Automotive. The sales data include 17 EV models: 10 BEVs
and 7 PHEVs. Due to different introduction schedules, there were two vehi-
cle models in our 2011 data: Nissan LEAF and Chevrolet Volt. The 2012 data
include four more vehicle models: Ford Focus EV, Mitsubishi i-MiEV, Fisker
Karma, and Toyota Prius Plug-in. The 2013 data include 11 additional mod-
els: Honda Accord Plug-in, Ford C-Max Energi, Cadillac ELR, Honda Fit EV,
Fiat 500E, Smart ForTwo Electric Drive, Tesla Model S, Porsche Panamera, Toy-
ota RAV4, Chevrolet Spark EV, and Ford Transit Connect EV. In 2013, the top
four EV models are Nissan Leaf, Chevrolet Volt, Tesla Model S and Toyota
Prius plug-in with market shares (sales) of 25.8% (22,610), 24.4% (23,094), 17.4%
(18,650) and 9.4% (12,088), respectively.
For our analysis, we focus on the 353 MSAs (out of 381 MSAs in total) for
which observations are available in all three years, and their EV sales accounted
for 83% of the national EV sales during our data period. Panel A of Figure
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1.1 depicts the spatial patten of EV ownership (the number of EVs per mil-
lion people) in the last quarter of 2013. It shows that large urban areas have
a higher concentration of EVs. The MSA with the highest concentration is San
Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA with 5,608 EVs per million people by the end
of 2013. The next two MSAs are both nearby: San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont
and Santa Cruz-Watsonville. The MSA with the lowest concentration is Laredo,
TX with only 36 EVs per million people (9 EVs with a population of a quarter of
a million).
We obtain detailed information on locations and open dates of all charging
stations from the Alternative Fuel Data Center (AFDC) of the Department of
Energy. By matching the ZIP code of each charging station to an MSA and
using the station open date, we construct the total number of public charging
stations available in each quarter for each MSA. Panel B of Figure 1.2 shows
the spatial distribution of charging stations (the number of charging stations
per million people). The pattern is very similar to what we observe in Panel A
for EV ownership. The correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.63,
partly reflecting the interdependence of EVs and charging stations. The top
three MSAs with the most charging stations per million people are Corvallis,
OR, Olympia, VA and Napa, CA with 210, 170, 117 public charging stations per
million people, respectively. These three MSAs are the number 11th, 5th, and
6th in terms of the EV concentration in Panel A.
We collect data on state-level incentives such as tax credits and rebates for
both electric vehicles and charging stations from AFDC. From the American
Chamber of Commerce cost-of-living index database, we collect quarterly gaso-
line prices for each MSA from 2008 to 2013. Household demographics are col-
14
lected from the American Community Survey.
1.3 A Model of Indirect Network Effects
In this section, we use a stylized model to illustrate indirect network effects on
both sides of the market (EV demand and charging station investment) and to
show how indirect network effects give rise to feedback loops. We then conduct
simulations to shed light on how the effectiveness of different types of policies
(e.g., subsidizing EV purchases versus charging station investment) hinges on
the relative magnitude of indirect network effects on the two sides as well as
consumer price sensitivity. The results from the simulations provide theoretical
basis for our empirical findings based on real-world data.
1.3.1 Model Setup and Properties
We assume that EV sales qt(Nt, pt, xt) depends on the number of public charging
stations in the market (Nt), the price of EV (pt) and other product characteristics
combined (xt) that affect consumers’ choice such as the fuel cost.14 The installed
base of EVs is the cumulative sum of EV sales minus scrappage by the time t,
denoted by Qt =
∑t
h=1 qh ∗ st,h, where st,h is the survival rate at time t for EVs
sold in time h. The number of charging stations that have been built Nt(Qt, zt)
depends on the EV market size Qt and other variables combined zt that might
affect the fixed cost of investment. To facilitate the illustration, we specify the
14We assume there is only one EV model to ease exposition. Our empirical analysis is at the
vehicle model level and uses a richer specification.
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following functions for EV demand and charging station deployment:
ln(qt) = β1ln(Nt) + β2ln(pt) + β3xt, (1.1)
ln(Nt) = γ1ln(Qt) + γ2zt. (1.2)
The EV demand equation arises from a discrete choice model of vehicle demand
and follows closely the logit model using the market-level data as in [12]. The
charging station equation can be derived from an entry model as in [40] and we
derive an empirical counterpart to this equation for our specific context in the
appendix.
β1 and γ1 capture the magnitude of the indirect network effects on the two
sides. Feedback loops (or two-way feedback) arise if both β1 and γ1 are non-zero.
Intuitively, a shock to the system, for example an increase in xt would change
EV sales qt, which would in turn affect the installed base Qt+1. This would then
lead to changes in the number of charging stations Nt+1 and hence affect qt+1.
The impact would circle back and forth between these two equations. If both β1
and γ1 are positive, positive feedback loops would arise and they can amplify
the shocks (either positive or negative) in either side of the market such as tax
credit for EV purchases or subsidy on charging station investment. β2 (negative)
is the price elasticity of demand and captures consumer price sensitivity.
To understand the property of the system such as the existence of the steady
state and its property, we assume that the survival rate st,h is δt−h, where δ < 1.
Further assume pt = p, xt = x and zt = z. Substituting equation (2) into equation
(1), we have:
ln(qt) − β1γ1ln(qt + δQt−1) = β1γ2z + β2ln(p) + β3x. (1.3)
The right-hand side β1γ2z + β2ln(p) + β3x is constant with respect to qt and
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we denote it by c. During period 1, Qt−1 = 0. Solving the equation, we obtain
q1 = exp( c1−β1γ1 ). To solve for the steady state solution (q
∗, N∗), we use the steady
state condition qt = qt+1 = q∗ and find:
q∗ = exp(
c − β1γ1ln(1 − δ)
1 − β1γ1 ) = q1 ∗ exp(
−β1γ1ln(1 − δ)
1 − β1γ1 ).
N∗ = exp[γ1
c − β1γ1ln(1 − δ)
1 − β1γ1 − γ1ln(1 − δ) + γ2z].
The stock of EVs in the steady state Q∗ = q∗/(1 − δ) where the outflow of
EVs due to scrappage is equal to the inflow from new EV sales.15 To examine
the stability of the steady state, we write Qt−1 = qt−1 + δQt−2 and substitute it
into equation (3): ln(qt) − β1γ1ln(qt + δqt−1 + δ2Qt−2) = c. This defines an implicit
function of qt = G(qt−1). When β1γ1 < 1, it can be shown that G(0) > 0,G′() > 0,
and G′′() < 0. Therefore, the steady state solution is stable as shown in Figure
1.3. In our following policy analysis, we take β1γ1 < 1, which is also confirmed
in our empirical analysis.
The partial effect of vehicle price p on EV sales in the steady state is:
∂q∗
∂p
= exp(
c − β1γ1ln(1 − δ)
1 − β1γ1 )
β2
1 − β1γ1 ,
where β2 < 0. When β1γ1 < 1, this partial effect is negative as economic theory
would suggest. Similarly, the changes in other demand side factors captured by
x and the changes in the factors in the charging station equation z will both shift
15Alternatively, the steady state can be equivalently expressed in terms of (Q∗, N∗). Our spec-
ification rules out (0,0) as another steady state solution. Having multiple equilibria is often a
signature property of two-sided markets with indirect network effects due to self-confirming
expectations (e.g., [40]). From an empirical perspective, our specification is without loss of gen-
erality since the empirical studies in this literature often assume that the non-zero stable solution
plays out in the data.
17
G(qt−1) in Figure 1.3 up or down and hence affect the steady state solution of EV
sales.
1.3.2 Implications on Policy Choices
Now we conduct simulations to understand how feedback loops magnify policy
shocks and their implications on policy choices. We fix pt, xt, and zt in equations
(1.1) and (1.2) and assume certain values for model parameters as reported in
Table 1.2. We then solve for qt, Qt, and Nt sequentially for each period. Because
of the positive feedback loops (by assuming both β1 and γ1 being positive), EV
sales and the number of charging stations will keep growing naturally until
they reach the steady state where the inflow of new vehicles equals the outflow
of vehicles due to scrappage. To examine how positive feedback loops could
amplify a policy shock, we simulate a scenario where all EV buyers are provided
with a $7,500 subsidy for the first five periods and no more subsidy is offered
afterwards.
As shown in Panel (a) in Figure 1.4, due to both the price effect (captured
by β2) and the indirect network effects (captured by β1 and γ1), the subsidy
increases EV sales substantially compared with the no-policy case during the
first five periods. When the subsidy terminates, EV sales continue to increase
through feedback loops but with a smaller magnitude. The sales increase due
to subsidy gets smaller as feedback loops diminish and the two growth paths
eventually overlap. In both cases, the path of EV sales converges to the same
steady state but the policy shock makes the system converge to the steady state
more quickly: indirect network effects expedite this process through positive
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feedback loops.
Figure 1.4 Panel (b) depicts a similar pattern in the dynamic path of charging
station deployment. With the positive policy shock on the EV purchase side, the
stock charging stations increases quickly for the first five periods and continues
to grow at a decreasing rate after the policy. It eventually converges to the same
steady state as in the no-policy scenario. This two graphs demonstrate that
feedback loops from indirect network effects magnify a shock to any side of the
system and alter the convergence process on both sides.
The existence of indirect network effects on both sides of the market could
have important policy implications. To foster the development of the EV mar-
ket, policy makers can choose to subsidize consumers for EV purchase directly
(policy 1) or to subsidize charging station investment (policy 2). We conduct
simulations to examine the relative cost-effectiveness of these two policy op-
tions. Policy 1 provides EV buyers with a subsidy of $7,500 per EV in the first
five periods. Policy 2 uses the same account of total funding as in policy 1 to
build charging stations. We compare the cumulative sales increase over time
due to these two policies (with a 5% annual discount rate).16
To examine the implication of relative strength of indirect network effects on
policy choices, we vary the ratio of β1/γ1 by holding β1 constant while changing
γ1. Figure 1.5 depicts, for any given price sensitivity β2 (say -1.5), as β1/γ1 in-
creases (i.e., indirect network effects in EV demand become relatively stronger),
16For policy 1, we subtract the EV price by $7,500 to simulate the counterfactual sales in the
first five periods. The total expenditure of the subsidy policy is then calculated by multiplying
$7,500 with the total EV sales for the five periods. By assuming the cost of building one charging
station to be $27,000, we obtain the total number of charging stations that could be built with the
same amount of funding. We assume that the investment occurs evenly each year over the first
five periods and we add the number of charging stations that could be funded to Nt to simulate
the counterfactual outcomes under policy 2.
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the second policy (subsidy on charging stations) becomes more and more effec-
tive measured by the increase in cumulative sales over time. The two policies
are equivalent when β1/γ1 is 1 given the price elasticity of -1.5.
In addition to relative strength of indirect network effects on both sides, the
policy comparison also depends on the price elasticity of EV demand. When
consumers are more sensitive to prices (e.g., going from -1.5 to -1.6), the pol-
icy of subsidizing charging stations becomes relatively less effective for a given
β1/γ1. This finding is illustrated by the outward shift of the curve when the price
elasticity changes to -1.4 and -1.6. The result is intuitive: if consumers are less
price-sensitive, it would take a larger subsidy on EV purchases in order to push
consumers to buy EVs, hindering the effectiveness of the policy.
To summarize, the policy of subsidizing charging stations becomes more
effective relative to the policy of subsiding EV purchases when indirect net-
work effects on the EV demand become stronger (holding network effects on
the charging station side constant) or when consumers are less sensitive to price.
These findings offer a theoretical foundation for the policy comparison after our
empirical analysis.
1.4 Empirical Framework
To investigate indirect network effects on both sides of the market, we estimate:
(1) a EV demand equation that examines the effect of charging stations on EV
sales; and (2) a charging station equation that estimates the effect of EV fleet on
charging station deployment. These equations build upon equations (1) and (2)
in the theoretical model above.
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1.4.1 EV Demand
To describe the empirical demand model of EVs, let k index an EV model such
as Nissan Leaf and Chevrolet Volt, m index a market (MSA), and t index a year-
quarter. We estimate the following equation:
ln(qkmt) = β0 + β1ln(Nmt) + β′2Xkmt + Tt + δkm + εkmt, (1.4)
where qkmt is the sales of EV model k in market m and year-quarter t.17 Nmt de-
notes the total number of public charging stations that have been built in the
MSA by the end of a given quarter.18 We use the number of charging stations
instead of the total number of charging outlets to represent the availability of
charging infrastructure but the qualitative findings remain if we use the num-
ber of charging units. ln(Nmt) captures the effect of charging stations on electric
vehicle purchases and the log form allows the effect to be diminishing. Xkmt is
a vector of related covariates including the effective purchase price, personal
income and other control variables. The effective purchase price of a model
is defined as the manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP) less the related
subsidies (tax credits and tax rebates at both federal and state levels).
We also include a full set of year-quarter (e.g., the first quarter of 2011) fixed
effects and MSA-model (e.g., Nissan Leaf in San Francisco) fixed effects in equa-
tion (1.4). Year-quarter fixed effects Tt control for national demand shock for
EVs common across MSAs such as consumer awareness. MSA-model fixed ef-
17This empirical specification is taken to be consistent with our theoretical model and to ease
results interpretation. The logit model from Berry (1994) implies that the dependent variable
would be ln(skit) − ln(s0mt) where skmt is the market share of model k in market m and time t and
s0mt is the share of consumers who are not purchasing an EV. These two specifications provide
almost identical parameter and elasticity estimates (see Table 1.6).
18In the estimation, we add one to qkmt, Nmt to deal with zero values for some of the observa-
tions. Our results are robust to excluding observations with zero values on qkmt or Nmt and using
ln(qkmt) and ln(Nmt).
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fects δkm not only control for time-invariant product attributes such as quality
and brand loyalty that could affect vehicle demand but also control for time-
invariant local preference for green products [55, 56] and demand shocks for
each model (e.g., a stronger preference or dealer presence for Nissan Leaf in
San Francisco). εkmt is the unobserved demand shocks that are time-varying and
market-specific (for example, unobserved local government subsidy for pur-
chasing EVs or market-specific promotions for a vehicle model that vary over
time).
It is well documented in the vehicle demand literature that failing to control
for unobserved product attributes could lead to downward bias in the price co-
efficient estimates (for example [13]; [11]). MSA-model fixed effects absorbs
both observed and unobserved vehicle attributes variations which are time-
invariant and what is left is the variation of vehicle attributes over time. Since
most of the EV models in our sample appear for only one year and there is
little variation of the observed attributes for the models that appear for more
than one year, we believe that using MSA-model fixed effects could control for
unobserved product attributes and alleviate the need to use the methodology
developed in Berry et al. (1995) [13] to deal with price endogeneity where they
only have national-level sales data (i.e., one market).19 The price coefficient is
identified from the fact that effective EV prices vary across markets and over
time due to state-level subsidies and temporal price variations.
Although we include a rich set of control variables, the charging station vari-
19The methodology in Berry et al. (1995) [13] uses a contracting mapping technique to first
back out product-level fixed effects (mean utility) in the first stage and then uses IV strategy to
estimate the remaining preference parameters based on the assumption that observed product
attributes are not correlated with observed product attributes, which could be a strong assump-
tion [60]. As a robustness check, we also include electric range and electric mpg in one of the
alternative specifications and the results are qualitatively the same.
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able is still endogenous due to simultaneity: the unobserved time-varying and
market-specific demand shocks could affect charging station investment deci-
sions and hence the stock of charging stations. To deal with the endogeneity,
we use the IV strategy and a valid IV needs to be correlated with the number of
charging stations in an MSA (the endogenous variable) but not correlated with
the unobserved shocks to EV demand. The IV we employ is the interaction term
between the number of grocery stores and supermarkets in an MSA in 2012 with
the number of charging stations in all MSAs other than the MSA corresponding
to a given observation (lagged for one quarter). Grocery stores and supermar-
kets are a major owner of charging stations and they build charging stations
to attract customers and boost green credentials among other reasons. These
places could be good sites for public charging stations because EV drivers can
charge their vehicles while shopping. Nissan has been actively partnering with
grocery store owners to build charging stations. Kroger, the country’s largest
grocery store owner has installed about 300 charging stations in their stores
across the country. Our data show that the number of grocery stores in an MSA
is positively correlated with the number of charging stations.
However, the number of grocery stores does not vary with time in our sam-
ple period and it is therefore absorbed by the MSA fixed effects. To introduce
temporal variation, we multiply it with the lagged number of existing charging
stations in all MSAs other than the MSA corresponding to a given observation,
which captures the national-level trend in charging station investment due to
aggregate shocks such as temporal variations in costs, investor confidence and
federal incentive programs. The construction of this IV is similar in spirit to
the Bartik instrument used in the labor literature to isolate local labor demand
changes [7]. The intuition for the IV is that national shocks to charging station
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investment (captured by the lagged number of charging station in all MSAs
other than own) have disproportional effects on charging station investment
across MSAs: MSAs with a larger number of grocery stores and supermarkets
(hence better endowment of good sites for charging stations) will be affected by
these national shocks more than others, leading to variations in charging sta-
tions across MSAs. Our first-stage results in Table 1.4 to be discussed below
show that the interaction term has a positive and highly statistically significant
impact on charging station investments.
We argue that this instrument should satisfy the exogeneity assumption. The
number of grocery stores and supermarkets is unlikely to affect EV sales di-
rectly. There might be common unobservables that influence both the EV sales
and the number of grocery stores, especially at the cross-sectional level. How-
ever, our model controls for MSA fixed effects and should capture these time-
invariant unobservables. At the temporal dimension, EV sales vary from year
to year but the number of grocery stores is very stable given the maturity of the
industry. In fact, the number of grocery stores is measured at the end of 2012.
The temporal variation in the IV comes from the total (lagged) number of charg-
ing stations in all MSAs other than the own city. Time fixed effect would control
for time-varying common shocks across MSAs. Excluding home city’s charging
stations also removes the concern that one MSA’s installation of large amount
of charging stations could overly influence the estimation results.
Our IV strategy leverages the interaction term between a national-level vari-
able with only temporal variation and a MSA-level variable with only spatial
variation. The rationale behind the IV is that different MSAs have different
pre-existing conditions/ability to absorb national shocks to charging station in-
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vestment such as changes in macro-economic conditions and costs. One might
be concerned that different MSAs may have different susceptibility to unob-
servable demand shocks at the national level and the number of grocery stores
could be correlated with this susceptibility for some reason. To address this
concern, we include a variety of MSA-level controls interacting with the time
trend. We use the sales of hybrid vehicles in 2007 (several years before EVs en-
tered the market) to proxy for preference heterogeneity for greener vehicles or
environmental friendliness. We also include personal income, the share of col-
lege graduates among residents, the share of commuters driving to work, the
share of commuters using public transport to work, and the share of white res-
idents. We use the interactions of these variables with the time trend to control
for potential heterogeneity in diffusion path of EVs across MSAs. Our results
are robust to the inclusion of these controls, providing further support that our
IV is a valid exclusion restriction.
In some of the robustness checks, we use local policy variables such as subsi-
dies on charging stations as additional IVs and obtain similar results. We do not
use them in our benchmark specifications due to the concern that local policies
whether subsidizing charging stations or EV purchases could be a response to
local unobserved demand shocks and hence be endogenous.
1.4.2 Charging Station Deployment
We derive the empirical model of charging stations investment from an entry
model presented in the Appendix where the profit depends on both the installed
base of EVs and the total number of charging stations in a market. Under certain
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functional form assumptions, the total number of charging stations in a free-
entry equilibrium is given by the following equation:
ln(Nmt) = γ0 + γ1ln(QEVmt ) + γ
′
2Zmt + Tt + ϕm + ςmt, (1.5)
where Nmt denotes the stock of public charging stations that have been built in
market m by time t and QEVmt denotes the installed base of EVs by time t. The vec-
tor of covariates Zmt include the state-level tax credit given to charging station
investors measured as the percentage of the building cost, a dummy variable
indicating whether there exists public grants or funding to build charging in-
frastructure, the interaction term of number of grocery stores in a MSA in 2012
with the lagged number of charging stations in all MSAs other than own (the
instrument in the EV demand equation), and other control variables.
We also include a full set of time and MSA fixed effects. Tt denotes year-
quarter fixed effects to control for time-varying common shocks to charging sta-
tion investment across MSAs such as macro-economic conditions. Market fixed
effects ϕm control for time-invariant and MSA-specific preferences for charging
stations. For example, some MSAs may be “greener” than others and invest
more on alternative fuel infrastructure. Similarly, MSAs with a higher popula-
tion density and limited private installment of charging stations may have more
public charging stations. ζmt is the unobserved shock to charging station invest-
ment, for instance, the unobserved local policies to support the charging station
building. In the estimation, we add one to Nmt and QEVmt to deal with zero val-
ues for some of the observations. We obtain similar results by dropping these
observations and use ln(Nmt) and ln(QEVmt ) instead.
The issue of endogeneity due to simultaneity also arises in this equation.
Both Nmt and QEVmt are stock variables but the inflows to each variable are deter-
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mined at the same time. As a result, time-varying and MSA-specific shocks to
investment decisions (the error term in the equation) could be correlated with
current EV sales which is part of the installed base. The instrument variables
emerge more naturally in this equation. In particular, we instrument for the in-
stalled base of EVs with a set of current and past gasoline price variables. The
fuel cost savings from driving EVs depend on the price difference between gaso-
line and electricity, which varies across locations. In MSAs with higher gasoline
prices, consumers may have a stronger incentive to purchase EVs 20. Because the
installed base of EVs is the cumulative sales of EVs, we include gasoline prices
not only in the current quarter but annual gasoline prices in the past three years
as instruments. For example, for the installed base of EVs in the 2nd quarter in
2013, we use the gasoline price in the 2nd quarter in 2013, the average gasoline
price in 2012, the average gasoline price in 2011, and the average gasoline price
in 2010 as instrumental variables.
These gasoline price variables (including current and past gasoline prices)
should affect the installed base, which is confirmed in the first-stage regression
in Table 1.8 to be discussed below. But they are unlikely to affect investment
decisions directly (i.e., other than through the installed base). Since we include
both time and MSA fixed effect, the remaining variation in gasoline prices is
largely driven by how time-varying crude oil prices interact with market condi-
tions that are likely time-invariant during our data period (e.g., market structure
in wholesale and retail gasoline markets and distance to refineries). These in-
teractions lead to time-varying and MSA-specific differences in gasoline prices,
which are unlikely to be correlated with charging station investment directly.
20A report on the ownership cost of EVs by Electric Power Research Institute (2013) finds that
the increases and decreases in gasoline prices will have a significant impact on the relative costs
of PEVs.
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The decision of charging station investment hinges on, among other things, the
EV market potential (proxied by the installed base of EVs) and the fixed costs of
investment. Fixed costs of charging station investment include the cost of equip-
ment (chargers) and labor cost, neither of which is likely to be correlated with
gasoline price variations (after controlling for MSA and time fixed effects). The
operating costs of the charger largely depend on electricity prices. There is no
direct link between electricity and gasoline prices (after controlling for common
shocks such as national economic conditions using time fixed effects).
1.5 Estimation Results
We first present parameter estimates for equation (1.4) and (1.5). We then dis-
cuss the indirect network effects implied by these parameter estimates.
1.5.1 Regression Results for EV Demand
Columns (a) to (e) in Table 1.3 report the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation
results for five different specifications where we add more control variables suc-
cessively. Column (a) includes only six explanatory variables. Column (b) adds
in year-quarter fixed effects to control for time-varying common unobservables
across MSAs. Column (c) further adds vehicle model fixed effects to control for
unobserved product attributes such as quality and brand loyalty that affect con-
sumer demand. Column (d) includes rich MSA-model fixed effects to control
for both unobserved product attributes and MSA-specific demand shocks for
different EV models. Column (e) adds two additional variables to control for
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potential heterogeneity in the diffusion pattern across MSAs. The first variable
is the interaction term between the sales of hybrid vehicles in 2007 (to proxy for
preference for green vehicles) and the time trend and the second variable is the
interaction between average personal income and the time trend. Column (f)
implements a GMM estimation strategy and uses the interaction term of num-
ber of grocery stores and supermarkets in a MSA in 2012 with the lagged num-
ber of charging stations in all the other MSAs as the instrument for the number
of charging stations.
Given the log-log specification, the coefficient estimates can be interpreted
as elasticities. All the specifications provide intuitive and statistically significant
coefficient on the key variables of interests: EV demand increases with a larger
network of charging stations, a lower vehicle price, and more home charging
stations funded by the EV project supported by the DOE, and higher income.
The coefficient on the charging station variable captures indirect network effects
from charging station investment on EV demand. The GMM results show that
a 10% increase in charging stations would result in a 8.4% increase in the EV
sales, which is higher than all the OLS estimates (ranging from 1.8% to 5%).
This suggests that the number of charging stations is negatively correlated with
the unobserved shocks to EV demand, leading to downward bias in OLS. One
example of unobserved shocks is local EV incentives that local governments
provide to compensate for the lack of public charging stations. Another example
is the home charging incentives from local electric utilities. Many local utilities
offer a rebate for installing a home charging station and a discounted rate for
home EV charging as part of the demand-side management program. Local
governments often partner with local utilities to provide more generous home
charging incentives when there is a lack of private investment in public charging
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stations.
The price coefficients changes from -0.470 to -0.817 from columns (b) to
(c) after vehicle model fixed effects are included. This is consistent with our
discussion above: vehicle model fixed effects control for unobserved product
attributes which could be positively correlated with prices. Ignoring unob-
served product attributes will bias the price coefficient toward zero. Going from
Columns (c) to (d) where MSA-model fixed effects are included, the EV demand
function changes from being inelastic with an price elasticity of -0.817 to being
elastic with a price elasticity of -1.378. MSA-model fixed effects control for MSA-
specific time-invariant demand shocks (such as environmental preference) and
these demand shocks could affect state-level tax incentives. For example, higher
incentives are used to counter negative demand shocks. Hence MSA fixed ef-
fects could control for the potential endogeneity in state-level tax incentives.
The GMM results provide a price elasticity of -1.288. Although this is at the
lower end of the price elasticity estimates in the literature on automobiles, we
believe that the magnitude is reasonable compared with the literature for two
reasons.21 First, EV buyers are more affluent and hence less price-sensitive com-
pared with average vehicle buyers. Second and perhaps more importantly, EV
buyers can be characterized as early adopters and one can argue that many of
them choose EVs out of their strong environmental concerns and/or making
a statement by driving an EV as has been documented in the case of hybrid
vehicles (e.g., [55], and [89]).22
21Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) estimate the price elasticities ranging from -3 to -7 for
vehicle models in 1990 with more expensive models having the smaller price elasticities (in
magnitude). The lower end of price elasticities for vehicles models in 2006 in Beresteanu and Li
(2011) is also around -3.
22California Plug-in Electric Vehicle Owner Survey (2014) shows that EV buyers have higher
household income than buyers of gasoline vehicles and that the environmental concern is an
important motivator for EV purchase. 38% of Nissan Leaf buyers and 18% Chevy Volt buyers
consider the environmental concern to be the top motivator.
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Lower fuel cost is one of the major benefits of EVs and higher gasoline prices
will have a positive impact on EV adoption by increasing future fuel cost sav-
ings from driving EVs in place of conventional vehicles. To capture the het-
erogeneous impact of gasoline price on the demand of the two types of EVs,
two interaction terms of quarterly gasoline prices with BEV and PHEV dummy
variables are included. The results from all the specifications find a positive
and statistically significant effect of gasoline price on BEV purchase. While the
interaction term with PHEV is positive and significant in Columns (a) to (c),
Columns (d) to (f) do not find a significant impact of gasoline price on PHEV
demand when MSA-model fixed effects are included. Intuitively, BEV drivers
could be more sensitive to gasoline prices than PHEV buyers given that BEV run
exclusively on electricity while PHEVs run mostly on gasoline for long-distance
driving given its short range of battery. That is, PHEV drivers do not make a
long-term commitment to an alternative fuel to the extent that BEV drivers do.
In addition to gasoline prices, we included electricity prices in previous analysis
and the coefficient estimate was small in magnitude and statistically insignifi-
cant in all specifications. This could be due to: (1) the operating cost from using
electricity is a small portion of vehicle lifetime cost for EVs; and (2) there is not
much MSA-specific temporal variation in electricity prices. The coefficient on
the interaction term between hybrid sales in 2007 and time trend is positive and
statistically significant, implying that MSAs that had more sales of hybrid vehi-
cles in 2007 (proxy for preference for greener products) have faster diffusion of
EVs.
The results from these regressions imply that the increased availability of
public charging stations has a statistically and economically significant impact
on EV adoption decisions. Our estimation results confirm that even if most
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EV drivers can charge vehicles at home, better access to public charging facil-
ities elsewhere is still an important demand factor by, for example, alleviating
range anxiety.23 Based on the parameter estimates on charging station and price
variables, a back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the demand effect from
having one more charging station from the sample average of 22.6 is equivalent
to that from a reduction of EV price by $961 (the average price is $33,127). When
the number of charging stations increases to 27.3 (the sample average in 2013),
the equivalent price reduction is $795. At the sample maximum of 320 charging
stations, one more charging station is only equivalent to $68 price reduction,
showing the diminishing effect implied by the log-log functional form.
1.5.2 Alternative Specifications for EV Demand
We take the estimates in Column (f) in Table 1.3 as our baseline specification.
To check the robustness of the results, we estimate a variety of different spec-
ifications and the results are reported in Table 1.5 & 1.6. Column (a) includes
the interaction term between the number of charging stations and average com-
mute time to work in the MSA to capture the heterogeneous impact of charging
stations across cities with different commuting patterns.24. The positive coeffi-
cient estimate on the interaction term suggests that the availability of charging
stations has a larger impact on EV demand in the MSAs with longer commute.
This is intuitive since in MSAs where people have longer commute, range anxi-
ety would be more of an issue. Across MSAs, the elasticity of charging stations
23According to the EV Project report (2013), the percentage of EV home charging for 22 pro-
gram areas is about about 74% for Nissan Leaf and 80% for Chevrolet Volt.
24The average commute time to work at the MSA level is calculated based on combined 2006-
2011 samples of American Community Survey. The average commute time is 22.96 with a stan-
dard deviation of 3.37, a minimum of 14.59 and maximum of 35.01
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with respect to the EV sales ranges from 0.27 to 1.05 depending on the average
commute time.
Column (b) adds the quadratic terms of the time trend variables to our base-
line specification to allow more flexible time effect. The coefficient estimates
on the key parameters are almost intact. Column (c) includes the interaction
term of charging stations with a BEV dummy to capture the different impact
of charging stations on BEVs and PHEVs. The coefficient estimate on the inter-
action term is positive while not statistically significant. Column (d) includes
two more instruments: the tax credits and the availability of public funding for
building charging stations, both of which appear in the charging station equa-
tion. We did not include them in our baseline specification because the exo-
geneity assumption may not hold for the subsidies as they could be a response
to unobserved EV demand shocks. Column (e) removes the price variable in
the regression to deal with the concern that the price variable especially state-
level incentives could be endogenous. Column (f) adds the interaction terms be-
tween various demographic variables and the time trend to further control for
MSA-level heterogeneity in the diffusion pattern. Across these specifications,
the estimated effects of charging station availability on EV demand as well as
other parameter estimates are similar to those from the baseline specification in
Table 1.3. Column (g) reports the demand estimation using the logit model as in
Berry (1994) and it produces almost identical elasticity estimates as our baseline
specification.
Some states such as California and Oregon have adopted Zero Emission Ve-
hicle program which requires a certain part of automakers’ sales to be clean
fuel vehicles and some automakers have introduced EV models in those regions
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only to comply with the regulations. To control for more intense competition in
those markets due to more EV models introduced, Column (h) in Table 1.5 in-
cludes ZEV specific time fixed effects and the results are similar to previous
results with a modest increase in the coefficient estimate on charging stations.
Column(i) uses only BEV sales and the estimates are not systematically differ-
ent from the estimates using the full sample with BEVs and PHEVs. Columns
(j) and (k) increases the lag of the total number of charging stations in all other
MSAs to 2 and 3 quarters when constructing the instrumental variable and there
is no substantial change of the estimates except that the coefficient of the charg-
ing stations decreased slightly, primarily due to loss of observations. However,
increasing the lag to more than three quarters leads to weak IV.
As shown in Column (g) in Table 1.6, our demand specifications would yield
nearly identical results as the Berry-logit model. With only EV models in our
data, our analysis treats all other non-EV models to be in one category (i.e.,
the outside good). Limiting the choice set and the substitution pattern across
choices could potentially impact our estimate of the price elasticity and our pol-
icy simulations. EV models represent a different technology that is dramatically
from conventional gasoline vehicles, therefore consumers are likely to consider
them as a separate category in making purchase decisions especially given that
the EV buyers in our data period are often motivated by strong environmental
concern according to California Plug-in Electric Vehicle Owner Survey (2014).
Nevertheless, some PHEVs do have conventional hybrid counterparts. For ex-
ample, Toyota Prius-plug in has a hybrid version, Toyota Prius. Considering
most of PHEVs have limited electric range (11-38 miles), some consumers may
compare PHEVs with hybrid vehicles. Recognizing this, Column (i) in Table 1.6
only include BEV models in the regression. The results are very similar to those
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obtained using the full sample, suggesting that the limitation in our choice set
and modeling framework may not have a large impact on the key parameters
of interest.25
1.5.3 Regression Results for Charging Station Deployment
Columns (a) to (d) in Table 1.7 report the OLS regression results for the charging
station equation (1.5). In Column (a), only the four explanatory variables of in-
terest are included. Column (b) includes year-quarter fixed effects to control for
time trends that are common to all MSAs such as federal subsidies for building
charging stations that occur during a specific period of time. Column (c) fur-
ther includes MSA fixed effects to control for time-invariant MSA-level baseline
differences in charging station investment. Column (d) adds in the interaction
term between the hybrid vehicle sales in 2007 (proxy for environmental friend-
liness) and time trend to control for heterogeneity in the diffusion pattern of
charging stations.
All OLS regressions find a positive and statistically significant coefficient for
the installed EV base. The estimate results in Column (d) suggest that a 10% in-
crease in the EV fleet size would lead to a 1.2% increase in the number of public
charging stations. The GMM results in column (e) show that a 10% increase in
EV fleet size would result in a 6.1% increase in charging stations. In Column (f),
we add the EV incentives (tax credits and rebates at the federal and state levels)
25EV models only represent less than 0.8% of new vehicle sales in the nation in 2013. In-
cluding models of other fuel types would not help us identify the indirect network effects since
their demand does not depend on EV charging stations. We believe that micro-level data with
the second-choice information is much better suited to assess the substitution pattern between
EVs and different types of non-EVs than the aggregate data that we currently have. This is an
ongoing work of the authors.
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as an additional instrument and the coefficient for charging stations increases
from 0.613 to 0.659. We take Column (e) as our baseline IV specification due
to the concern that the EV incentives (especially those at the state level) could
be endogenous as they could be a response to the unobserved shocks to the
deployment of charging stations.
The GMM coefficient estimates are higher than all the OLS estimates, sug-
gesting that the installed base of EVs is negatively related to the unobserved
shocks to charging station investment, leading to downward bias in OLS. An
example of the unobserved shocks is the unobserved local policies: policy mak-
ers may design policies to support charging station investment to counteract
negative EV demand shocks.
The results in Column (e) show that tax credits and the availability of public
funding for charging stations have positive but statistically insignificant coef-
ficients. The tax credits and public funding are both at the state level. The
dependent variable in the charging station equation, however, only includes
publicly-accessible charging stations, which are mainly subsidized by the fed-
eral government directly through the federal projects such as the EV Project
and ChargePoint Project. Although state-level tax credits and funding also ap-
ply to public charging stations, they mostly support the installation of charging
stations at workplace and multi-family dwellings, which are usually privately-
accessible and are excluded from our analysis. The interaction term of grocery
stores with the lagged number of stations in all MSAs other than own has a pos-
itive and statistically significant coefficient, consistent with our argument for
using it as a relevant instrument in the EV demand equation.
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1.6 Policy Simulations
Our empirical analysis suggests that indirect network effects exist on both sides
of the market. In this section, we first examine the policy impact of the current
federal income tax credit policy for EV buyers and then compare this policy
with an alternative policy that subsidizes charging station investment instead.
1.6.1 Impact of Income Tax Credits
The federal government has adopted several policies to support the EV industry
including providing federal income tax credits for EV purchase, R&D support
for battery development, and funding for expanding charging infrastructure.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) [21] estimates that the total budgetary
cost for those policies will be about $7.5 billion through 2017. The tax credits for
EV buyers account for about one-fourth of the budgetary cost and are likely to
have the greatest impact on vehicle sales. Under the tax credits policy, EVs pur-
chased in or after 2010 are eligible for a federal income tax credit up to $7,500.
Most popular EV models on the market are eligible for the full amount.26The
credit will expire once 200,000 qualified EVs have been sold by each manufac-
turer.
In order to examine the effectiveness of the income tax credit policy in terms
of stimulating EV sales, we use our parameters estimates from the two baseline
GMM regressions to stimulate the counterfactual sales of EVs that would arise
26The only EV models that are not eligible for the full amount of credits are Honda Accord
Plug-in, Ford C-Max Energi, Porsche Panamera, and Toyota Prius plug-in. And their eligible tax
credits are $3,626, $4,007, $4,751.8, and $2,500 respectively. In our policy simulation, we remove
the tax credits based on different models.
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in the absence of the $924.2 million worth of tax credits to EV buyers from 2011
to 2013. The impact of the policy depends not only on the price elasticity of
EV demand in the EV demand equation, but also on the magnitude of indirect
network effects captured in both equations.
We assume in our simulations that the MSRPs will not be affected implying
that the consumers previously captured all the subsidies. We believe that this
is a reasonable assumption in the EV launch stage when automakers produce
EVs likely at a loss since the production level is far below the efficient produc-
tion scale.27 While more and more states are providing subsidy programs to
encourage the adoption of EVs, the retail prices for electric vehicles have actu-
ally been decreasing (for the same model) during our sample period likely due
to decreasing production cost and the increasing competition.
Our simulation results in Table 1.9 show that EV sales would have been
56,690 less (or 40.44% of the total sales) from 2011 to 2013 without the $924.2
million worth of income tax credit to EV buyers. If we shut down feedback
loops, the sales contribution from the tax credit policy would only have been
33,949 (24.2% of the total sales). This implies that feedback loops magnify the
policy shock and explain 40% of the sales increase from the policy. The results
suggest feedback loops have a multiplier effect of 1.67. CBO finds the policy
impact to be 30% of the total EV sales while their study only considers the price
effect of the tax credit but not the role of indirect network effects in amplifying
the policy effect [21]. DeShazo et al. (2014) [29] study the California Clean Vehi-
cle Rebate Projects for EVs and find a 7% increase in EV sales from the rebate of
27In a study by Sallee (2011) on the income tax credit on hybrid vehicles after hybrid vehicles
were first introduced to the market, he finds consumers captured the majority of the gains for
the income tax subsidy. Automobile assembly lines generally operate most efficiently with an
output of 200,000 to 250,000 vehicles per platform [86]. The global sales of the most popular EV
model, Nissan Leaf, was only 61,027 in 2014.
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$1,838 on average. Neither of these studies takes into account indirect network
effects and their estimates likely provide the lower bounds of subsidy impacts.
1.6.2 Policy Comparison
Our stylized model suggests that feedback loops from indirect network effects
on both sides of the market have important policy implications. A policy shock
on one side of the market would affect the other side. To promote EV adoption
based on a variety of rationale as discussed in Section 1.2.2, policy makers face
a problem of optimal policy design in that the tax revenue can be used to sub-
sidize one or both sides of the market. We compare the subsidy policy on EV
purchase with an alternative policy of subsidizing charging station investment.
The alternative policy uses the same budget of $924.2 million evenly in each
quarter during 2011-2013 to install charging stations in all MSAs (proportional
to population). As a lower bound estimate of the investment cost of charging
stations, we assume the government is only responsible for the purchase and in-
stallation of the charging hardware and the charging station company will then
operate and maintain the charging stations, as in the case of the EV Project and
ChargePoint Project, the two federal charging station support programs. As a
robustness check, we also estimate an upper bound investment cost for charg-
ing stations assuming the government will also need to maintain and operate
those charging stations. The lower bound and the upper bound of the charging
station investment cost are $27,000 and $50,244 respectively. 28
28According to the charging station cost report by U.S. Department of Energy Vehicle Tech-
nologies Office (2015), the maintenance and operation cost of charging stations include the fol-
lowing components: electricity use, network fee, maintenance and repair, and rents in parking
lots. The average electricity consumption is reported to be 6,864 kWh per year with an average
network fee of $500 and maintenance fee of $300. Assuming the charging station charges cus-
39
The policy comparison between these two policies is provided in Table 1.10.
We assume the policy period from 2011 to 2013 (i.e., no subsidy available in ei-
ther policy after that). The existing tax credit policy (policy 1) has led to 56,690
more EVs from 2011 to 2013, amounting to $16,303 for one additional EV. The
policy effect will continue to exist until the feedback loops die out in 2055. 29
The impact on EV sales from this policy in the long term would be 184,049,
amounting to $5,022 per policy-induced EV purchase. If instead, the govern-
ment had spent the $924.2 million subsidizing charging stations by purchasing
and installing charging infrastructure (policy 2 with lower station cost), EV sales
would have increased by 124,904 during these three years. The cumulative im-
pact on EV sales from this policy until year 2055 would be 403,558, amounting to
$2,290 per induced EV, only 46% of the unit cost under the existing policy. If the
government were also responsible for maintaining and operating those stations
(policy 2 with higher station cost), EV sales would have increased by 75,199
during these three years and 267,741 in the long term, amounting to $3,452 per
induced EV, still preferable to policy 1.
As depicted in Figure 1.6, policy 2 that subsidizes charging station invest-
ment demonstrates a dominant advantage in stimulating EV sales in the early
stage of the EV market. The $924.2 million spending during the three years
can install about 18,395 to 34,231 charging stations depending on the actual in-
vestment cost. This is more than one eighth to one fourth of the total number
tomers $0.39 per kWh (the current charging fee of Blink Network supported by the EV project)
and the average annual parking lot rate being $ 1995.12 (the national average parking lot rate in
2012 Colliers International Parking Rate Survey), the estimated operation and maintenance cost
less revenue is $805 per charging unit and $2,896 per station (3.6 units per station). Assuming
a 10-year life span of a charging station, the discounted total cost of maintenance and opera-
tion is $23,244 per station and the total investment cost of a charging station including initial
installation is $ 50,244.
29We assume the public charging stations and the installed base of EV drivers keep increasing
at a rate that was observed in the last quarter of 2013.
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of gasoline stations in the country and almost one and half to three times of
the current total number of public charging stations in the whole country. This
large amount of public charging stations should dramatically alleviate or even
eliminate range anxiety for potential EV buyers. Our results indicate that build-
ing charging stations is a more effective way to boost EV sales in the EV launch
stage. As shown in our regression results, indirect network effects on the EV de-
mand side are much stronger than those on the charging station side (coefficient
ratio being 1.4) and consumers are not very sensitive to prices (price elasticity
being -1.3). As a result, the policy that builds charging stations stimulates EV
sales at a much faster pace, consistent with our findings in the model section.
The long-run simulations are based on a variety of assumptions and are
meant to be illustrative. As the technology improves, the EV driving range is
likely to increase, weakening indirect network effects from charging stations to
EV demand. In addition, in the longer term, as EVs become more of a serious
choice for average vehicle buyers, consumer price sensitivity among EV buy-
ers could increase. Both of these changes would affect the policy outcomes and
weaken the effectiveness of policy 2 relative to policy 1.
As discussed in Section 1.5.2, the network size of charging stations has het-
erogeneous impacts on the EV demand across locations with different average
commute time. This implies heterogeneity in the relative strength of indirect
network effects on the two sides of the EV market and hence heterogenety in
policy comparison. That is, policy 2 may not be always preferred as previous
analysis suggests. In MSAs where indirect network effects on EV demand are
not strong since drivers have shorter commute and home charging is enough to
ensure their daily trips, policy 1 that subsidies EV purchase could be more effec-
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tive. Figure 1.7 depicts the relative effectiveness of the two policies in promoting
EV adoption. The MSA with policy 2 being most effective is New York-New
Jersey-Long Island (NY-NJ-PA) where the average commute time is longest,
while the MSA with policy 1 being most effective is Grand Forks (ND-MN)
where the average commute time is shortest. This suggests that a more elabo-
rate and cost-effective policy design would be to subsidize charging stations in
areas with long commute (e.g., large MSAs) but to subsidize EV purchases in
areas with short commute (e.g., small MSAs). This type of regionally differenti-
ated policy could be implemented at the federal level but perhaps more feasibly
at the state and local levels. For example, in states or cities where average com-
mute is longer, state and local government should focus on building charging
station infrastructure while subsidies on EV adoption for example through re-
bate and HOV lane usage can be implemented in states and cities where average
commute is shorter.
1.7 Conclusion
This study first demonstrates through a stylized model that positive indirect
network effects in both EV demand and charging station deployment give rise
to feedback loops which amplify shocks to the system and have important pol-
icy implications. Although indirect network effects on both sides of the market
imply subsidizing either side of the market will result in an increase in both EV
sales and charging stations, the relative cost-effectiveness of different subsidy
policies depends on consumer price sensitivity for EVs and the relative magni-
tude of indirect network effects on the two sides of the market.
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The paper provides to our knowledge the first empirical analysis of indirect
network effects in this market and evaluates the impacts of the current federal
income tax credit program for EV buyers. Our analysis estimates the elasticity of
EV adoption with respect to charging station availability to be 0.84 and the elas-
ticity of charging station investment with respect to the EV installed base to be
0.61. These indirect network effects enhance the effectiveness of the tax credit
policy, which has contributed to 40% of the EV sales during 2011 to 2013 and
will continue to exhibit a positive effect on the market for many years through
feedback loops. Given the relatively strength of indirect network effects on the
EV demand side and the low price sensitivity of early adopters, subsidizing
charging station deployment would be much more cost-effective than the cur-
rent policy of subsidizing EV purchases.
Our findings offer some insights for policy design to promote the EV tech-
nology. First, the policy to expand the charging station network (e.g., through
subsidies) would be especially effective in the EV launch stage due to low price-
sensitivity of early adopters and strong indirect network effects from charging
stations on EV demand. Second, our analysis demonstrates that significant spa-
tial differences exist in optimal policy design. Together with the finding from
the literature that the environmental benefits from EVs exhibit significant het-
erogeneity across locations with different fuel mix of electricity generation, the
spatial variation in indirect network effects limits one-size-fit-all policies and
argues for regionally differentiated policies.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std.dev
Panel (a): Vehicle Demand Equation
Sales of a EV model 9.62 40.01
Gasoline prices ($) 3.52 0.26
EV retail price - tax incentives ($) 33161 18569
No. of charging stations 22.13 45.74
Residential charging stations from the EV project 9.21 65.41
Annual personal income ($) 41607 82536
Hybrid vehicle sales in 2007 945 1859
No. of grocery stores 278 624
Average commute (minutes) 22.96 3.37
College graduate share 0.40 0.07
Use public transport to work share 0.02 0.03
Drive-to-work share 0.88 0.05
Share of white residents 0.78 0.11
Number of observations 14563
Panel (b): Charging Station Equation
No. of charging stations 9.94 28.13
No. of EV installed base 134 584
Charging station tax credit (%) 4.56 14.7
Public funding or grants 0.33 0.47
No. of grocery stores 186 455
Hybrid vehicle sales in 2007 568 1354
Current gasoline prices ($) 3.49 0.27
Gasoline price last year ($) 3.25 0.39
Gasoline price two years ago ($) 2.78 0.59
Gasoline price three years ago ($) 2.78 0.58
State EV incentives (rebates+tax credits) ($) 1575 3121
Number of observations 4236
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Table 1.2: Parameters for Simulating Indirect Network Effects
Coefficients Values Variables Values
β1 0.8 p 30,000
β2 -1.5 X 16
β3 1 Z 2
γ1 0.4
γ2 1
δ 0.9
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Table 1.4: First Stage Results for EV Demand Equation
Variable
ln(No. of grocery stores)*ln(lagged national stations) 0.139***
(0.023)
ln(retail price-tax incentives) -0.193***
(0.054)
ln(gasoline price)*PHEV 0.146
(0.125)
ln(gasoline price)*BEV 0.064
(0.135)
ln(residential charging from EV project) -0.011
(0.010)
ln(personal income) -0.980
(1.035)
ln(hybrid vehicle sales in 2007)*time trend 0.010***
(0.003)
ln(personal income)*time trend 0.018
(0.022)
R2 0.677
Note: The dependent variable is ln(No.of stations). The number of observations is
14563. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. The model includes year-
quarter fixed effects and MSA-model (e.g., Nissan Leaf in San Francisco) fixed ef-
fects. *Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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Table 1.5: Additional Specifications for Vehicle Demand (a)
Variable GMM (a) GMM (b) GMM (c) GMM (d) GMM (e) GMM (f)
ln(No. of charging stations) -0.282 0.785*** 0.817*** 0.791*** 0.866*** 0.851***
(0.243) (0.229) (0.156) (0.152) (0.165) (0.157)
ln(No. of stations)*commute time 0.038***
(0.010)
ln(gasoline price)*PHEV -0.086 -0.090 -0.079 -0.075 0.037 -0.093
(0.193) (0.200) (0.205) (0.204) (0.204) (0.245)
ln(gasoline price)*BEV 0.389* 0.411* 0.424* 0.440* 0.292 0.440*
(0.208) (0.217) (0.221) (0.218) (0.222) (0.256)
ln(retail price - tax incentives) -1.324*** -1.294*** -1.214*** -1.300*** -1.499***
(0.130) (0.130) (0.147) (0.130) (0.150)
ln(residential charging from EV project) 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.049***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
ln(personal income) 1.896*** 1.710* 2.059** 2.026** 2.167** 2.849***
(0.708) (0.958) (0.868) (0.839) (0.859) (1.040)
ln(hybrid sales in 2007)*time trend 0.011*** 0.019 0.011** 0.012** 0.011** 0.009
(0.004) (0.024) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
ln(personal income)*time trend -0.001 0.044 0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.020
(0.015) (0.081) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.027)
ln(hybrid sales in 2007)*time trend2 -0.000
(0.001)
ln(personal income)*time trend2 -0.003
(0.005)
ln(No. of stations)*Battery EV 0.094
(0.059)
College shares*time trend -0.023
(0.081)
Drive-to-work share*time trend -0.117
(0.116)
Use public transit to work*time trend 0.071
(0.167)
White share*time trend -0.100**
(0.040)
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Table 1.6: Additional Specifications for Vehicle Demand (b)
Variable GMM (g) GMM (h) GMM (i) GMM (j) GMM (k)
ln(No. of charging stations) 0.842*** 0.953*** 1.005*** 0.725*** 0.683***
(0.162) (0.170) (0.281) (0.224) (0.347)
ln(gasoline price)*PHEV -0.083 0.099 0.127 0.176
(0.206) (0.211) (0.204) (0.201)
ln(gasoline price)*BEV 0.420* 0.590** 0.024 0.238 0.223
(0.220) (0.231) (0.283) (0.218) (0.220)
ln(retail price - tax incentives) -1.288*** -1.283*** -0.927*** -1.297*** -1.307***
(0.131) (0.131) (0.268) (0.135) (0.139)
ln(residential charging from EV project) 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.027 0.054*** 0.055***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.020) (0.012) (0.011)
ln(personal income) 2.058** 2.184** 0.045 1.764** 2.900***
(0.854) (0.933) (1.362) (0.831) (0.835)
ln(hybrid vehicle sales in 2007)*time trend 0.011** 0.006 0.013 0.014** 0.015*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
ln(personal income)*time trend 0.001 -0.001 0.014 0.008 0.007
(0.020) (0.020) (0.032) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 14563 14563 6720 14328 13990
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Table 1.8: First Stage Results for Charging Station Equation
Variable
ln(current gasoline price) 0.206
(0.233)
ln(gasoline price last year) 3.304***
(0.824)
ln(gasoline price two years ago) 3.236***
(0.676)
ln(gasoline price three year ago) 3.087***
(0.810)
ln(hybrid vehicle sales in 2007)*time trend 0.021***
(0.004)
ln(No. of grocery stores)*ln(national charging stations) 0.085***
(0.023)
Charging station tax credit (%) -0.017
(0.018)
Public funding or grants for stations -0.228***
(0.061)
R2 0.922
Note: The number of observations is 4236. The dependent variable is ln(EV stock).
The model includes year-quarter fixed effects and MSA fixed effects. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the MSA level. *Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***sig-
nificant at 1%.
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Table 1.9: Policy Impacts of Federal Income Tax Credits for EVs
Time Observed EV Sales Counterfactual Sales Sales Reduction Percentage
2011-1 1,105 772 333 30.10%
2011-2 3,241 2,580 661 20.40%
2011-3 2,813 1,887 926 32.91%
2011-4 3,900 2,256 1,644 42.16%
2012-1 4,307 2,015 2,292 53.22%
2012-2 7,030 3,517 3,513 49.97%
2012-3 9,662 5,575 4,087 42.30%
2012-4 12,665 7,838 4,827 38.11%
2013-1 21,140 12,931 8,209 38.83%
2013-2 24,803 15,571 9,232 37.22%
2013-3 25,782 15,679 10,103 39.19%
2013-4 23,747 12,884 10,863 45.74%
Total 140,195 83,505 56,690 40.44%
Note: Counterfactual sales are the simulated sales in all 353 MSAs in our data after removing the fed-
eral income tax credit for EV buyers (the amount based on different models) while holding everything
else the same.
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Table 1.10: Comparison of EV Income Tax Credit and Charging Station
Subsidy Policies
EV Sales Increase EV Sales Increase EV Sales Increase
from Policy 1 from Policy 2 from Policy 2
Low Cost High Cost
2011-1 333 2,532 1,439
2011-2 661 3,839 2,214
2011-3 926 4,116 2,422
2011-4 1,644 5,937 3,505
2012-1 2,292 6,500 3,891
2012-2 3,513 8,599 5,185
2012-3 4,087 9,074 5,482
2012-4 4,827 9,856 5,966
2013-1 8,209 17,832 10,762
2013-2 9,232 18,340 11,088
2013-3 10,103 18,880 11,443
2013-4 10,863 19,397 11,801
Sales increase in 3 years 56,690 124,904 75,199
Total increase long-term 184,049 403,558 267,741
Total increase in 10 years 168,131 373,748 245,687
Government spending per EV $5,022 $2,290 $ 3,452
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Figure 1.1: National Quarterly EV Sales and Public Charging Stations
Source: Author’s calculations using Hybridcars.com monthly sales dashboard data and electric
charging station location data by Alternative Fuel Data Center of the Department of Energy.
Note: The quarterly EV sales plotted include both BEV and PHEV sales.
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Figure 1.2: Spatial Distribution of EVs and Public Charging Stations
Panel (a) Installed Base of EVs Per Million People
,
Panel (b) Public Charging Stations Per Million People
Note: Map boundaries define metropolitan statistical areas. Both graphs are shown for the
fourth quarter of 2013).
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Figure 1.3: Steady State Solution and Stability
Note: qt is the number of new EV sales in each period. qt = G(qt−1) is the implicit function
defined in equation (1.3). q∗ is the steady state solution.
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Figure 1.4: Impacts of Income Tax Credits (5 periods) under Feedback
Loops
Panel (a) EV Sales Increase Due to Feedback Loops
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Panel (b) Charging Stations Increase Due to Feedback Loops
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Note: The simulated subsidy effects are due to a policy design that gives EV buyers a tax credit
of $7,500 for the first five periods.
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Figure 1.5: Policy Comparison and Relative Strengthen of Indirect Net-
work Effects
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Note: This figure depicts the relationship between the relative policy effects of two subsidy de-
signs and the relative strengthen of the indirect network effects on both sides of the EV market.
Policy 1 subsides the EV purchase by tax credits and policy 2 uses the same amount of funding
subsidizing charging stations. Given a price elasticity of EVs, Policy 2 becomes more and more
effective than Policy 1 when the effect of charging stations on EV demand (denoted by β1) be-
comes larger relative to the effect of EV stock on charging stations (denoted by γ1). When the
magnitude of the price elasticity increases (decreases) and consumers are more (less) sensitive
to prices, policy 2 becomes less (more) effective relative to policy 1 for a given ratio of β1/ γ1.
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Figure 1.6: Sales Impacts from Two Subsidy Policies
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Note: Each data point represents EV sales increase by quarter due to the policy. Policy 1 gives
new EV buyers a tax credit of $2,500-$7,500 based on different models as the current income tax
credit policy for EVs. Policy 2 builds charging stations in all MSAs with the same total spending
as policy 1 by assuming a charging station investment cost with a lower bound cost of $27,000
and an upper bound of $50,244.
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Figure 1.7: Heterogeneous Policy Effectiveness (Policy2/Policy1)
Note: Policy 1 gives new EV buyers a tax credit of of $2,500-$7,500 based on different models as
the current income tax credit policy for EVs. Policy 2 builds charging stations in all MSAs with
the same budgetary cost as policy 1 assuming the investment cost per station being $27,000. The
figure plots the ratio of the EV increases due to the two subsidy policies. The policy effectiveness
of policy 2 varies across locations due to the heterogeneous impacts of public charging stations
on the EV demand. The regions with the dots are locations where policy 1 is more effective.
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CHAPTER 2
THE SUBSTITUTION PATTERN OF ELECTRIC VEHICLES
2.1 Introduction
The electrification of the transportation sector through the diffusion of plug-in
electric vehicles (EVs), coupled with cleaner electricity generation, is consid-
ered a promising pathway to reduce air pollution from on-road vehicles and to
strengthen energy security. Different from conventional gasoline vehicles with
internal combustion engines, EVs use electricity stored in rechargeable batter-
ies to power the motor and the electricity comes from external power sources.
When operated in all-electric mode, EVs consume no gasoline and produce zero
tailpipe emissions. But emissions shift from on-road vehicles to electricity gen-
eration, which uses domestic fuel source. The environmental benefits of pro-
moting EVs critically depend on the fuel source of electricity generation [48]
and also what types of cars do the policy-induced EV replace. The environmen-
tal implication of replacing a gasoline vehicle with lower fuel efficiency would
be different from replacing a hybrid vehicle (HEV) with higher fuel economy.
Since the introduction of the mass-market models into the U.S. in late 2010,
monthly sales of EVs have increased from 345 in December 2010 to 13,388 in
December 2015.1 Despite the rapid growth, the market share of electric cars is
still small: the total EV sales only made up 0.82% of the new vehicle market
in 2015 (Figure 2.1). To overcome the barriers to wider adoption of EVs such
as high purchase cost, limited driving range, the lack of charging infrastruc-
1From 1996 to 1998, GM introduced over 1000 first-generation EVs (EV1) in California,
mostly made available through leases. In 2003, GM crushed their EVs upon the expiration of
the leases.
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ture and long charging time, both the federal and state governments provide
different forms of incentives. The federal government provides federal income
tax credit to new qualified EVs based on each vehicle’s battery capacity and the
gross vehicle weight rating, with the amount ranging from $2,500 to $7,500. Sev-
eral states have established additional state-level incentives to further promote
EV adoption such as tax exemptions and rebates for EVs and non-monetary in-
centives such as HOV lane access, toll reduction and free parking. In addition,
federal, state and local governments provide funding to support charging sta-
tion deployment. For example, the Department of Energy provided ECOtality
Inc. $115 million grant to build residential and public charging stations in 22
U.S. cities in collaboration with local project partners.
A potential problem associated with the direct subsidy to consumers is that
the policy may not lead to ”additionality” in the sense that many of the EV buy-
ers may still purchase EVs even if there were no subsidy. Since early adopters
of EVs are those who favor the newest technology and who have the strongest
environmental awareness and usually have higher income, 2 it is more likely
that the effect of a uniform subsidy policy such as the current federal income
tax credit policy in terms of boosting additional EV sales is limited. Califor-
nia Clean Vehicle Rebate Program (CVRP) used to offer incentives of $1,500
to PHEVs and $2,500 to BEVs, but the majority of the rebates went to house-
holds with higher-income. In order to direct the rebates towards households
who value the rebates most, CVRP has been redesigned such that lower-income
households will be able to claim more generous rebates. The households with
income less that 300 percent of Federal Poverty Limit will be able to get $3,000
2According to California Plug-in Electric Vehicle Owner Survey (2014), among buyers of
conventional new vehicles, 15% of households have annual household income over $150,000
while that share is 54% among EV buyers.
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for PHEVs and $4,000 for BEVs, and the households with gross annul income
above certain thresholds are no longer eligible for the rebates: $250,000 for sin-
gle filers, $340,000 for head-of-household filers and $500,000 for joint filers.
Moreover, even if the tax credits make additional EV purchases by making
potential consumers to switch from other fuel types to EVs, the policy effects
in terms of environmental benefits may still not be additional if they replace
vehicles with fuel efficiency that is already high. First, the emission reduction
of additional EVs depend largely on the emission from generating the electric-
ity that is used to fuel EVs, which varies significantly across locations. In some
locations where electricity comes mainly from coal-fired generation, EVs even
generate negative environmental benefits if they replace their gasoline counter-
parts [48]. Second, the emission reduction from additional EVs also depend on
which vehicles were replaced by EVs, or the fuel economy of the forgone ve-
hicles when consumers purchase EVs. The lower the difference in emissions
between EVs and the vehicles that consumers would have purchased without
the subsidy, the lower the emission reduction. The substitution pattern between
EVs and other fuel types is thus critical when evaluating the environmental ben-
efits of promoting EVs.
Taking advantage of a survey data set of U.S. new vehicle buyers from 2010
to 2014 which are rich in consumer demographic variables and a national level
automobile registration data set with vehicle model and fuel type breakdowns,
this study is able to estimate a demand model of U.S new automobile market
and investigate the substitution pattern of EV models, which could provide in-
sight of the environmental implications of different EV models and guidance
of implementing more effective subsidy programs. With the estimated parame-
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ters for consumer preference, this study is also going to simulate counterfactual
market outcomes when removing the EVs from the market or removing the fed-
eral EV subsidy to examine the substitution pattern of the EV market and the
cost-effectiveness of the federal income tax credits policy in terms of reducing
emissions from the vehicle fleet. When evaluating the environmental benefits of
EVs, Holland et al. (2016) [48] assigned each electric vehicle a substitute gasoline
vehicle that captures the closest substitution in terms of non-price attributes. As
a robustness check, they also rely on the survey data where consumers report al-
ternative vehicle choices to form the substitute gasoline vehicles. However, this
approach assumes that all sales of a specific EV model replaces the same sub-
stitute gasoline vehicle, which is often not the case in reality. For example, due
to consumer heterogenous preferences, some Nissan Leafs replace Toyota Prius,
and other Nissan Leafs might replace Ford Fusion. In addition, this approach re-
quires having a representative sample of consumers who report second choices
for each EV model, which might not be available in some cases. 3 Unlike us-
ing survey data solely to assign a substitute model for each EV, we estimate a
vehicle demand model incorporating both aggregate sales data and micro-level
survey data. The estimated own- and cross-price elasticities can directly reflect
the substitution pattern between EVs and vehicles of other fuel types. The re-
covered consumer preference parameters can also help us conduct simulations
to directly quantify the emission difference between the observed EV sales and
the simulated replaced vehicles, and also the impact of the subsidy programs in
boosting EV sales.
This study directly contributes to the following three strands of literature.
3Holland et al. (2016) [48] use create a composite substitute gasoline vehicle for each EV by
taking the weighted average of emissions of the top gasoline substitute vehicles reported in the
survey. But they do not have substitute choice data for certain EV models including Honda Fit
EV, Fiat 500 EV, and BYD e6.
64
First, our study adds to the emerging literature on the market of electric vehi-
cles. Congressional Budget Office (2012) [21] estimates the effect of income tax
credits for EV buyers based on previous research on the effects of similar tax
credits on conventional hybrid vehicles and finds that the tax credit could con-
tribute to nearly 30% of future EV sales. DeShazo et al. (2014)[29] use a state-
wide survey of new car buyers in California to estimate price elasticities and
willingness to pay for different vehicles and then simulate the effect of different
rebate designs. They estimate that the rebate policy in California that offered all
income classes the same rebate of $2,500 for BEVs and $1,500 for PHEVs lead
to a 7% increase in EV sales. Helveston et al. (2015) [46] model consumer pref-
erences for conventional, hybrid, and electric vehicles in China and U.S. using
data from choice-based conjoint surveys and and simulate the market shares of
EVs under different subsidy amounts. Their results suggest that BEVs have a
larger share in China than in U.S. and the share of low-range PHEVs is higher in
U.S. than in China when both of the two countries have comparable subsidies.
Their study also finds that older, wealthier and more educated consumers, es-
pecially those who own multiple vehicles and have children in households, are
less senstive to upfront and operating costs of EVs. Dimitropoulos et al. (2016)
[31] evaluates the effects of the favorable tax treatment of electric vehicles in the
company car market by using data from a new survey among Dutch company
car drivers. They also analyze drivers’ sensitivity to changes in applicable tax
base rates and other vehicle characteristics and find that drivers are sensitive
to changes in tax base rates and there exist substantial heterogeneity in drivers’
sensitivity to company car’s list prices. Using market-level sales data, Li et al.
(2016) [70] offered the first study in quantifying the role of indirect network ef-
fects in the EV market and their implications on government subsidies. They
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find in the EV market which exhibits indirect network effects, indirectly sub-
sidizing charging stations is more effective in increasing EV sales considering
early adopters are less price sensitive. Springel (2016) [91] estimates a structural
model of consumer vehicle choice and charging station entry in Norwegian EV
market and compare the effectiveness of direct purchasing price subsidies with
charging stations subsidies. Li (2017) [68] studies the effect of compatibility in
U.S. EV market where three incompatible standards for charging stations exist.
She shows that mandating compatibility in charging standards would increase
the sales of EVs. Our study differs from the earlier work by taking a structural
method to estimate the demand of U.S. automobile market with all the vehi-
cle models included and focusing on the substitution pattern between electric
vehicles and the vehicles of other fuel types.
Second, our analysis contributes to the rich literature on the diffusion of ve-
hicles with advanced fuel technologies (e.g., hybrid vehicles) and alternative fu-
els (e.g., FFVs). Kahn (2007) [55], Kahn and Vaughn (2009)[56], and Sexton and
Sexton (2014) [89] examine the role of consumer environmental awareness and
signaling in the market for conventional hybrid vehicles. Heutel and Muehleg-
ger (2012) [47] study the effect of consumer learning in hybrid vehicle adoption
focusing on different diffusion paths of Honda Insight and Toyota Prius. Several
recent studies have examined the impacts of government programs both at the
federal and state levels in promoting the adoption of hybrid vehicles including
Diamond (2009) [30], Beresteanu and Li (2011) [11], Gallagher and Muehleg-
ger (2011) [38] and Sallee (2011) [88]. Diamond (2009) [30] finds that the effects
of monetary incentives on consumer adoption are weak, which could result in
incentive payments effectively creating a subsidy for the highest income con-
sumers without significantly affecting their purchase decisions. The monetary
66
incentives may be rewarding those who need the incentive the least for a pur-
chase they would have made anyway. Huse (2014) [50] examines the impact of
government subsidy in Sweden on consumer adoption of FFVs and the environ-
mental impacts when consumers subsequently choose to use gasoline instead of
ethanol due to low gasoline prices. Based on naturalistic driving data, Langer
and McRae (2014) [62] show that a larger network of E85 fueling stations would
reduce the time cost of fueling and hence increase the adoption of FFVs. These
previous studies consistently find better environmental awareness, higher gaso-
line price and more generous incentives are associated with higher adoption of
the ”green” vehicles. Some also examine the effects of different subsidy formats
and find that sales tax waiver and HOV incentives could have more significant
impact than income tax credits.
Third, our analysis relates to the literature that studies the cost-effectiveness
of energy subsidy programs. Allcott et al. (2015) [1] find that some energy effi-
ciency subsidies are poorly-targeted and are primarily taken up by consumers
who are wealthier and more informed about energy costs. They conclude that
restricting subsidy eligibility could increase the welfare gains from those subsi-
dies. Boomhower and Davis (2014) [19] find that half of all participants would
have adopted the energy-efficient technology even with no subsidy. Ito (2015)
[51] finds that most of the treatment effects of incentives come from consumers
who are closer to the target level of consumption, and that the treatment effect
is not significantly different from zero for consumers who are far from the target
level. Fowlie et al. (2015) [37] find evidence that high non-monetary costs con-
tribute to the low participation of energy efficiency investment for households
and there are demographic differences between households who chose to par-
ticipate by themselves and who were encouraged to participate in the program
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by encouragement intervention. By empirically estimating the vehicle demand
model and recover consumer preference parameters, we are able to run conter-
factual analysis to examine the welfare impact of current subsidy design and
quantify to what extent does the subsidy increase the sales of EVs.
Section 2.2 briefly describes the industry and policy background of the study
and the data. Section 2.3 presents the empirical model and estimation strategy.
Section 2.4 presents the estimation results of the substitution. In section 2.5, we
present the counterfactual simulations to evaluate the environmental benefits of
the introduction of EVs and the impact of the EV subsidy. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Industry and Policy Background and Data
In this section, we first present industry background focusing on important bar-
riers to EV adoption and then discuss current government policies. Next we
present the data used in the empirical analysis.
2.2.1 Industry background
There are currently two types of EVs: battery electric vehicles (BEVs) which run
exclusively on high-capacity batteries (e.g., Nissan LEAF), and plug-in hybrid
vehicles (PHEVs) which use batteries to power an electric motor and use an-
other fuel (gasoline) to power a combustion engine (e.g., Chevrolet Volt). As
depicted in Figure 2.1, monthly EV sales increased from less than 2,000 in the
first month of 2011 to nearly 120,000 in December of 2014. Nevertheless, the EV
market is still very small: EV sales only made up 0.82% of the total new vehicle
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sales in the U.S. in 2015.
The diffusion of electric vehicles together with a clean electricity grid can be
an effective combination in reducing local air pollution, greenhouse gas emis-
sions and oil dependency. The EV technology is widely considered as represent-
ing the future of passenger vehicles. The International Energy Agency projects
that by 2050, EVs have the potential to account for 50% of the light duty vehi-
cle sales.4 Many countries around the world have developed goals to develop
the EV market and provide support to promote the diffusion of this technology
[74].5
EVs are more expensive than their conventional gasoline vehicle counter-
parts. The manufacturer’s suggested retail prices (MSRP) for the 2015 model
of Nissan Leaf and Chevrolet Volt are $29,010 and $34,345, respectively, while
the average price for a comparable conventional vehicle (e.g., Nissan Sentra,
Chevrolet Cruze, Ford Focus and Honda Civic) is between $16,000 and $18,000.
To reduce the price gap between EVs and their gasoline counterparts, the En-
ergy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, and later the American Clean En-
ergy and Security Act of 2009 grant federal income tax credit for new qualified
EVs. The minimum credit is $2,500 and the credit may be up to $7,500, based
on each vehicle’s battery capacity and the gross vehicle weight rating. More-
over, several states have established additional state-level incentives to further
promote EV adoption such as tax exemptions and rebates for EVs and non-
monetary incentives such as HOV lane access, toll reduction and free parking.
California through the Clean Vehicle Rebate Project offers $2,500 rebate to BEV
4Hydrogen vehicles (not yet mass-produced) will account for the majority of the remainder.
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/EV PHEV Roadmap.pdf.
5The Chinese government provides rebate of over $9,000 to BEV buyers and nearly $8,000
for PHEV buyers. The UK government offers a grant of up to $7,800 to EV buyers. In Japan, EV
buyers were eligible for a subsidy of up to $10,000 in 2013 and $8,500 in 2014.
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buyers and $1,500 rebate to PHEV buyers. In addition, federal, state and local
governments provide funding to support charging station deployment. For ex-
ample, the Department of Energy provided ECOtality Inc. $115 million grant to
build residential and public charging stations in 22 U.S. cities in collaboration
with local project partners.
A potential problem associated with the direct subsidy to consumers is that
the subsidy may not always result in additional EV sales in the sense that many
of the buyers who claim the subsidy may still purchase EVs even if there were
no subsidy policy. Since early adopters of EVs are those who favor the newest
technology and who have the strongest environmental awareness and usually
have higher income, it is more likely that the effect of a uniform subsidy policy,
such as the current federal EV income tax credit, on boosting additional EV
sales is limited. California Clean Vehicle Rebate Program (CVRP) used to offer
incentives of $1,500 to PHEVs and $2,500 to BEVs, but the majority of the rebates
went to households with high income. In order to direct the rebates towards
households who value the rebates most, CVRP has been redesigned such that
lower-income households will be able to claim a larger rebate. The households
with income less that 300% of Federal Poverty Limit will be able to get $3,000 for
PHEVs and $4,000 for BEVs, and the households with gross annul income above
certain thresholds are no longer eligible for the rebates: $250,000 for single filers,
$340,000 for head-of-household filers and $500,000 for joint filers.
Another potential problem with the subsidy is related to the substitution
pattern. One of the justifications for EV subsidies is to reduce the emissions
from the transportation sector by replacing fuel-inefficient vehicles with EVs.
However, when upstream emissions are taken into account, substantial hetero-
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geneity of the environmental benefits could exist. For example, EVs may not
have an advantage over conventional vehicles in locations where the electric-
ity is generated through fossil fuels. Thus, even if the EV subsidy results in
additional EV purchases, the reduction of overall emissions would be limited.
By incorporating spatial heterogeneity of damages and pollution export across
jurisdictions, Holland et al. (2016)[49] find considerable heterogeneity in en-
vironmental benefits of EV adoption depending on the location and argue for
regionally differentiated EV policy. They find the environmental benefits of EVs
being the largest in California due to large damages from gasoline vehicles and
a relatively clean electric grid and the benefits to be negative in places such as
North Dakota where the conditions are reversed.
The fuel economy of the vehicles that get replaced by EVs due to subsidy will
determine the effectiveness of the EV subsidy in terms of addressing the envi-
ronmental externalities. An potential efficiency loss could arise if the subsidy
does not induce people to switch from a gas guzzler to an EV but from another
fuel-efficient gasoline vehicle to an EV, or another hybrid vehicle to an EV, mak-
ing little net gain of environmental benefits. Holland et al. (2016) [49]evaluate
the heterogenous environmental benefits of EVs by comparing the externalities
of EVs with their gasoline counterparts. However, the relative environmental
benefits would be smaller if a higher fuel-efficient vehicle such as a hybrid vehi-
cle is compared. At the national average fuel mix, BEVs and PHEVs do not have
an advantage over hybrid vehicles in the emission reduction and PHEVs even
generate more emissions than hybrid vehicles (Table 2.2). With the expiration of
the tax credits for hybrid vehicles, the income tax credits for EVs are very likely
to encourage consumers who would otherwise purchase hybrid vehicles to pur-
chase EVs. Table 2.1 shows that as the market share of EVs increase in most re-
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cent years, the market share of hybrids started to decline. As the gasoline price
increases, the efficacy of the government subsidy for EVs in terms of reducing
emissions is further weakened since more consumers would be induced by the
market incentive to adopt EVs in the absence of subsidy. Chandra et al. (2010)
[22] find that the rebate programs in Canada primarily subsidize people who
would have bought hybrid vehicles or fuel-efficient cars in any case and they
may not be the most effective way to encourage people to switch away from
fuel-inefficient vehicles like large SUVs or luxury sport passenger cars, at least
in the short or medium run.
2.2.2 Data
There are three main data sets used to estimate the model of vehicle demand.
The first source is the household-level survey data of the Maritz Research U.S.
New Vehicle Customer Study, which is a monthly survey of households that
purchased or leased new vehicles. The data provides detailed information of
demographic characteristics of households who purchased each vehicle, and
the alternative vehicles they considered while making the purchase decisions.6
We use survey data for five model-years: MY 2010 -MY 2014, the first 5 years
after the introduction of mass-market EVs, and each model year is defined as
September of the previous calendar year to August of the current calendar year
(For example, MY 2011 is defined as September 2010-August 2011). For com-
putational purposes, we draw a sample of 11,628 transactions from the cleaned
6We only include the most seriously considered models (second choices) in our sample.
Many respondents do not report the third and fourth choices. Incorporating the third and fourth
choices increase the estimation burden. In order to free up more computation space to include
more observations to have more variation in observed consumer characteristics, we did not
include the third and fourth choices.
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sample after removing observations with missing observed consumer attributes
or information on the purchased and seriously considered models, and end up
having 1,509, 1,860, 2,287, 2,899, and 3,073 transactions for MY 2010-14 respec-
tively. As the market share of EVs is tiny, in order to include enough EV obser-
vations to have enough variation in consumer demographic attributes for EV
buyers to identify the different demographic’s preference for EVs, we use non-
random sampling by including all EV observations from the survey sample and
randomly draw observations for the other fuel types. To adjust for non-random
sampling, we then follow Manski and Lerman (1977) [73] to include a weighted
exogenous sampling maximum likelihood (WESML) by re-weighting the each
observation in the likelihood. The weight is defined by the actual market share
in the population divided by the within sample market share.
Table 2.3 summarizes the demographic information for the households who
made those purchase transactions. The average household income for the sur-
vey respondents in the sample is $140,448, which is larger than the average
household income of $117,795 for married couples in the U.S. considering we
over-drew consumers who purchased EVs.7 The average household size is 2.66
and 63.9% of the heads of household have earned a college degree. 66.1% of
the respondents are from an urban or suburban areas with an average commut-
ing of 25.6 minutes and average gasoline price of $3.48 during the survey time.
About 50% of the sampled households selected a light truck and the average
price of the vehicles that the sampled households purchased is $33,451. The
average MPG of the purchased vehicles is 34.8.
The survey data is merged with Wards data which provide detailed at-
tributes of each vehicle model for each corresponding model year, including
7Data source: IRS Statistics of Income, 2014.
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horsepower, size, curb weight, wheelbase, and fuel economy. The data set is
further complemented by aggregate vehicle sales data, which provide market-
level information of vehicle demand, obtained from registration data complied
by IHS Automotive. The IHS data record the quarterly number of registrations
for each car model, broken down by fuel type, which are aggregated to model
year level to construct the market share for each vehicle model in each model
year. All of the above data sets are matched at a model-fuel-type level, for exam-
ple, Toyota Prius-hybrid. The total number of vehicle models that are defined
in the choice set are 424, 404, 417, 441 and 459 respectively for MYs 2010-2014.
We obtain detailed information on locations and open dates of all charging
stations from the Alternative Fuel Data Center (AFDC) of the Department of
Energy. By matching the ZIP code of each charging station to an MSA and
using the station open date, we construct the total number of public charging
stations available in each quarter for each MSA. From the American Chamber
of Commerce cost-of-living index database, we collect quarterly gasoline prices
for each MSA from 2008 to 2013. Household demographics are collected from
the American Community Survey.
2.3 Empirical Model and Estimation
In this section, we discuss our empirical model and estimation strategy. We
estimate the vehicle demand using random coefficient discrete choice model in
the spirit of Berry et al. (1995,2004) [14] [15], Petrin (2002) [81] and Train and
Winston (2007) [94].
74
2.3.1 Vehicle Demand
The consumer characteristics we observe are not representative of the entire
population since the consumer-level data we observe is only for people who
choose to buy new vehicles during the specific period of time. Therefore, we
will estimate the substitution pattern conditioning on buying a new vehicle.
Our approach will not be able to capture the substitution between the new ve-
hicle models and the outside option: buying a used car, continuing using their
old vehicle, or relying on public transportation. Our estimates will provide the
information that what types of vehicles that the policy induced EVs actually
replace conditioning on households choosing to purchase a new vehicle. Con-
sidering that consumers who purchase EVs are those who are more attentive to
environmental impact and the newest technology, the group of consumers who
would only purchase EVs with the subsidy but choose not to buy a new vehicle
without the subsidy would be small. Therefore, the impact of not modeling the
outside option on the evaluation of the subsidy effectiveness is limited.
Household i’s utility from purchasing vehicle model j is defined as:
ui j =
K∑
k=1
x jkβ¯k − α1lnp j + ξ j︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
δ j
+α2
lnp j
Yi
+
∑
kr
x jkzirβokr +
∑
k
x jkvikβuk︸                                         ︷︷                                         ︸
µi j
+εi j (2.1)
where δ j is the mean utility of vehicle model j which is constant across con-
sumers in the same market. The x jk stands for the kth vehicle attribute for model
j, and we include horsepower, weight, gallons per mile, and some vehicle seg-
ment dummy variables as the observed vehicle attributes. The price p j is the
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average transaction price observed from the survey data, which is constant for
a same model in all locations. The logarithm of price is employed to make the
price effect decrease as the price of a vehicle model increases.
The second component µi j captures heterogeneous utility driven by both ob-
served and unobserved consumer characteristics. Yi is household i’s income in
the corresponding year and 1/Yi captures how a household’s income influences
their price sensitivity. One would expect α2 to be negative as higher income
households would be less sensitive to a price increase due to the diminishing
marginal utility of money. zir denotes consumer i’s other demographic vari-
ables including family size, education level, whether living in an urban area,
the average gasoline price and the number of charging stations in the area,
which are interacted with certain vehicle attributes to capture variation in con-
sumer preference due to observed heterogeneity. The unobserved consumer
taste vik is assumed to have a standard normal distribution. The coefficient βuk
can be interpreted as the standard deviation in the unobserved preference for
the vehicle attribute k conditional on the consumer’s observed attributes. Let
θ1 = {βokr, βuk}, denoting the “nonlinear” parameters, and it is understood that
the vector δ = {δ1, ..., δ j} is estimated conditional on a given θ1. The last compo-
nent εi j is the idiosyncratic preference of household i for vehicle model j and
it is assumed to have an i.i.d. Type 1 extreme value distribution. The Maritz
data includes vehicle models that consumers seriously considered other than
the purchased model, which allows for a ranking of both the first and second
vehicle choice. Thus, the joint probability of household i choosing j and seri-
ously considering h as an alternative choice when the outside option and j are
removed is:
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Pi jh =
∫
exp[δ j(θ1) + µi j(θ1)]
1 +
∑
g exp[δg(θ1) + µig(θ1)]
· exp[δh(θ1) + µih(θ1)]∑
g, j exp[δg(θ1) + µig(θ1)]
f (v)dv (2.2)
The probability of observing household i choosing model j is conditional on
the household’s vi vector and the probability is calculated by integrating over
the distribution of v. The market demand is the sum of individual consumers’
demand and the predicted market share is calculated by calculating Pi j with
parameters θ = {βokr, βuk} and δ = δ1, ..., δ j and averaging over the N consumers in
the survey sample. We back out the mean utility fixed effects from equating the
predicted market shares with the actual market shares from our sales data:
S j = Sˆ j(θ, δ(θ, S )) =
∑
n
Pi j(θ, δ(θ, S ))/N (2.3)
We include dummy variables for all vehicles models in our sample to esti-
mate consumers’ average value of utility from each vehicle. In the numerical
search for maximum of the likelihood function, δ is calculated for each trial
value of θ. We estimate δ by contraction mapping following Berry et al. (1995):
δtj(θ, S ) = δ
t−1
j (θ, S ) + ln(S j) − ln(Sˆ j(θ, δt−1(θ, S ))) (2.4)
We then recover the parameters in mean utility following specification:
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δ j = −α1lnp j +
K∑
k=1
x jkβ¯k + ξ j
where ξ j denotes the unobserved vehicle attributes of model j. To control for
the correlation of price with the unobserved product attributes, following Train
and Winston (2007) [94] , we use BLP-style instruments Z j that measures the
sum of distance and squared distance in attribute space between own product
and other products in the same firm and from other firms.
2.3.2 Identification
Consumer utility is comprised by three parts: the mean utility portion, the
observed heterogeneity component, and the unobserved heterogeneity com-
ponent. The linear parameters in the mean utility partβ¯ and α1 are identified
through the variation in market shares corresponding to variation in price and
other observed vehicle attributes. Due to the potential correlation between price
and the unobserved vehicle attributes ξ j, functions of attributes of other compet-
ing products that capture the intensity of competition are used as instruments
to provide an exogenous variation in price.
The nonlinear parameters βokr and α2 in the observed individual heterogene-
ity component are identified with the aid of demographic information observed
for different households who purchased different vehicle models. For exam-
ple, if we observe households with a higher education level disproportionately
purchased more electric vehicles, we would expect a positive coefficient for the
interaction between household education level and the EV dummy. If higher
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income groups tend to be less price sensitive to vehicle prices and dispropor-
tionately buy more expensive vehicle models, we would expect a negative sign
for α2, which captures the impact of income on consumers’ price sensitivity.
The unobserved consumer heterogeneity parameters βuk governs the substi-
tution pattern and are mainly identified by the substitution patterns observed
from the consumer alternative vehicle choice data. The alternative choices are
the choices that consumers make in a choice set where the observed purchased
choice is removed. The proximity in the vehicle attributes between the pur-
chased vehicle choice and the alternative vehicle choice facilitates identifying
the unobserved heterogeneity parameters βuk . For example, if consumers’ pur-
chased vehicles and their second choices are often within a certain range for
fuel cost, we would expect a statistically significant coefficient for the parameter
associated with gallons/mile. Our data sample includes only surveyed house-
holds who report both the purchased and alternative vehicle choices, which
provides significant identification power in estimating the random coefficients.
Berry et al.(2004)[15] note that having micro-level 2nd choice data greatly helps
the estimation of random coefficients when they only have observations for one
market year and Train and Winston (2007)[94] also mention that including alter-
native choice data significantly improves the precision of the random coefficient
estimates.
2.4 Estimation Results
We first report parameter estimates for the random coefficient model and the use
there estimates to calculate price elasticities to show the substitution pattern.
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2.4.1 Parameter Estimates
Table 2.4 & 2.5 report the estimation results of the demand model. The mean
utility δ represents the average preference consumers have for each vehicle
model and are estimated via matching the model predicted market share to the
observed market share. The mean preference coefficients for price and each ob-
served vehicle attribute are recovered from IV estimation with the instruments
correcting for the endogeneity of price. Both OLS and IV results are reported
in Table 2.4 and reflect the preferences for vehicle attributes that are generally
expected. In average, consumers have a negative preference for price and the
price coefficient in the IV specification is more negative, suggesting OLS un-
derestimates the price sensitivity. Consumers have a positive preference for
acceleration, measure by horsepower/weight, and also prefer heavier vehicles.
Without interacting with gasoline price, the coefficient for gallons/mile is posi-
tive, suggestion average consumers do not like fuel-efficient cars but prefer cars
that are more powerful. Consumers in general dislike AFVs and EVs, proba-
bly due to limited model choices and unfamiliarity with the new technology.
Conditional on other vehicle attributes, consumers do not have a significantly
different preference for pickup trucks relative to passenger cars. The positive
signs for MY 2011-14 dummies suggest that consumers prefer vehicles in later
model years relative to MY 2010, controlling for other vehicle attributes.
Turning to the consumer heterogeneity parameters, with the aid from the in-
dividual transaction data, the interaction terms of consumer demographics with
vehicle attributes are estimated precisely with intuitive signs. The coefficient of
log(price) divided by income captures the extent to which a consumer’s price
sensitivity varies with income. The negative sign of the estimate suggests that
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households with lower income react more negatively to a vehicle’s price than
households with higher income. The elasticities implied from the price prefer-
ence will be further discussed below. Households of a larger family size prefer
larger vehicles that are heavier. Compared with households who live in subur-
ban and rural areas, households who live in urban areas are less likely to adopt
pickups, probably due to less towing utility and limited parking space, but are
more interested in EVs due to both more frequent city driving needs and bet-
ter refueling infrastructure provided in urban areas. The interaction of gasoline
price with gallons/mile, which measures the operating cost per mile of the ve-
hicle, has a negative sign, suggesting that consumers have a negative preference
for the fuel cost. The estimation results also suggest that consumers with better
education and live in cities with more charging stations are more likely to adopt
EVs.
Four random coefficients are included, which represent unobserved con-
sumer heterogenous preference for gallons/mile, horsepower/weight, light
trucks, and AFVs. As indicated by the estimation results, data on consumers’
alternative vehicle choices greatly helps precisely identifying those parameters.
Based on the standard normal distribution of the random taste vik, the coefficient
βuk can be interpreted as the standard deviation in the unobserved preference for
the vehicle attribute k. To reduce simulation noise and bias, following [94], we
use 150 Halton draws in the simulation of the integral over the unobserved con-
sumer taste v. 8 All of the four coefficients are statistically significant, indicating
that consumers have heterogenous preference for those vehicle attributes condi-
tional on the observed consumer characteristics. Those precisely estimated ran-
dom coefficient parameters help breaking down the I.I.A. problem experienced
8Halton draws are a type of low-discrepancy sequence. The demand results are similar when
the number of Halton draws are increased to 200.
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in traditional logit models and play a critical role in governing the substitution
patterns.
2.4.2 Elasticities and Substitution Pattern
The demand system implies sensible elasticities. All implied own-price elas-
ticties are greater than one, ranging from -3.97 to -2.37 with an average being
-2.67 and standard deviation being 0.21. The sales-weighted average elastic-
ity among all the 2,146 products in five model years is -2.75. The magnitude
of the own-price elasticities are slightly smaller than those obtained in Berry et
al.(1995)[14], Petrin (2002) [81], Beresteanu and Li (2011) [11] and Li (2012) [69].
Figure 2.2 plots the own-price elasticities against price and demonstrates that
more expensive models tend to have less elastic demand. Table 2.6 demonstrate
the cross-price elasticities for a selected group of models. One obvious pattern
is that the demand for less expensive models tend to be more price sensitive.
More expensive models such as Tesla Model S have lower own-price elastici-
ties in magnitude. Compared with other conventional gasoline vehicles, elec-
tric vehicles such as Nissan Leaf and Chevrolet Volt have a larger cross-price
elasticity with hybrid vehicles such as Toyota Prius. Battery electric vehicles
such as Nissan Leaf and Tesla Model S do not have a large cross-price elastici-
ties with plug-in hybrid vehicles such as Chevrolet Volt. BEVs can only run on
electricity and many of them have limited range. PHEVs, on the other hand,
rely on gasoline mode to boost the range, since the electric range is only around
30-40 miles. These two different kinds of plug-in vehicles are likely to attract
consumers with different driving needs as consumers who have more frequent
long-distance travels are more likely to adopt PHEVs. Therefore, it makes sense
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that no strong substitution exists between PHEVs and BEVs especially when
there were only few models during at early deployment stage. Ford F-150, the
only pickup truck in the sample, does not have much substitution with the other
small and mid-sized sedans and it has almost zero substitution with EV models.
The substitution pattern indicates that consumers who purchase EVs generally
favor mid-sized sedans that are relatively fuel efficient rather than large vehi-
cles.
Table 2.7 summarizes the elasticity estimates by fuel type. Across different
fuel types, the sale-weighted own-price elasticities are similar since all fuel types
include vehicle models with a large price range. Each cell in the cross-price
elasticity matrix represents the average sales change of a vehicle model of a
particular fuel type due to a price change from another vehicle model of other
fuel type. For example, a 10% increase in the price of hybrid vehicle model
will increase the sales of a BEV model by 0.37% in average, and a 10% increase
in the price of another BEV model will increase the sales of a BEV model by
0.13%. Both BEVs and PHEVs have a larger cross-price elasticity with respect
to hybrid vehicle models than gasoline, diesel and FFV models, suggesting EV
buyers prefer vehicles with better fuel economy. Due to the large selection of
model choices, gasoline vehicle is a major substitute fuel type for vehicles of all
fuel types. Since our data mostly cover the first few years after the introduction
of EVs, the within segment substitution for BEVs and PHEVs is relatively small
considering that we do not have enough between-segment variation to identify
a strong substitution between EV models.
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2.5 Counterfactual Analysis
In this section, we conduct simulations to examine the counterfactual vehicle
fleet when all the EV models were removed or when the EV subsidy were re-
moved. The magnitude of the resulting sales changes of the other fuel types
could suggest what types of cars were replaced by EVs. The estimated substitu-
tion pattern is then translated into emission reduction to assess the environmen-
tal benefits of the EV subsidy. The simulation results could provide guidance for
future policy designs that intend to better promote alternative fuel technologies.
2.5.1 The Environmental Benefits of EVs
The introduction of EVs could make consumers who would originally choose
gasoline vehicles or hybrid vehicles to purchase EVs, and the substitution pat-
tern critically determines the environmental benefits of promoting EVs. To ex-
amine the substitution pattern of EVs with other fuel types, we conduct a con-
terfactual exercise where all EVs are removed from the choice set. The resulting
sales changes of other fuel types will reveal what vehicles were replaced by
the introduction of EVs. Since we do not allow consumers to choose an out-
side option as the demand estimation is conditioning on buying a new vehicle,
consumers who purchased EVs would switch to another non-EV new vehicle
model. In 2014, 109,449 EVs were sold in the U.S. vehicle market. The sim-
ulation results suggest that 78.7% of EVs replaced conventional gasoline vehi-
cles, 12% of EVs replaced hybrid vehicles, 2.4% replaced diesel vehicles and
the remaining 6.9% replaced flexible fuel vehicles (Table 2.8). The average fuel
economy of the vehicles that were replaced by EVs is 28.9 mpg. Among gaso-
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line vehicles replaced by EVs, 74% of them have fuel economy above 25 mpg.
The vehicle models that were replaced by EVs most are: Honda Accord, Toyota
Prius, Toyota Camry, Honda Civic, Toyota Corolla, Nissan Altima, and Chevro-
let Cruze. This substitution pattern suggests that EVs mainly attracted con-
sumers who were originally choosing mid-sized and fuel-efficient gasoline or
hybrid vehicles, rather than gas-guzzlers such as large SUVs or trucks.
To evaluate the environmental impact of the introduction of EVs, we evalu-
ate the total gasoline saved and CO2 emission reduction from EVs by comparing
the gasoline consumption of the actual vehicle fleet with the counterfactual fleet
without EVs. The existence of EVs helps saving lifetime gasoline consumption
of 0.51 billion gallons, resulting in a CO2 emission reduction up to 9.94 mil-
lions pounds.9 If we do not estimate the substitution pattern, but assume each
EV replaces a conventional gasoline vehicle of 23 mpg, the total lifetime gaso-
line saved would become 0.65 billion gallons, with a 12.8 billion pounds of CO2
emission reduction. Simply assuming EVs replace a gasoline vehicle of an av-
erage mpg would overestimate the environmental benefits of EVs by 27%. The
overestimated portion would be larger if EVs replace more fuel-efficient vehi-
cles such as hybrid vehicles.
2.5.2 Impact of Income Tax Credits
The federal government has adopted several policies to support the EV industry
including providing federal income tax credits for EV purchase, R& D support
for battery development, and funding for expanding charging infrastructure.
9Assuming the lifetime VMT for all cars is 195,264. In reality, EVs might have a larger VMT
than gasoline cars due to lower fuel cost or a lower VMT due to limited range and inconvenience
of charging.
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[21] estimates that the total budgetary cost for those policies will be about $7.5
billion through 2017. The tax credits for EV buyers account for about one-fourth
of the budgetary cost and are likely to have the greatest impact on vehicle sales.
Under the tax credits policy, EVs purchased in or after 2010 are eligible for a
federal income tax credit up to $7,500. Most popular EV models on the market
are eligible for the full amount. The credit will expire once 200,000 qualified EVs
have been sold by each manufacturer. In 2014, the federal spent 725.7 millions
dollars in providing EV buyers with the income tax credit. In order to exam-
ine the effectiveness of the income tax credit policy in terms of stimulating EV
sales, we use our parameters estimates to stimulate the counterfactual sales of
EVs that would arise in the absence of the tax credits to EV buyers in 2014. The
counterfactual sales could help us identify the percentage of “non-additional”
EV sales and also evaluate the environmental benefits of the policy. The result-
ing sales increase in gasoline and hybrid vehicles could help us evaluate the en-
vironmental benefits of the ”additional” EV sales. The short-run benefits could
be small if the additional sales simply come from people who were considering
buying other fuel-efficient vehicles.
The simulation results of the market impact of EV subsidy are summarized
in Table 2.9. If removing the federal income tax credits, the EV sales would
decreased by 28.8% in 2014, with BEVs experiencing a sales reduction of 32.6%
and PHEV sales falling by 24.5%. The results suggest that about 70% of the EV
buyers would still purchase EVs even without income tax credits.
If there were no federal-level EV subsidy, 78.9% of the “additional” EV buy-
ers would switch to gasoline vehicles with an average fuel economy of 27.2
mpg, and 11.8% would switch to hybrid vehicles with an average fuel economy
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of 45 mpg, with the remaining switching to diesel and flex-fuel vehicles. By
inducing consumers to switch to more fuel-efficient EVs, the income tax credit
policy leads to a lifetime gasoline consumption of 0.15 billion gallons and CO2
emission reduction of 2.91 billion pounds, which is equivalent to reducing 1750
gasoline vehicles of an average fuel economy of 23 mpg. If we assume each
EV replaced an conventional gasoline vehicle with a fuel economy of 23 mpg,
the gasoline consumption saved would become 0.19 billion gallons and the CO2
emission would become 3.74 billion pounds, equivalent to removing 2250 gaso-
line cars from the road. Not taking account of the actual substitution pattern
would over estimate the environmental benefits by 27% (Table 2.10).
Table 2.11 summarizes the environmental benefits of EV income tax credits
by evaluating the external cost savings from emission reduction of various pol-
lutants. In 2014, the EV subsidy results in a total environmental benefits of $73.8
million from a more fuel-efficient vehicle fleet, by taking account of the reduc-
tion of CO2, VOC, NOx, PM2.5, and SO2. The environmental benefits are much
lower than the total spending of $725.7 million since the majority of the subsi-
dies are non-additional and the additional portion mainly induces consumers
who would purchase a fuel-efficient vehicles anyways to switch. The current
subsidy policy offers equal tax credits amount to all buyers of the same electric
model. Alternatively, more credits could be given to lower-income households
with no tax credits given to the highest-income group households. This policy
design would mimic the policy reform of California Clean Vehicle Rebate Pro-
gram which intends to direct the incentives towards households who are most
likely to value the rebates the most. The subsidy could also target first-time buy-
ers, who may not have a good sense of vehicle fuel consumption but are more
sensitive to upfront costs.
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2.6 Conclusion
Promoting electric vehicles is considered as an effective way to increase the ve-
hicle fleet fuel economy and reduce emissions from on-road transportation. The
environmental benefits of subsidizing EVs critically hinge on the fuel efficiency
of the substitute vehicles. Simply subsidizing consumers who would otherwise
purchase another fuel-efficient vehicles to switch to EVs would not lead to sig-
nificant emission reduction. The paper provides to our knowledge the first em-
pirical analysis of the substitution pattern of EVs with other fuel types. Our
simulation results suggest that 78.7% of EVs replace gasoline vehicles with an
average fuel economy of 27.2 mpg and 12% of EVs replace hybrid vehicles with
an average fuel economy of 45 mpg. If we ignore the substitution pattern but
simply assume each EV replaces a gasoline vehicle of 23 mpg, we would over-
estimate the environmental benefits of EVs by 27%. In 2014, the federal-income
tax credits lead to a 28.8% increase in the sales of EVs, the majority of which re-
placed vehicles that are relatively fuel efficient. The increased EV sales translate
to a total of environmental benefits up to $73.8 million due to reduced emissions
of major air pollutants. The total subsidy spending of the income tax credit pol-
icy in 2014 far exceeds the environmental benefits of the program since about
70% of consumers would purchase EVs even without the subsidy and the sub-
sidy also mainly attracted consumers who would otherwise purchase mid-sized
gasoline or hybrid vehicles which are already fuel efficient. Our findings sug-
gest that policy designs that intend to promote the EV technology and reduce
emissions should target marginal buyers and encourage more consumers who
would purchase gas-guzzlers such as large SUVs to adopt EVs.
88
Table 2.1: History of hybrid and EVs
Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of No. of hybrid No. of EV
years hybrid EVs hybrid and EVs Models Offered models offered
2000 0.054 0.000 0.054 2 0
2001 0.118 0.000 0.118 2 0
2002 0.213 0.000 0.213 3 0
2003 0.285 0.000 0.285 3 0
2004 0.492 0.000 0.492 4 0
2005 1.234 0.000 1.234 8 0
2006 1.521 0.000 1.521 10 0
2007 2.150 0.000 2.150 15 0
2008 2.365 0.000 2.365 17 0
2009 2.766 0.000 2.766 21 0
2010 2.373 0.003 2.376 30 2
2011 2.091 0.139 2.230 33 4
2012 3.010 0.367 3.376 44 11
2013 3.191 0.626 3.817 50 17
2014 2.748 0.723 3.471 50 22
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Table 2.2: Vehicle emissions 100 miles (National average grid mix)
Vehicles GHG gas emissions
Gasoline 87 lb CO2
Hybrid Electric 57 lb CO2
Plug-in Hybrid Electric 62 lb CO2
All electric 54 lb CO2
Data source:AFDC.
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Table 2.4: Parameter Estimates in Mean Utility
(1) OLS (2) IV
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
constant -2.4560 0.1028 -2.4728 0.1113
log(price) -1.3497 0.2572 -1.7375 0.8164
horsepower/weight 1.9525 0.3211 2.2664 0.6870
weight 1.3393 0.2505 1.2943 0.2606
gallons/mile 0.1805 0.1283 0.1327 0.1529
AFV dummy -3.6229 0.5823 -3.6632 0.5942
EV dummy -2.9321 0.2652 -2.8913 0.2791
pickup dummy 0.4192 0.2863 0.7285 0.6828
model year 11 dummy 0.2743 0.1143 0.2763 0.1144
model year 12 dummy 0.3127 0.1075 0.3321 0.1153
model year 13 dummy 0.0559 0.1063 0.0687 0.1098
model year 14 dummy 0.1741 0.0920 0.1768 0.0929
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Table 2.5: Parameters Estimates in Heterogeneity Component
Coefficient S.E.
Observed Heterogeneity
log(price)/income -9.0659 0.4839
family size*vehicle weight 0.0892 0.0207
urban*pickups -0.6678 0.0561
urban*EV 0.2305 0.0482
gasoline price*gallons/mile -0.3078 0.0234
education*EV 0.8309 0.0808
stations*EV 0.6728 0.1022
Random coefficients
gallons/mile 1.9291 0.0565
horsepower/weight 1.0865 0.0396
light trucks 0.2823 0.0254
AFVs 0.9493 0.0886
Own-price Elasticity -2.67
Note: the number of observations are 11628. log-likelihood at conver-
gence: -144129.38. 150 Halton draws are used for simulating the unob-
served heterogeneity. The instrument variables used to estimate the lin-
ear parameters are the difference and squared difference in characteristics
with other products in the same firm and in other firms.
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Table 2.7: Elasticity Estimates by Fuel Type
BEV PHEV Hybrid Gasoline Diesel FFV
BEV 0.013 0.018 0.015 0.004 0.003 0.002
PHEV 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.002
Hybrid 0.037 0.036 0.029 0.009 0.007 0.006
Gasoline 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.026 0.027
Diesel 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.007
FFV 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.021 0.024 0.024
Own Price Elasticity -2.751 -2.649 -2.705 -2.761 -2.606 -2.680
Note: the table summarizes the sales-weighted average own- and cross-price elasticity es-
timates by fuel type. For example, in average, a one percent increase in a BEV model will
increases the sales of other BEV models by 0.013%.
Table 2.8: Sales Impact of Removing EVs
Fuel types Sales change Percentage Average MPG
Gasoline 86114 78.7% 27.2
Hybrid 13167 12.0% 45.1
Diesel 2594 2.4% 27.4
FFV 7574 6.9% 22
All non-EVs 109449 100% 28.9
Among gasoline vehicles Sales change Percentage
low mpg (<19) 1972 2.3%
medium mpg (>19 & < 25) 20409 23.70%
high mpg (>25) 63733 74.0%
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Table 2.10: Environmental Benefits and Substitution
Actual benefits
Gasoline consumption saved (billion gallons) 0.15
CO2 emission saved (billion lbs) 2.91
Equivalent gasoline cars reduction 1750
Benefits if assuming replacing a 23 mpg gasoline car
Gasoline consumption saved (billion gallons) 0.19
CO2 emission saved (billion lbs) 3.74
Equivalent gasoline cars reduction 2250
Table 2.11: Environmental Benefits of EV Subsidy
Pollutants Reduction (tons) Damage ($/ton) Damage reduction (million $)
CO2 1,321,767.1 36.0 47.6
VOC 3,695.2 1,482.0 5.5
NOx 2,478.3 6,042.0 15.0
PM2.5 14.8 330,600.0 4.9
SO2 25.2 35,340.0 0.9
All 73.8
Note: the table summarizes the environmental benefits of the federal-level income tax credit
for EVs. with a total spending of 725.7 million dollars in 2014.
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Figure 2.1: Monthly EV Sales and Shares of New Car Sales in the U.S.
Note: The monthly EV sales plotted include both BEV and PHEV sales. Data source: Hybrid-
cars.com monthly sales dashboard.
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Figure 2.2: Own-price elasticity estimates
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CHAPTER 3
THE IMPACT OF DISCRETE ATTRIBUTE BASING IN FUEL ECONOMY
REGULATIONS
Many public policies feature policy differentiation by providing differenti-
ated incentives or imposing unequal compliance burdens across different sub-
jects, mainly for equity, efficiency or political reasons. For example, in the
United States, the earned income tax credit (EITC) only applies to households
with annual income below certain thresholds and the exact credit amount de-
pends on the recipient’s income and number of children.1 The property tax,
imposed by local governments on real estate, bases the tax amount on the mar-
ket value and usage of the property, and properties owned by governments,
non-profit organizations, senior citizens and veterans are often completely or
partially exempt from property taxes. Since policy differentiation can be eas-
ily integrated into a existing policy system, it serves as a popular tool for policy
makers to redistribute compliance burden or deliberately alter certain behaviors
to achieve specific goals.
In the realm of environmental regulations, policy differentiation figures
prominently and is often conducted in the form of attribute basing. Attribute-
based regulations (ABRs) aim to regulate product offerings or firm behaviors
by basing the standard or the stringency of the regulation on one attribute of
the product or the firm. Examples include the energy efficiency standards for
home appliances in the U.S.2 and fuel economy regulations across the world,
1In 2017, the maximum credit for families with one child is $3,400, while the maximum credit
for three or more children is $6,318. Similar programs include the public housing program
that provides rental housing only for low-income families, managed by the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
2In the U.S., the energy efficiency standard for refrigerators depend on the attributes such as
manual or automatic defrosting and whether having an automatic icemaker, and the standard
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whose stringency is based on either vehicle weight or footprint.3 The often-
cited vintage-differentiated regulations (VDRs) and spatial-differentiated reg-
ulations (SDRs) are also special cases of attribute basing with the regulation
stringency being based on a temporal attribute (dates of entry) or a spatial at-
tribute (geographical locations) of the subject [92, 9]. One common feature of
ABRs are that they often target one attribute of a product that is directly related
to the externalities that the policies intend to reduce (emissions), while basing
the regulation stringency on a secondary attribute that is not the intended tar-
get (vehicle weight), primarily for the purpose of equalizing the marginal costs
of regulatory compliance across different sources. However, the difference in
the regulatory stringency based on the secondary attribute creates an incentive
for market participants to manipulate the attribute in order to receive favorable
policy treatment, resulting in social welfare loss due to distortion in the choice
of the secondary attribute [52].
This study aims to empirically investigate the welfare implication of ABRs
in the context of U.S. Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards by
focusing on the attribute basing on a discrete characteristic:4 whether the vehi-
cle is categorized as a passenger car or a light truck.5 Before the introduction of
the footprint-based standards in 2012, the fuel economy regulation in the U.S.
for air conditioners depend on their cooling capacity and whether they have reverse cycles.
3The fuel economy standards in Europe, China, and Japan are based on vehicle weight with
heavier vehicles subject to a lower MPG target. Since 2012, the Corporate Average Fuel Econ-
omy (CAFE) standards in the U.S. have become footprint-based and footprint is defined as the
wheelbase multiplied by track, in square feet, which approximately measures the size of the
rectangle defined by the four wheels. Vehicles with a larger footprint are subject to a less strin-
gent target.
4As opposed to attribute basing on a continuous variable such as vehicle size or weight
weight.
5Passenger cars mainly include sedans, hatchbacks, convertibles and wagons that are pri-
marily for transporting no more than 10 individuals. Light trucks are truck-based vehicles
with maximum gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) less than 8,500 lbs. Light trucks include
minivans/vans, SUVs and Pickup trucks. Starting model year 2012, 2-wheel-drive SUVs with
GVWR less than 6,000 lbs are classified as passenger cars instead of light trucks.
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has always been attribute-based since its initial implementation in 1975. Un-
der CAFE, vehicles are classified as either passenger cars or light trucks. Light
trucks have been subject to a lower fuel economy standard, with about 6-8 lower
in mpg (Figure 3.1). On May 7, 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) jointly
developed a coordinated national program, which established greenhouse gas
emission (GHG) standards and CAFE standards that allow manufacturers to
build a single national fleet to meet requirements of both programs for model
years 2012 through 2016. The joint rule sets additional attribute-based standards
where the exact target for a vehicle depends on its footprint. Larger vehicles are
subject to less stringent emission or fuel economy targets, and light trucks are
still assigned a separate set of footprint-based standards which are less stringent
than those for passenger cars. For example, in the GHG standards for Model
Year (MY) 2016, light trucks are allowed to emit 30.3-71 more grams of CO2 per
mile than passenger cars of the same footprint (Figure 3.2). Since automakers
adjust vehicle prices in the short run to make the sales-weighted average fuel
economy compliant with the regulation, the fuel economy standards work as
a revenue-neutral “feebate” that taxes inefficient vehicles and subsidizes effi-
cient vehicles. By being subject to a less aggressive standard, the vehicles that
are classified as light trucks are therefore being subsidized relative to passenger
cars.
The rationale behind this standard split between cars and trucks dates back
to the 1970s when CAFE was initially designed. At that time, light trucks were
mostly comprised of pickup trucks and mainly used for small commercial and
farming purposes. Policy makers did not want to impose a larger compliance
burden to those buyers. However, the majority of light trucks sold on the mar-
102
ket are used for personal transport nowadays, not for agriculture or small busi-
nesses.6 The fleet composition has evolved dramatically to meet the growing de-
mand for light trucks. With the increasing market share of SUVs, which are clas-
sified as light trucks under CAFE, the market share of light trucks has increased
from about 20% in the 1970s to almost 60% in 2016 (Figure 3.3). Since consumers
might choose between several vehicle models which fall into both the car and
truck category, switching between vehicle segments is more likely to happen
than 40 years ago. Although the primary goal of CAFE is to increase the fleet
fuel economy to address the externalities associated with gasoline consumption,
the differential treatment of cars versus trucks could distort consumer vehicle
choice by encouraging more buyers to purchase light trucks, exacerbating the
emission and accident externalties associated with light trucks, and impeding
the progress of raising the average fleet fuel economy (Figure 3.3). ABRs are of-
ten justified by efficiency benefits of reducing the disparity of compliance bur-
den across different sources. However, two new provisions under the joint pro-
gram after MY 2012 muted the efficiency benefits of separating the standards
between cars and trucks. First, the joint program implements footprint-based
standard by setting less stringent targets for larger vehicles, which takes account
of the compliance cost differences due to technological constraints. Second, the
joint program features credit trading between truck and car fleets within firms
and across firms, which should make the marginal cost of reducing one unit of
emissions equal across vehicles. The provision of credit-trading thus eliminates
6According to U.S. Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey, the percentage of trucks (including
medium- and heavy-duty trucks) used for personal transport increased from 65.7% in 1987 to
76.7% in 2002 and the percentage used for agriculture and retail business decreased from 8.5% to
2.6% and 5.6% to 2.7% respectively. Medium- and heavy-duty trucks (with gross weight weight
rating over 14,000 lbs) are mainly used for business and construction with only 0.9% used for
personal transport, and they are subject to a different set of standards under the joint rule of
EPA and NHTSA. The vehicle use survey was discontinued by U.S. Census Bureau in 2002.
The updated percentage of light trucks used for personal transport nowadays should be much
higher.
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the benefit of attribute basing in improving the program’s cost-effectiveness and
the addition of ABR to a credit trading system will only create a welfare distor-
tion without any benefit [52].7
Quantifying the policy impact of discrete attribute basing in CAFE is im-
portant for the following reasons. First, the standard split between passenger
cars and light trucks fails to make consumers internalize the external cost of
fuel consumption, running counter to the policy goal of CAFE in achieving the
socially optimal level of fuel economy. According to U.S. Energy Information
Administration, about 143.37 billion gallons of gasoline were consumed in the
U.S. in 2016, setting the highest amount on record. Increasing the fuel efficiency
of the vehicle fleet is a critical step in strengthening energy security and allevi-
ating environmental damage associated with gasoline consumption. Not only
does CAFE fail to discourage consumers from adopting light trucks which are
less fuel efficient, the discrete attribute basing might induce additional buyers
to switch from passenger cars to light trucks. Such switching can impede the
progress of raising the fleet fuel economy and exacerbate the problem of lo-
cal air pollution, GHG emissions and energy security, the very externalities the
CAFE regulation is designed to alleviate.
Second, the implicit subsidy for light trucks created by the standard split
could make households choose vehicles with a fuel economy level that is even
lower than the private optimal level. Between 2012 and 2014, U.S. households
on average spent $2,090- $ 2,756 (3.7%- 5.4% of total household expenditure) an-
nually on gasoline [18]. Fuel consumption on average contributes to 29%-32.6%
7The regulatory agents might have realized the potential impact of car-truck classification
on the fleet composition, and starting MY 2011, NHTSA has reclassified many small, 2-wheel
drive, sport utility (SUVs) from the truck category to the car category. Small SUVs (less than
6,000 GVWR pounds) are now grouped with cars if with 2WD and grouped with trucks if with
4WD.
104
of the total owning cost of vehicles and the ratio increases as household income
decreases [17]. For lower-income households, the fuel consumption could be
the largest component of the vehicle owning cost when gasoline prices were as
high as in 2012. Therefore, mis-optimization in vehicle fuel economy could lead
to a significant welfare loss, especially for lower-income households. Choosing
inefficient vehicles would leave consumers subject to a greater financial burden
when gasoline price increases, due to both the increased operational cost and
the decreased resell value. EPA and NHTSA estimate that consumers would
save more than $3,000 over the lifetime of a MY 2016 vehicle from CAFE [33],
but the fuel cost savings could be undermined if some consumers are induced
by CAFE to choose larger vehicles which are less fuel efficient.
Third, attribute basing could further result in additional welfare loss if the
distorted secondary attribute is associated with another externality that the reg-
ulation does not intend to target. Although light trucks are likely to better
protect their occupants, driving light trucks creates externalities by imposing
greater danger to other road users [41] [97] [78] [3], and an increase in the
market share of light trucks could exacerbate the accident-related externali-
ties.8 Li(2012)[69] estimate that the accident externality imposed by a light truck
amounts to be $2,444 in 2006. Anderson and Auffhammer (2014) [2] show that
due to the structural difference, light trucks significantly raise the probability
of a fatality in a struck vehicle, in addition to the effect of their already higher
weight, and conclude that the removal of the split in CAFE standards between
cars and trucks would improve welfare. Jacobsen (2013)[54] estimates the rates
8Light trucks are generally taller with higher center of mass and are more likely to hit the
upper bodies of the occupants in a truck and car collision. When light trucks strike pedestrians,
bicyclists and motorcyclists, they are also more likely to hit the upper bodies of the victims,
resulting in greater injury. The stiffer and heavier body structures of light trucks make trucks
transfer more force to the victims in collisions.
105
of fatality for collisions between different vehicle classes and his policy simula-
tion shows that a unified CAFE standard encourages switching away from light
trucks into cars, which improves overall safety substantially.
Fourth, attribute basing alters the incidence of compliance across agents and
could be justified on distributional grounds [52]. Although the motive for the at-
tribute basing in fuel economy regulations can be disputed, the attribute-based
standards could constitute a form of disguised protectionism [67]. The U.S. au-
tomakers produce a disproportionately large share of light trucks (about 70% in
2016). Allowing light trucks to receive a more lenient target reduces the compli-
ance burden of domestic producers. However, the benefits of welfare redistri-
bution is achieved at the cost of sacrificing social welfare from the distortion in
the secondary attribute, which needs to be carefully evaluated if implementing
attribute basing.
Motivated by the above considerations, this study evaluates the welfare loss
of CAFE standards from attribute basing on a discrete characteristic, the car-
truck classification. I utilize individual transaction data and vehicle sales data
of MY 2012-2014, which covers the first three years following the implementa-
tion of the compliance trading provision of CAFE. I estimate a vehicle market
equilibrium model with consumer vehicle demand using a random coefficient
discrete choice model in the spirit of Berry et al. (1995) [14] and a stylized au-
tomaker supply model assuming that multi-product firms engage in price com-
petition by maximizing profits from both product and regulatory credit sales.
With the estimated parameters, counterfactual exercises are then conducted to
simulate the prices and sales under a uniform standard to evaluate the welfare
impact of attribute basing on consumer surplus, the distribution of firm profits,
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and environmental and accident externalities. The simulation results show that
the removal of the standard split between cars and trucks could increase the
sales of passenger cars by 8.0% and decrease the sales of light trucks by 4.9%.
Although the uniform standard results in a larger consumer welfare loss by
making consumer’s choice deviate more from their private optimal choice, the
deviation is nevertheless efficient by getting closer to the social optimum and
the uniform standard improves the social welfare amounting to $2.83 billion
from the decrease in environmental and accident-related externalities. Surpris-
ingly, with a more stringent target, the automobile industry as a whole actually
experiences a profit increase from the increased market size as fuel-efficient pas-
senger cars become more affordable. In addition, eliminating the standard split
leads to welfare redistribution among firms, suggesting that domestic firms ben-
efit from a profit increase of 1.8% at the expense of Asian and European firms
suffering from a profit loss of 1.5% and 4.0% respectively.
The findings from this study are policy relevant and particularly timely since
the EPA and NHTSA are having a mid-term review of the fuel economy stan-
dards and need to determine before April 1, 2018 whether the standards for
Model Years 2022-2025, established in 2012, should be revised. Since the im-
plementation of EPA-NHTSA joint rule, the gasoline price has decreased from
$3.68 in 2012 to $2.25 in 2016, and the market share of light trucks among light-
duty vehicles has increased from 50% to 60% at the same time. By providing the
estimate of policy-induced sales of light trucks, the study helps policy makers
revisit the differential treatment of cars and trucks in CAFE and re-evaluate its
consequences on the fleet composition. Given the ubiquity of attribute basing
in fuel economy regulations across the world including emerging automobile
markets such as China and India, this study also provides guidance for those
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markets to re-evaluate the consequences of implementing attribute basing when
using fuel economy regulations to alleviate environmental externalities.
In addition to its policy relevance, this paper makes the following three con-
tributions to the literature. First, this paper adds to the literature on attribute
basing. Although ABRs are ubiquitous in economic policies, there is limited
economic literature examining the impact of ABR. Ito and Sallee (2016) [52]
provides the first analysis of the welfare consequences of ABR by providing
a theoretical framework that identifies the key parameters that determine the
distortionary cost and potential benefit of attribute basing. They show that ABR
would only result in welfare loss if compliance trading is allowed, which has al-
ready equalized marginal compliance costs. They also empirically identify the
distortion due to ABR through bunching analysis in Japanese automobile mar-
ket and they use the estimated loss function as a sufficient statistic to compare
the welfare impact of ABR relative to a more efficient policy. Kellogg (2017)
[58] provides a theoretical framework to evaluate the welfare loss of a fixed
fuel economy standard under gasoline price violatility. He shows that although
attribute-based standard builds flexibility into the regulation, the distortion in
attribute caused by ABR still outweighs the flexibility benefit, extending the
theoretical findings from Ito and Sallee (2016) [52] to the case of gasoline price
uncertainty. By focusing on the data period after the provision of CAFE compli-
ance trading that eliminates efficiency gain from ABR in equalizing compliance
costs, I am able to directly quantify the welfare loss of ABR due to the distortion
in the secondary attribute. Unlike using a loss function to approximate the wel-
fare as in Ito and Sallee (2016)[52], which requires assumption of perfect compe-
tition or at least no policy impact on firm markups, this study directly models
consumer vehicle choice and firm profit maximization with market power and
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compliance trading, and conducts counterfactual simulations to directly and
separately quantify the policy impact on consumer surplus, firm profits and ex-
ternalities.
Second, it contributes to the substantial literature about CAFE standards,
which mainly focuses on the efficiency of CAFE in terms of reducing gasoline
consumption, such as Goldberg (1998)[42]; Kleit (2004) [59]; Austin and Di-
nan (2005) [6]; Jacobsen (2013)[53]. Those studies consistently find gasoline tax
could achieve the same policy goal at a much lower cost. Some studies examine
the distributional impacts of CAFE and find CAFE is regressive as low-income
households suffer more welfare losses than high-income households: Jacobsen
(2013)[53]; Davis and Knittel (2016) [28]; Levinson (2016) [66]. Other studies
examine the safety impacts of fuel economy standards, including Crandall and
Graham(1989)[27]; Jacobsen (2013) [54]; Bento et al. (2017) [10]. Those stud-
ies find CAFE affects vehicle mix and vehicle weight distribution, leading to
different safety implications. Few recent studies investigate the attribute-based
CAFE standards by focusing on the footprint-based standards. Whitefoot and
Skerlos (2012) [99] models automaker’s vehicle dimension choice and finds the
footprint-based standard creates an incentive for firms to increase vehicle size,
undermining gains in fuel economy, with the incentive being larger for light
trucks. Leard et al. (2016) [63] use a reduced-form approach to look at the effect
of recent gasoline price decreases on the stringency of fuel economy require-
ment and find the effect is relatively small as the gasoline price mostly makes
consumers switch within the same footprint. Levinson (2017) [67] point out
that the change from a uniform standard to the new footprint-based standard
constitutes a form of disguised protectionism, by imposing costs on imported
cars equivalent to a tariff because larger cars are disproportionately assembled
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domestically. All of these recent studies examine the impact of the newly intro-
duced footprint-based standards and none of them directly quantify the total
welfare consequences. My study focuses on attribute basing on the discrete
attribute, the car-truck classification, which has been in place since the intro-
duction of CAFE but whose welfare impact has not been empirically evaluated.
Third, this study will contribute to the understanding of notched policies
and vintage- or spatial-differentiated policies. Notches in policies essentially
provide different marginal incentives among different decision makers depend-
ing on their proximity to a notch, resulting in bunching on the policy-favorable
side of a notch [88, 90]. Vintage-differentiated regulations, which are common in
environmental policies, assign standards for regulated units based on the units’
dates of entry, with later entrants or newer sources facing more stringent regula-
tion, potentially retarding the environmental progress by providing incentives
for extending the lives of aging facilities and equipment [92]. Similar to VDRs,
spatial-differentiated regulations vary regulation stringency based on locations,
resulting in firm reallocation to less-regulated areas [9]. By providing empirical
evidence of welfare loss from attribute basing in the context of fuel economy
regulations, the findings of this paper suggest policy makers should fully assess
the welfare consequences when designing regulations that intend to limit some
behaviors or product dimensions but implement unequal standards or policy
incentives to do so.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly describes
the policy background of CAFE and the data sets. Section 3.3 uses a theoreti-
cal model with graphic illustration to demonstrate the potential welfare conse-
quences of the discrete attribute basing. Section 3.4 sets up a market equilib-
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rium model of vehicle demand and supply and discusses the estimation strat-
egy. Section 3.5 presents the estimation results from the structural model. Sec-
tion 3.6 conducts policy simulations to evaluate the welfare consequences of the
attribute basing. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.1 Policy Background and Data
In this section, I first present the policy background about CAFE and its new
changes since 2012. Next I present the data used in the empirical analysis.
3.1.1 Policy Background
CAFE standards were first enacted in 1975, following the 1973-74 Arab Oil Em-
bargo. The Department of Transportation, through the NHTSA had the respon-
sibility for setting and enforcing fuel economy standards since then. The CAFE
standards in a given model year define the minimum level of average fuel econ-
omy that each manufacturer’s fleet is required to attain, and passenger car fleet
and light truck fleet have always been subject to separate standards. The fuel
economy standard for passenger cars stayed at 27.5 mpg from 1990 to 2010 and
the requirement for light trucks has increased gradually from 20.7 mpg in 2004
to 23.5 mpg in 2010 (Figure 3.1). In 2007, The U.S. Supreme Court determined
that the EPA possesses the authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate GHG
emissions from motor vehicles. On May 7, 2010, EPA and NHTSA finalized a
joint rule establishing standards for CAFE and emissions of GHGs, which ap-
ply to passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles
for model years 2012 through 2016. Subsequently, on October 15, 2012, EPA and
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NHTSA issued standards for GHG emissions and fuel economy of light-duty
vehicles for model years 2017-2025. The harmonized program allows manu-
facturers to build a single national fleet to meet requirements of both programs.
The stringency of the regulation increases over years and the standards require a
combined fleet-wide fuel economy of 48.7-49.7 mpg under NHTSA’s CAFE pro-
gram and a fleet-wide average emission of 163 grams/mile under EPA’s GHG
program in MY 2025.9
The joint rule sets attribute-based standard where the exact target for a ve-
hicle depends on its footprint and vehicles with larger footprints are subject to
less stringent targets. The regulatory agents believe that this design encourages
the increasing of fuel economy for all vehicle sizes and discourages automakers
from downsizing vehicles, creating a more equitable framework, avoiding im-
posing disproportionate compliance obligations for most U.S. automakers who
produce larger vehicles. In addition to attribute basing on footprint, this new
joint program still features differential treatment between passenger cars and
light trucks as light trucks are assigned a separate set of footprint-based stan-
dards that are less stringent than those for passenger cars (Figure 3.2). Since au-
tomakers need to price in the additional cost in complying with the fuel econ-
omy regulations, the separate standards between cars and trucks potentially
distorts the relative prices of passenger cars and light trucks and subsequently
distorts consumer’s vehicle choices.
The joint program implemented starting 2012 features great flexibility in-
cluding credit banking and borrowing, and the newly-added provisions includ-
9NHTSA sets CAFE standards only five years at a time and the 2022-2025 standards are
non-final standards that were proposed to help manufacturers better plan for future products
and to be harmonized with the GHG program. The EPA and NHTSA are having a midterm
review of whether the 2022-2025 standards should be revised. For the GHG program, part of
the improvement is expected to be made through reduction in air conditioning leakage.
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ing credit transfer between the car and truck fleets and credit trading across
firms. A manufacturer’s car and truck fleet that achieves a fleet-average CO2 or
fuel economy level better than the standard can generate credits. For example,
GHG credits are owned for grams of CO2 saved beyond the standard over the
lifetime of the vehicles exceeding the standard and are recorded in metric tons of
CO2. Additional credits are awarded to vehicles that adopt specific alternative-
fuel technologies.10
There is great heterogeneity in terms of firms’ model offerings and the fuel
efficiency technologies, therefore firms bear heterogenous compliance cost un-
der a fuel economy regulation. Figure 3.4 plots the average fleet emission and
the required GHG standard relative to the sales-weighted average footprint for
each automaker’s newly sold vehicles in MY 2014, separately for passenger car
and light truck fleets. The length of the red dashed lines reflect the relative
stringency of the standard based on each automaker’s product profile. The
green dashed lines represent the credit surplus if the automaker’s emissions
were lower than the standard. As indicated by the figure, domestic “Big Three”
(General Motors, Ford, and Fiat-Chrysler) and some German firms produce rel-
atively large vehicles while Asian firms tend to specialize in vehicles of smaller
sizes. Among domestic firms, Fiat-Chrysler faces a relatively stringent regula-
tion for both of its passenger car and light trucks fleets, while GM and Ford face
a similar compliance burden in the light truck fleet but maintain a relatively
fuel-efficient passenger car fleet. Due to the technology difference, automakers
face unequal compliance cost for each unit of fuel economy improvement per
vehicle. Jacobsen (2013)[53] estimates that the additional cost to attain the stan-
10For MY 2012-2016, GHG program allows electric vehicles and fuel cell vehicles to use a zero
grams/mile compliance value and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles could use zero grams/mile
for the use of grid electricity.
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dard per MPG ranges from $52 to $438 per car across manufacturers for MYs
1997-2001. However, with a credit trading provision, the automakers who have
a relatively fuel-inefficient truck fleet but a fuel-efficient car fleet can transfer
the credits they own from their car fleet to make up for the deficits of their truck
fleets. The automakers who have an overall fuel-inefficient vehicle fleets can
purchase credits from firms who produce fuel-efficient vehicles that overcom-
ply with the regulation. A competitive credit trading will equalize the marginal
cost of reducing one unit of emissions across vehicles and allows the policy goal
of reducing gasoline consumption and emissions to be achieved at the lowest
cost.
The credit trading provision makes the U.S. CAFE standard an ideal con-
text to investigate the welfare loss due to attribute basing since the an efficient
credit trading eliminates the efficiency benefit of ABR in reducing the disparity
of marginal compliance burdens and the addition of attribute basing will only
result in a welfare loss [52]. To empirically quantify the welfare loss, I maintain
the credit trading feature in a counterfactual analysis where the standard split
between passenger cars and light trucks is removed, and resolve a new market
equalibrium under the new policy scenario. Since credit trading equalizes the
marginal compliance cost for each vehicle, the observed credit price also helps
identifying the marginal cost for each vehicle, which solves the identification
problem that marginal costs and Lagrangian multipliers cannot be separately
identified in the first order condition of a constrained profit maximization prob-
lem [53].
The credit banking and borrowing provision allows automakers to bank
credits from overcompliance in one year to use for compliance in future model
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years. The banked credits could be carried up to five years to offset future
shortfalls and back in time for up to three years to cover previous deficits,
which helps automakers smooth economic shocks (fluctuation of fuel prices)
to marginal compliance cost across years. The empirical section of this study
assumes away this banking and borrowing feature when modeling vehicle sup-
ply as it involves modeling automakers’ dynamic decisions, which is beyond
the scope of the paper. The implication of this abstraction will be discussed in
detail in the empirical section.
3.1.2 Data
The primary data for the demand estimation is the individual transaction data
from the household-level survey data of the Maritz Research U.S. New Vehicle
Customer Study,11 which is a monthly survey of households that purchased or
leased new vehicles. For each individual transaction, I observe the make, model,
trim, model year, fuel type, transaction year-month and transaction price. The
data also provides detailed demographic characteristics of the households who
purchased each vehicle including income, family size, education level, zipcode,
and valuable information on the alternative vehicle models they considered
while making the purchase decisions. Since including the alternative vehicle
choice greatly helps identifying consumer heterogeneity parameters, I only se-
lect the transactions that list at least one alternative vehicle choice, which is the
model that consumers most seriously considered.12 In order to define a tractable
11The data was accessed through the secure server of Resources for the Future and was not
removed from the server.
12The survey asks the respondents to ranks three alternative vehicle choices, but the majority
of the respondents (87%) only report one alternative vehicle choice. Therefore, I only include
one alternative vehicle choice as consumer 2nd choice when modeling demand.
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choice set for each model year, I limit my analysis of the groups of consumers
who report an alternative vehicle choice that is from the new vehicle choice of-
fered in each market year. Therefore, all the consumers included in the demand
estimation are assumed to choose their purchased choice and alternative choice
from a single new vehicle choice set that is defined for each market year. The
sample period covers MY 2012-14, the first three model-years after the imple-
mentation 2012 CAFE standards and each model year is defined as September
of the previous calendar year to August of the current calendar year. For ex-
ample, MY 2012 is defined as September 2011-August 2012. For computational
purposes, I randomly draw a sample of 9,075 transactions from the cleaned sam-
ple after removing observations with missing observed consumer attributes or
information on the purchased and seriously considered models, and end up
having 2,784, 3032, and 3259 transactions for MY 2012-14 respectively. Table 3.1
summarizes the demographic information for the households who made those
purchase transactions. The average household income for the survey respon-
dents in the sample is $122,260, which is close to the average household income
of $117,795 for married couples in the U.S..13 The average household size is 2.62
and 59% of the heads of household have earned a college degree. 63% of the
respondents are from an urban or suburban areas with an average commuting
of 25.54 minutes and average gasoline price of $3.48 during the survey time.
About 50% of the sampled households selected a light truck and the average
price of the vehicles that the sampled households purchased is $29,706. The
average MPG of the purchased vehicles is 25.77.
The individual transaction data is then merged with Wards data which pro-
vide detailed information on each vehicle model for each corresponding model
13Data source: IRS Statistics of Income, 2014.
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year, including horsepower, size, curb weight, wheelbase, and fuel economy.
The data set is further complemented by aggregate vehicle sales data, which
provides market-level information of vehicle demand, obtained from registra-
tion data complied by IHS Automotive. The IHS data record the quarterly num-
ber of registrations for each car model, broken down by fuel type, which are
aggregated to model year level to construct the market share for each vehicle
model in each model year. All of the above data sets are matched at a model-
fuel-type level, for example, Toyota Prius-hybrid. The total number of vehicle
models that are defined in the choice set are 418, 441, and 459 respectively for
MYs 2012-2014. To alleviate the concern that consumers who purchase some cer-
tain vehicle models could be over-drawn or under-drawn due to sampling issue,
each individual transaction is re-weighted in the estimation with the weight de-
fined as the ratio of the actual market share of the model that the consumer pur-
chased to the within-sample market share of that model. The average of those
sampling weights is 0.99 with a standard deviation of 0.084, indicating that in
general, the sample is relatively representative of the new vehicle market.
3.2 Theoretical Background
Before introducing the empirical model to quantify the welfare impact of the
discrete attribute basing in CAFE, this section provides a theoretic model to il-
lustrate the welfare impact of attribute basing on a discrete characteristic, which
distills intuition for the empirical analysis. Ito and Sallee (2016)[52] uses a the-
oretical framework to demonstrate the welfare impact of ABR on a continuous
variable: vehicle weight. The model presented here extends their main find-
ing to attribute basing on a discrete variable. Due to the discrete choice nature,
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following the setup in Holland et al. (2016)[49], I assume a discrete choice trans-
portation model, in which consumers in the market choose between a passenger
car and a light truck. The assumptions in Ito and Sallee (2016)[52] and Holland
et al. (2016)[49] are maintained and the implications of the assumptions are dis-
cussed in details in those work. Most of the assumptions are made for model
simplicity and tractability to help providing analytical results and main impli-
cations.
Assume that consumers obtain utility from a composite consumption good
x with price being normalized to one and buying a passenger car with the emis-
sion level ec and a light truck with the emission level et. The present discounted
benefit of the two choices are denoted as Fc(ec) and Ft(et) respectively. Con-
sumers have exogenous income I, which they allocate on the vehicle and the
numeraire good x. The supply side is assumed as perfectly competitive and
consumers pay the car or the truck with prices equal to their respective marginal
costs of production Cc(ec) and Ct(et), and the cost function is assumed to be de-
creasing in its argument (higher emission, lower cost). Both cars and trucks
consume fuel and there is an externality associated with fuel burning with the
external cost being δ for each unit of emission level. When consumers make pur-
chase decisions, they do not take account of the external cost from emissions.
Suppose a regulator wants to reduce emissions and implements an emission
standard for vehicles but base the standard on the vehicle class such that cars
are allowed to emit k units and trucks are subject to a lenient target with k + σ
units of emissions. The mandate allows compliance trading between the car and
truck fleets, and there will be a fine with an amount of t dollars per unit of ex-
cess emission on either the car or truck fleet if any of them fails to comply with
the mandate or have a credit balance deficit. This mandate acts as a constraint
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for consumers and the indirect utility of buying a passenger car and buying a
light truck, after substituting the budget constraint, are defined respectively as
the following:
Vc = max
ec
Fc(ec) −Cc(ec) + I, s.t. ec ≤ k
Vt = max
et
Ft(et) −Ct(et) + I, s.t. et ≤ k + σ
The Lagrangeans of the above maximization problems are thus defined as
the following with a single Lagrangean multiplier when compliance trading
equalizes the shadow cost of the regulation:
Lc = max
ec
Fc(ec) −Cc(ec) + I + λ(k − ec)
Lt = max
et
Ft(et) −Ct(et) + I + λ(k + σ − et)
Following [49] and the literature of discrete choice, assuming that the choice
between passenger cars and light trucks is influence by the i.i.d. random tastes
drawn from the extreme value distribution with zero expected value and stan-
dard deviation that is proportional to a parameter µ, the utility of cars and trucks
is then defined as:
Uc = Vc + εc,
Ut = Vt + εt
Given the assumption of the distribution of the random taste, the probability
of consumers choosing a light truck is:
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s =
exp(Vt/µ)
exp(Vc/µ) + exp(Vt/µ)
and the expected utility from vehicle purchase for a consumer is:
E[max(Uc,Ut)] = µln(exp(Vc/µ) + (exp(Vt/µ))
The regulator maximizes the welfare W, which is the expected utility from
vehicle purchase and expected revenue from noncompliance payments less the
expected external cost from vehicle emissions, by choosing the policy parame-
ters k, σ and t:
maxW
k,σ,t
= µln(exp(Vc/µ)+(exp(Vt/µ))+t[(1− s)(ec−k)+ s(et−k−σ))]−δ[(1− s)ec+ set]
Proposition 1 shows that the optimal policy does not involve a standard split
between cars and trucks (proofs in the appendix).
Proposition 1: Where there is compliance trading and the only regulatory goal
is to target the emission externality with no distributional considerations, the optimal
policy should have a uniform standard such that:
σ∗ = 0.
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The proofs of Proposition 1 shows that with an optimal policy, the regula-
tory agent sets the standard at k such that the compliance credit price equals to
the marginal cost of emission, and the fine payment will also be set equal to the
price of the trading credit, therefore t = λ = δ. If the fine payment is set less
than the trading price, automakers would just pay the fine without increasing
the fuel economy. Ito and Sallee (2016) [52] shows that when ABR is based on
a continuous variable such that the ABR standard function takes the form that
k j = k + σ(a) where a denotes the vehicle weight or size, the optimal attribute
slope is zero: σ′(a) = 0. Proposition 1 coincides with their finding and extends
their finding to the context of attribute basing on a discrete variable and con-
cludes that the optimal standard split is zero. The intuition is simple, with a
compliance trading which equalizes the marginal compliance cost between cars
and trucks, there should not be any difference in the regulation stringency if the
regulation aims to reduce emissions and the marginal damage from an addi-
tional unit of emission is equal between cars and trucks. If, however, the reg-
ulatory agent employs attribute basing by treating cars and trucks separately,
there will simply be distortion in the fleet composition: a larger share of light
trucks. If light trucks are associated with an additional externality that the pol-
icy does not intend to target, additional welfare loss would occur. The distortion
is demonstrated via the aid of graphic illustration in Figure 3.5.
A policy intervention would cause deviation of consumer’s choice away
from their private optima. Suppose the private optimal choice (which is the
average across consumers) without any fuel economy regulation is at (s0, e0),
where s0 is the market share of light trucks and e0 is the average fleet emission
level. Suppose the fuel economy regulation moves consumer’s vehicle choice
to (s1, e1) and denote the choice deviation as ∆s = s1 − s0, and ∆e = e1 − e0, and
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define the consumer welfare loss from this choice deviation as L(s1− s0, e1−e0) =
U(s1, e1)−U(s0, e0). This welfare loss could be considered as a policy compliance
cost, which should be evaluated against the environmental benefits of each pol-
icy less other distortionary cost if any. Following [52], assume the loss function
takes the following quadratic form for the easiness of graphic illustration:
L(∆s,∆e) = α(∆s)2 + β(∆e)2 + γ∆s∆e
Panel (a) of Figure 3.5 depicts the impact of a uniform emission standard
which is set at the level k, and there is no standard difference between passenger
cars and trucks. Therefore, the standard is a constant line whose slope does
not change with the market share of trucks. The original optimal choice by
consumers is at (s0, e0), which has a higher emission level than the standard. If
the standard is set higher than the original emission level such that k > e0, the
standard is not binding and consumer choice would stay at the original point.
With a binding standard such that k < e0, the choice moves to the new point (s1,
e1), where the lowest level set of the loss function, which has the ellipse shape
due to the quadratic function form assumption, is tangent to the regulation line.
Bundles on the same ellipse (level set) experience the same utility loss due to
choice deviation and the further away from the private optimal point, the larger
the utility loss. The compliance cost is measured by the length of the vector and
the compliance direction is reflected by the direction of the vector (lower e and
lower s). The average emission level is now at k and the market share of light
trucks is at s1, which is lower than the private optimum. This decrease in the
share of light trucks (4s1) is an efficient change, rather than a distortion. With
a fuel economy regulation that helps internalizing the externalities of gasoline
consumption, consumers would choose more fuel-efficient vehicles than in a
private optimum, resulting in a decrease in the share of light trucks.
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Panel (b) demonstrates the impact of an ABR based on the car-truck classi-
fication. Suppose cars are subject to a higher standard k1 and trucks received
a less aggressive target at k2 (k2 > k1). Suppose the regulator still wants to
achieve the original policy goal as in the uniform policy at (s1, e1) and k1 and
k2 are set such that s1 ∗ k1 + (1 − s1) ∗ k2 = k, which means when the market
share of light trucks is at the level of the optimal compliance choice under the
uniform standard (s1), the sales-weighted standard is equal to the uniform stan-
dard. The fleet average standard now depends on the fleet composition. Due to
the less-stringent standard of light trucks, the fleet-average standard is become
less stringent (with higher emission allowance) when the market share of light
trucks increases. The new compliance choice moves to (s2, e2), with a higher
share of light trucks and higher fleet emission level than under a uniform stan-
dard.
The attribute basing results in a smaller consumer welfare loss compared
with the uniform standard since the length of the compliance vector is smaller
than in the uniform standard. However, the discrete attribute basing distorts
the choice of trucks, resulting in more trucks sales (from s0 to s2). With a steeper
slope of the standard (with a larger difference between k1 and k2), the distor-
tion in the share of light trucks is much larger. The reduced emissions by the
attribute-based standard is also lower than the uniform standard due to higher
emissions from trucks (4e2 < 4e1).
The qualitative findings from the graphic illustration suggest that attribute
basing not only runs counter to the policy goal of achieving a more efficient fleet,
but also creates additional distortion in the secondary attribute. To quantify
the welfare loss from the discrete attribute basing, we need to compare ABR
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with a uniform standard by taking account of the consumer welfare loss due
to deviation from the private optima, the environmental benefits brought by
each policy, and additional externalities due to distortion if any. Therefore, an
empirical analysis which models both consumer vehicle choice and automaker
vehicle supply is needed and is presented in the following sections.
3.3 Empirical Model and Estimation
The empirical section aims to estimate a structural model of the automobile mar-
ket so that counterfactual analysis could be carried out to quantify the welfare
impact of discrete attribute basing under CAFE by comparing the market out-
comes with a uniform standard that removes the standard split.
By taking advantage of the individual transaction data from Maritz, I first es-
timate consumer demand for new cars taking into account of both observed and
unobserved consumer heterogeneity in the spirit of Berry et al. (1995,2004)[14]
[15], Petrin (2002) [81] and Train and Winston (2007)[94]. With the demand esti-
mates, marginal costs are backed out assuming optimal pricing under Bertrand-
Nash competition where automakers adjust prices to maximize profits from
both vehicle and regulatory credit sales, taking product choices as given. This
section presents the demand and supply models as well as estimation strategies.
3.3.1 Vehicle Demand Model
I define a market as the aggregated market of all the MSAs for each model year
from 2012 to 2014. Within each market, households purchase one model jwithin
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the inside goods or choose the outside good, which is defined as not purchas-
ing a new vehicle. I model vehicle purchase decision statically assuming that
consumers behave myopically and make their purchase decisions based on the
current price and product attributes. Due to the durable nature of vehicles, con-
sumers might delay their purchase expecting for price drop or quality improve-
ment in future [44]. However, unlike the markets of cellphones, computers, and
digital cameras where the technology is evolving rapidly, the automobile indus-
try is relatively mature and no technological breakthrough happened within my
sample period and the vehicle price and gasoline price were also stable between
MY 12-14. Thus, the benefits of delaying a purchase may not be high and assum-
ing a static vehicle demand model may be reasonable.
Household i’s utility from purchasing vehicle model j is defined as:
ui j =
K∑
k=1
x jkβ¯k − α1lnp j + ξ j︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
δ j
+α2
lnp j
Yi
+
∑
kr
x jkzirβokr +
∑
k
x jkvikβuk︸                                         ︷︷                                         ︸
µi j
+εi j (3.1)
where δ j is the mean utility of vehicle model j which is constant across con-
sumers in the same market. The x jk stands for the kth vehicle attribute for model
j, and I include horsepower, weight, size, gallons per mile as the observed ve-
hicle attributes. The price p j is the average transaction price observed from the
survey data, which is constant for a same model in all locations. The logarithm
of price is employed to make the price effect decrease as the price of a vehi-
cle model increases. The second component µi j captures heterogeneous utility
driven by both observed and unobserved consumer characteristics. Yi is house-
hold i’s income in the corresponding year and 1/Yi captures how a household’s
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income influences their price sensitivity. One would expect α2 to be negative
as higher income households would be less sensitive to a price increase due
to the diminishing marginal utility of money. zir denotes consumer i’s other
demographic variables including family size, whether living in an urban area,
the average gasoline price in the area, which are interacted with certain vehi-
cle attributes to capture variation in consumer preference due to observed het-
erogeneity. The unobserved consumer taste vik is assumed to have a standard
normal distribution. The coefficient βuk can be interpreted as the standard de-
viation in the unobserved preference for the vehicle attribute k conditional on
the consumer’s observed attributes. Let θ1 = {βokr, βuk}, denoting the “nonlinear”
parameters, and it is understood that the vector δ = {δ1, ..., δ j} is estimated con-
ditional on a given θ1. The last component εi j is the idiosyncratic preference
of household i for vehicle model j and it is assumed to have an i.i.d. Type 1
extreme value distribution. The Maritz data includes vehicle models that con-
sumers seriously considered other than the purchased model, which allows for
a ranking of both the first and second vehicle choice. Thus, the joint probability
of household i choosing j and seriously considering h as an alternative choice
when the outside option and j are removed is:
Pi jh =
∫
exp[δ j(θ1) + µi j(θ1)]
1 +
∑
g exp[δg(θ1) + µig(θ1)]
· exp[δh(θ1) + µih(θ1)]∑
g, j exp[δg(θ1) + µig(θ1)]
f (v)dv (3.2)
Instead of constructing moments exploiting the exogeneity assumption that
unobserved product attributes are uncorrelated with observed attributes, I esti-
mate the demand function using maximum likelihood as in [94, 61, 43, 98, 75].
Let lnRi = lnPi jh, denoting the individual log-likelihood of household i choos-
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ing the observed purchased model j and considering the observed alternative
choice h. The log-likelihood function of the entire sample for a single market is
therefore:
lnL =
N∑
i=1
lnRi (3.3)
The nonlinear parameters θ1 are estimated via maximum likelihood by max-
imizing the likelihood function above. To reduce the dimensionality of the co-
efficient space, I do not directly maximize the likelihood over the entire space
of (θ1, δ) but back out the mean utility δ conditional on θ1 using market share
inversion as in [12]. Define the probability of observing household i choosing
model j as:
Pi j =
∫
exp[δ j(θ1) + µi j(θ1)]
1 +
∑
g exp[δg(θ1) + µig(θ1)]
f (v)dv
The market demand is then the sum of individual consumers’ demand and
the predicted market share is obtained by calculating Pi j with parameters θ1
and δ and averaging over the N consumers in the survey sample. The mean
utility fixed effects δ are solved by matching the observed market shares from
the aggregate sales data to those predicted by the model:
S j = Sˆ j(θ1, δ(θ1, S )) =
∑
n
Pi j(θ1, δ)/N (3.4)
I estimate δ by contraction mapping following [14] and δ is calculated for
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each trial value of θˆ1 in the numerical search for the maximum of the log- likeli-
hood function:
δtj(θˆ1) = δ
t−1
j (θˆ1) + ln(S j) − ln(Sˆ j(θˆ1, δt−1j (θˆ1))) (3.5)
After estimating θˆ1 and δˆ(θˆ1), the “linear” parameters θ2 = {α1, β¯k} are esti-
mated using IV-GMM given the following specification:
δ j = −α1lnp j +
K∑
k=1
x jkβ¯k + ξ j
where ξ j denotes the unobserved vehicle attributes of model j. To control
for the correlation of price with the unobserved product attributes, following
Train and Winston (2007) [94] , I use BLP-style instruments Z j that measures the
sum of distance and squared distance in attribute space between own product
and other products in the same firm and from other firms. θ2 is estimated using
GMM solving the following minimization problem:
min
θ2
GJ(θ2)′WGJ(θ2) (3.6)
where J is the total number of models, W is the weighting matrix and GJ(θ2)
is the sample analog of the moment condition defined as:
GJ(θ2) =
1
J
∑
j
ξˆ jZ j
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3.3.2 Vehicle Supply
Vehicle manufacturers could meet tighter CAFE standards by adopting fuel-
saving innovations, by lowering the relative price of fuel-efficient vehicles and
reducing weight or adjusting other vehicle attributes. In this study, I only al-
low firms to adjust sales mix by changing prices to maximize the profit from
both vehicle sales and regulatory credit sales holding the models introduced
and vehicle characteristics constant. This “mix-shifting” strategy is a common
practice that automakers adopt in complying with the fuel economy regulation.
Jacobsen (2013) [53] tests the assumption of “mix-shifting” by exploiting time-
series variation in the stringency of CAFE at the firm level and his findings
strongly support this firm behavior: fuel-inefficient vehicles are priced higher
and fuel-efficient vehicles are priced lower when the standard is more binding.
Although there is evidence that automakers could redesign a vehicle model to
make it classified as a light truck to take advantage of the preferential treatment
of light trucks,14 this paper only focuses on the short-run impact of the stan-
dard split within a specific model year, and transforming a passenger car to a
light truck involves significant vehicle redesign such as significantly increasing
GVWR (weight), squeezing in a third row of seats or converting 2WD to 4WD
which takes a much longer production phase [77].15 Besides, the number of
light truck models introduced was quite stable during MY 2012-14, which my
data period covers. Therefore, only allowing automakers to adjust price is a rea-
sonable assumption for the scope of this paper and endogenizing automaker’s
decision in vehicle attributes is relevant for investigating the long run impact of
14Examples include Subaru’s 2004 Outback four-door sedan, Chrysler’s PT Cruiser, and Lexus
NX 300h, which all retain certain dimensions of a car but were classified as light trucks. The
practice helped the automakers improve their light truck average fuel economy.
15According to NHTSA (2010)[77], even increasing the footprint requires platform changes,
which usually occurs once every 5 years.
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the discrete attribute basing on the automobile industry.
The vehicle supply follows Berry et al. (1995)[14] with the modification of
adding the revenue from regulatory credit sales from the GHG program. Since
the national program is harmonized to allow automakers to build one single ve-
hicle fleet that satisfies both CAFE and GHG standard requirements, only GHG
credits sales, whose credit prices are observed, are modeled for simplicity.16 An
automaker f is assumed to face a profit-maximization problem that maximizes
the profit from both vehicle sales and sales from regulatory credits, which is
defined as follows,
max
p j, j∈J f
pi f =
∑
j=J f
[p jq j(P) − vc j(q j)] + λ
∑
j∈J f
(t j − e j)VMT j · q j(P), (3.7)
t j =

µc + γca j, j ∈ C
µt + γta j, j ∈ T
where J f is the set of all the vehicle models produced by firm f . vc j is the
total variable cost of producing model j, p j is the price and q j is the sales for
product j. P is the vector of prices of all the vehicle models in the market. e j is
the CO2 emission for vehicle model j and t j is the emission target for model j de-
pending on j’s footprint a j and whether it is classified as a car C or a light truck
T . Corresponding parameters µc and γc or µt and γt are plugged into the equa-
16The credit trading prices are not observed for the CAFE program. The vehicle supply mod-
eling here assumes that the two programs are equivalent. However, there are some differences
between CAFE and GHG programs, which are summarized in Leard and McConnell (2017)[64].
If the two programs are not fully harmonized, prices observed in the credit trading market of
one program will not reflect the marginal costs of compliance for the two programs.
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tion of t j to obtain the emission targets for each vehicle model. VMT j is the total
miles traveled over the life cycle of model j. EPA assumes that the lifetime VMT j
is 195,264 miles for cars and 225,865 miles for trucks. λ denotes the equilibrium
credit trading price. Since the new joint rule starting in 2012 allows credit trad-
ing between car and truck fleets within the same firm and also across firms, there
is only one equilibrium price for each unit of credit. The second summation in
Equation (7) denotes the total credit sales, which is positive if firms generate rev-
enue from producing excess credits and is negative if firms loss revenue from
buying credits from other firms to make up for credit shortage. The model here
assumes away credit banking and borrowing, and automakers are required to
use the credits generated within the current model year to comply with the reg-
ulation and are required to offset a negative balance by purchasing credits from
other firms. Under the current joint program, automakers are allowed to bank
credits for up to five years and carry back credits to offset previous deficits up
to three years. The flexibility intends to help automakers harmonize compli-
ance burden from year-to-year fluctuations of market shocks including chang-
ing fuel prices. For example, if a gasoline price drop makes consumers choose
more vehicles that are less fuel-efficient, using banked credits to make up for
credit shortage or carrying deficits and borrowing future credits could reduce
firm’s compliance burden in that affected year. Therefore, assuming away the
feature of credit banking and borrowing increases firms’ compliance cost and
would potentially overestimate the policy impact. However, my data period
MY 2012-14 witnessed a relatively stable gasoline price (around $3.5 per gallon
in average) and the gasoline price plummeted starting October 2014, which is
right after MY 2014 that is defined till August 2014. As long as the demand is
stable and there is no market shock that significantly affects firms’ compliance
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strategies across years, the static period-by-period should coincide with the dy-
namic solutions that incorporates credit banking and borrowing [53].
The first-order condition of the firm profit defined in Equation (7) with re-
spect to model j’s price p j is:
q j(P) + (
∑
r∈J f
pr −
∑
r∈J f
mcr − λ
∑
r∈J f
(er − tr)VMTr)∂qr
∂p j
= 0, ∀ j
The above systems of equations can be written in a matrix form as follows,
Q(P) + ∆[P − MC − λ(E − T )VMT ] = 0
P = −∆−1Q(P) + MC + λ(E − T )VMT (3.8)
where ∆ is a J by J matrix where J is complete set of all vehicle models in a
model year and the element of ∆ are:
∆ jk = {
∂q j
∂pk
if products j and k are produced by same firm
0 otherwise
and the elasticity element in the ∆ matrix can be estimated as:
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∂q j
∂p j
= M · ∂s j
∂p j
= M ·
∑N
i=1
∂si j
∂p j
N
= M ·
∑N
i=1 −αisi j(1 − si j)
N
∂q j
∂pk
= M · ∂s j
∂pk
= M ·
∑N
i=1 αisi jsik
N
where M denotes the market size. With the ∆ matrix estimated and λ ob-
tained from the credit trading market, I can back out marginal cost for each
model j. Without λ, marginal cost and the credit price cannot be separately
identified. For the trading credit values, I use the GHG credit price estimated
in Leard and McConnell (2017) [64], which are 36, 63, and 42 $/Mg respectively
for MY 2012-2014.17
MC = P + ∆−1Q(P) − λ(E − T )VMT (3.9)
This first-order condition differs from a profit maximization problem with-
out credit trading by having an extra term interacted with the credit price. If
there is no credit trading, the credit price will be zero and the first-order con-
dition will be the same as in a Bertrand price competition case for oligopolies.
With a positive credit price, there will be an additional cost for the vehicles
whose emissions are above the required level and an additional revenue from
selling the vehicles whose emissions are below the required level. Therefore,
with credit trading, the fuel economy regulation works as a revenue-neutral tax
system by taxing fuel-inefficient vehicles and subsidizing fuel-efficient vehicles.
Under the original CAFE system before 2012, there were three types of firms as
17[64] calculate the GHG credit price from the revenue of GHG credit sales by Tesla, and the
settlement between Hyundai and Kia and EPA and US Department of Justice concerning the
two automakers’ violation of the Clean Air Act.
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summarized in Jacobsen (2013)[53]: (i) firms with fleet fuel economy exceeding
the standard and therefore the constraint is not binding (ii) firms that violate
the standard and pay the associated fines and face a non-constraint less-penalty
profit maximizing problem and (iii) firms that are constrained by CAFE. Un-
der the joint program starting MY 2012, the credit-trading system encourages
firms who produce vehicles that overcomply with the regulation, those who
were originally not constrained by the regulation, to continue increasing fuel
efficiency to generate revenue from selling credits. Under the GHG program,
intentionally paying fines in lieu of meeting the standard is also no longer al-
lowed [77]. Therefore, all the three types of firms under the original CAFE pro-
gram have the incentives to continue increasing fuel economy to generate cred-
its under the new joint program and all the firms’ behaviors could be modeled
as a multi-product profit maximization problem with credit trading represented
by the single first-order condition above (Eq. (8)).
3.3.3 Identification
This subsection discusses the identification of the demand model. The prefer-
ence parameters are identified primarily through variation in the market shares
corresponding to variation in the choice set across markets, variation in the ob-
served vehicle attributes across models, and variation in observed consumer
demographic attributes.
The mean utility component δ represents the average consumer utility for
each vehicle model and is backed out by matching the observed market shares
with the model prediction. If there is no consumer heterogeneity, all variation in
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market shares would be driven by variation in the observed vehicle attributes.
The linear parameters β¯ and α1 in the mean utility are identified though vari-
ation in market shares corresponding to the variation in price and other ob-
served vehicle attributes (such as vehicle size). Due to the potential correlation
between unobserved vehicle attributes ξ j with price p j as automakers observe ξ j
when choosing prices, instruments that capture the extend of price competition
are used to correct for potential endogeneity. More specifically, following Train
and Winston (2017)[94] and Langer (2012)[61], I use BLP-style instruments as
the sum of the difference in attribute space between the vehicle and all others
sold by the same firm and all others sold by other firms, and also the sum of
the squared differences. Those distance instruments measure the competition
pressure that automakers face when pricing each model, which provides exoge-
nous variation in price that aids the identification of consumer average price
sensitivity.
The consumer heterogeneity component includes both the observed hetero-
geneity portion that could be explained by observed consumer attributes and
the unobserved heterogeneity portion that are related to unobserved consumer
tastes. Consumers have heterogenous preference and therefore different vehi-
cle models would attract consumers with different tastes. The parameters βokr,
which are associated with observed consumer attributes, are identified with the
aid of demographic information observed for different households who pur-
chased different vehicle models. For example, if we observe households with a
larger family size disproportionately purchased larger and heavier vehicles, we
would expect a positive coefficient for the interaction between family size and
vehicle weight. Variation in the transaction prices of the purchased vehicles
across different income groups helps identifying the parameter α2. If higher
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income groups tend to be less price sensitive to vehicle prices and dispropor-
tionately buy more expensive vehicle models, we would expect a negative sign
for α2, which captures the impact of income on consumers’ price sensitivity.
The unobserved consumer heterogeneity parameters βuk governs the substi-
tution pattern and are identified by the substitution patterns observed from both
the macro and micro-level data. At the macro data level, variation in the market
shares corresponding to variation in the choice set (available vehicle models)
helps identifying βuk . For example, if we observe a consumer purchases model A
in market 1 and another consumer with similar observed consumer attributes in
market 2 purchases model B when model A exits or becomes more expensive,
the proximity in vehicle attributes between model A and B helps the identi-
fication of βuk . At the micro data level, the alternative choices that consumers
considered when making purchase decisions provides valuable information in
estimating consumer’s substitution pattern between vehicles, which greatly as-
sists the identification of βuk . The alternative vehicle choices are the choices that
consumers make in a choice set where both the purchased choice and the out-
side option are removed. By observing each consumer’s alternative choice in
a hypothetical choice set that varies across consumers is similar to observing
consumer’s substitution with actual variation in choice sets. Since different con-
sumers buy different vehicle models, the number of the hypothetical choice sets
created by the alternative choice data equals to the number of purchased vehicle
choices, which provides variation in choice sets that are much richer than that
provided by macro-level data, which often relies on observing multiple mar-
kets or multiple model years. More specifically, the closeness in the vehicle at-
tributes between the purchased vehicle choice and the alternative vehicle choice
facilitates identifying the parameters βuk . For example, if consumers’ purchased
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vehicles and their seriously considered alternative choices are often within a
certain fuel economy range, we would expect a statistically significant coeffi-
cient for the unobserved heterogeneity parameter associated with MPG. Since
my data covers only 3 markets (MY12-14) which is relatively small compared
to previous applications of random coefficient discrete choice models that relies
on observing a large number of markets, most of the identification of the unob-
served heterogeneity parameters comes from the alternative choice information.
Berry et al.(2004)[15] note that having micro-level 2nd choice data greatly helps
the estimation of random coefficients when they only have observations for one
model year and Train and Winston (2007)[94] also mention that including alter-
native choice data significantly improves the precision of the random coefficient
estimates.
3.4 Estimation Results
3.4.1 Demand parameters
Table 3.2 & 3.3 report the estimation results of the demand model. The mean
utility δ represents the average preference consumers have for each vehicle
model and are estimated via matching the model predicted market share to the
observed market share. The mean preference coefficients for price and each
observed vehicle attribute are recovered from GMM-IV estimation with the in-
struments correcting for the endogeneity of price. Both OLS and IV results are
reported in Table 3.2 and reflect the preferences for vehicle attributes that are
generally expected. In average, consumers have a negative preference for price
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and the price coefficient in the IV specification is more negative, suggesting OLS
underestimates the price sensitivity. Consumers have a positive preference for
acceleration, measure by horsepower/weight. Without interacting with gaso-
line price, the coefficient for gallons/mile is positive, suggestion average con-
sumers do not like fuel-efficient cars but prefer cars that are more powerful.
Consumers in general prefer cars that are heavier and dislike alternative fuel
vehicles including hybrid and plug-in electric vehicles. Conditional on other
vehicle attributes, consumers dislike vans and pickups but favors SUVs relative
to passenger cars, which coincides with the evidence that the SUV segment ex-
periences the largest sales increase among all vehicle categories in recent years.
The positive signs for MY 13 and MY 14 dummies suggest that consumers pre-
fer MY 13 and MY 14 vehicles to MY 12 models, controlling for other vehicle
attributes.
Turning to the consumer heterogeneity parameters, with the aid from the in-
dividual transaction data, the interaction terms of consumer demographics with
vehicle attributes are estimated precisely with intuitive signs. The coefficient of
log(price) divided by income captures the extent to which a consumer’s price
sensitivity varies with income. The negative sign of the estimate suggests that
households with lower income react more negatively to a vehicle’s price than
households with higher income. The elasticities implied from the price prefer-
ence will be further discussed below. Compared with households who live in
suburban and rural areas, households who live in urban areas are less likely to
adopt pickups, probably due to less towing utility and limited parking space,
but are more interested in alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs) due to both more fre-
quent city driving needs and better refueling infrastructure provided in urban
areas. Households of a larger family size prefer larger vehicles that are heavier.
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The interaction of gasoline price with gallons/mile, which measures the operat-
ing cost per mile of the vehicle, has a negative sign, suggesting that consumers
have a negative preference for the fuel cost.
Three random coefficients are included, which represent unobserved con-
sumer heterogenous preference for gallons/mile, horsepower/weight, and
light trucks. As indicated by the estimation results, data on consumers’ alterna-
tive vehicle choices greatly helps precisely identifying those parameters. Based
on the standard normal distribution of the random taste vik, the coefficient βuk
can be interpreted as the standard deviation in the unobserved preference for
the vehicle attribute k. To reduce simulation noise and bias, following Train
and Winston (2007)[94], I use 150 Halton draws in the simulation of the integral
over the unobserved consumer taste v. 18 All of the three coefficients are statis-
tically significant, indicating that consumers have heterogenous preference for
those vehicle attributes conditional on the observed consumer characteristics.
Those precisely estimated random coefficient parameters help breaking down
the I.I.A. problem experienced in traditional logit models and play a critical role
in governing the substitution patterns.
3.4.2 Elasticities and Profit Margins
The demand system implies sensible elasticities and markups. All implied own-
price elasticties are greater than one, ranging from -7.75 to -3.5 with an average
being -5.51 and standard deviation being 0.37. The sales-weighted average elas-
ticity among all the 1,318 products in three model years is -5.55. The magnitude
18Halton draws are a type of low-discrepancy sequence. The demand results are similar when
the number of Halton draws are increased to 200.
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of the own-price elasticities are close to those obtained in Berry et al.(1995)[14],
Petrin (2002)[81], Beresteanu and Li (2011)[11] and Li (2012) [69]. Figure 3.6
plots the own-price elasticities against price and demonstrates that more ex-
pensive models tend to have less elastic demand. With the elasticity estimates,
the price-cost margins are recovered. The average implied price-cost margin is
19.0% (sales-weighted average being 19.1%) of the transaction price, which is
close to 24% in [14], 16.7% in [81], 17.7% in [11] and 18.13% in [69] . Figure 3.7
plots the estimated profit-cost margins against transaction prices, which demon-
strates a pattern that more expensive models have a larger profit margin as they
usually target consumers who have a higher income and thus are less sensitive
to prices. Alternatively, products with more elastic demand tend to have lower
price-cost margins than products with less elastic demand. For example, the
price-cost margins for 2014 Chevrolet Spark and Porsche 911 are 16% and 22%
respectively.
With the estimated implied profit-cost margins and the credit trading com-
ponent, marginal costs are backed out from transaction prices using the first
order condition in Equation (9), which will be used for counterfactual simula-
tions.
3.5 Policy Simulations
To quantify the welfare impact of the discrete attribute basing in CAFE stan-
dards, I set passenger cars and light trucks subject to a uniform standard using
a single footprint-based standard formula and simulate counterfactual market
outcomes and compare the social welfare with the observed scenario.
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3.5.1 Simulation Method
I run a counterfactual simulation where light trucks and passenger cars are sub-
ject to a uniform footprint-based standard. The footprint-based feature is still
preserved, since it encourages automakers to improve fuel economy of all sizes
and helps preserving the size distribution of the entire fleet by reducing the in-
centives for automakers to downsize the vehicles, alleviating the safety concern.
Keeping the footprint-based standards instead of having one single target for all
vehicles also makes the alternative policy less aggressive. The alternative policy
essentially removes the differential treatment between cars and trucks with the
same footprint. Since my paper focuses on the impact of attribute basing on the
car-truck classification, maintaining the footprint-based feature helps me isolate
the impact of the standard split between cars and trucks.
The uniform standard would use the sales-weighted average parameters for
the footprint-based emission standard formula:
t j = µ + γa j, ∀ j
µ = (1 − s)µc + sµt, γ = (1 − s)γc + sγt
where s denotes the market share of light trucks. Figure 3.8 depicts the
uniform footprint-based standards for MY 2014: light trucks are subject to
more stringent targets and passenger cars are subject to less stringent tar-
gets. Throughout the counterfactual exercise, I assume that automakers do not
change vehicle attributes other than price, and therefore the estimated results re-
flect the short-run impact of the discrete attribute basing under CAFE. To com-
pare the policy impacts on consumer surplus, I compare the welfare losses of
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the two policies in making consumers’ choices deviate from their private op-
tima. More specifically, I estimate the monetary transfer that is need to make
consumers indifferent between the choice with policy and the choice without
policy for both of counterfactual and observed policy scenarios, which mea-
sures the policy compliance cost borne by consumers.
Since automakers are subject to a different standard in the counterfactual
scenario, the new equilibrium regulatory credit price along with the new equi-
librium vehicle prices and sales need to be resolved. The simulations are carried
out through the following steps:
1. Plug the initial credit price and the initial vehicle price vector p, but the
counterfactual emission target into the first order condition, as defined in
Equation (8).
2. Update the price vector such that the difference between the left-hand side
and the right-hand side are within a certain threshold.
3. Calculate the credits generated by each firm conditioning on the new equi-
librium sales. Sum across all firms to obtain the total credits for the market.
If there is excess demand (supply) for credits in the equilibrium, increase
(decrease) the credit price and repeat from step (1) to find a new equilib-
rium.
4. If there is again excess demand (supply), further increase (decrease) the
credit price and repeat the above steps until the newly searched credit
price clears the credit trading market.
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3.5.2 Impacts on market outcomes
Under the uniform standard, the more efficient passenger car models are subject
to a lower standard than before and thus receive more subsidy, while the less
efficient trucks are subject to a more stringent target and thus receive a higher
implicit tax. Due to the larger share of light trucks, the automaker industry is
facing a more stringent regulation in general. The original credit price is too low
to clear the credit trading market, inducing excess credit demand. Not surpris-
ingly, the simulated new credit price increases to $133.1, reflecting an increase in
the stringency and marginal compliance burden of the regulation. With changes
in the credit price and emission targets from removing the attribute basing, au-
tomakers need to re-adjust the sales mix by increasing the sales of the vehicles
which could generate more credits while balancing between the revenue from
vehicles sales and credit sales. The magnitude of vehicle price and sales changes
depend on the own and cross price elasticties. Table 3.4 shows the price and
market share impacts of the uniform standard on different vehicle segments.
In average, the price of passenger cars decreases by $471 with the largest
price reduction from battery electric vehicles (BEVs) such as Tesla Model S, Nis-
san LEAF, Ford Focus Electric, which would have a price reduction over $13,000.
With a higher regulatory credit price, automakers rely more on BEV models to
generate credits since they are the models which have the least tailpipe emis-
sions and they are treated having zero emissions under the current regulation.
The implicit subsidy under CAFE is close to the price difference between EVs
and their gasoline counterparts. Having a uniform standard would make BEV
models more affordable and encourage more consumers to adopt this new tech-
nology. With a higher credit price, automakers are also reducing the sales of car
143
models which are least fuel-efficient by increasing their prices. The car models
that experience the highest price hikes are Dodge Viper, Audi R8, Mercedes-
Benz C63, which are all luxury sporty cars with the lowest fuel efficiency.
Without the favorable treatment for the light truck category, the prices for
light trucks would increase by $2,766.2 in average. More specifically, SUVs
would have an average price increase of $2,215.9, with the least price increases
from SUV models that are fairly fuel efficient such as Lexus RX350, Lexus RX450
Hybrid, and Subaru XV Crosstrek Hybrid, and the largest price increases from
the models which are the least fuel efficient: Mercedes-Benz G63, Lexus Lx570
and Mercedes-Benz GL63. Similar patterns are observed for the van segment.
The average price increase of vans is $2,988.7 with GMC Savana Passenger Van,
Ford E-150 and Ford E-350 Passenger Vans experiencing the largest price in-
crease over $7,000. The prices for pickups would go up by $4,317.2 in average,
higher than both the SUV and Van segments due to a higher emission level in
general. The pickup models that are hurt most under the uniform standard
are: RAM Pickup 3500 and RAM Pickup 2500. Figure 3.9 panel (a) and (b) plot
the relationship between the price change under the uniform standard and fuel
economy level for the passenger car and light truck segments respectively. As
expected, the sign and magnitude of the price changes are highly correlated
with the fuel economy levels. In general, passenger cars with higher fuel effi-
ciency experience a larger price decrease and light trucks with lower fuel effi-
ciency experience a larger price increase.
Removing the standard split between cars and trucks has a significant im-
pact on the market structure of the automobile industry. The total sales in the
car segment would increase by 8.0% and the total sales of light trucks would
144
decrease by 4.9% with the sales in the SUV, van and pickup segments falling
by 1.5%, 12.2%, and 11.9% respectively. The uniform standard hurts the van
segment more since it has fewer models available than the SUV and pickup
segments, making it easier for consumers to switch to other segments given a
price increase. The SUV segment has the least percentage decrease in profit
due to its largest sales base and the largest number of available model choices
among the light truck category. With more models to choose from, consumers
are more likely to switch from expensive SUV models to less-expensive SUV
models instead of switching out of the segment. The sales decrease of the SUV
segment is also likely to be offset by consumers switching from the van and
pickup segments. The uniform standard affects the market structure by increas-
ing the market share of cars and decreasing the market share of light trucks.
The total market share of passenger cars increases from 46.6% to 49.7% and
the market share of light trucks decreases from 53.4% to 50.3%. The decreas-
ing price for some fuel-efficient car models increase the utility of owning new
cars and makes some consumers switch from the outside good towards buying
a new vehicle. The uniform standard increases the sales from the subsidized
car segment more than the sale losses from truck segment that is being taxed
more. This should not be surprising considering that small car buyers are more
price sensitive than truck buyers and they are more likely to switch from choos-
ing public transportation or used cars to purchasing new cars. With a stronger
preference for new vehicles, existing light truck buyers are also less likely to
switch to the outside option due to a higher price from the removal of the pref-
erential treatment for trucks. The uniform standard also makes a more efficient
vehicle fleet by increasing the sales-weighted average fuel economy from 26.1
mpg to 27.5 mpg, compared with the current standard that features the discrete
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attribute basing. This fuel economy change translates to a considerable vehicle-
lifetime gasoline consumption saving up to 1.61 billion gallons discounted to
MY 2014.
3.5.3 Welfare impact
This section explores the welfare impact of removing the discrete attribute bas-
ing by focusing on consequences on consumer surplus, firm profits, and ex-
ternalities associated with air pollutants, emissions and accidents, which are
interpreted as total vehicle lifetime changes from annual sales.
Consumer surplus
A policy intervention like the fuel economy regulation intends to alter consumer
vehicle choice to help consumers internalize the externalities associated with
their behaviors. An efficient policy is to improve the social welfare by reduc-
ing the external costs from the externality that the policy intends to target while
minimizing the distortionary cost and the welfare loss in consumer surplus.
Consumer surplus loss under the regulation could be thought as the compli-
ance cost that consumers need to bear and is defined as the utility loss due to
deviation form their private optimal choice. If a consumer purchases a vehi-
cle that is being subsided (taxed) under CAFE while the consumer would have
purchased the same vehicle without CAFE, this consumer experiences a welfare
gain (loss), which is equal to the difference of consumer surplus of purchasing
the model with and without the subsidy (tax). If, however, consumers are in-
duced by CAFE to pick a model that deviates from their private optimal choice,
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they suffer a welfare loss, which is equal to the gap in the intrinsic utility be-
tween a consumer’s top choice and the policy-induced choice. For example,
if a consumer chooses a vehicle model A without CAFE, while being induced
to purchase a sub-optimal model B by the relative price change due to CAFE,
the consumer suffers a welfare loss which is equal to the difference between the
consumer surplus obtained from the private optimal choice A and that obtained
from the suboptimal choice B.
To compare the welfare impact on consumer surplus between the two CAFE
policies with and without attribute basing, I first simulate the equilibrium price
without CAFE regulation. Following Barwick et al. (2017) [8], I use simulations
to compare the welfare loss from the fuel economy regulations with and with-
out the discrete attribute basing. I draw 10,000 random idiosyncratic preference
vectors ei from the Type 1 extreme value distribution for each consumer i. Con-
ditional on each draw, I calculate the difference in the intrinsic utility between
a consumers’ private optimal choice and the policy-induced choice under each
CAFE scenario. Let j∗ denote the private optimal choice for consumer i with its
intrinsic utility defined as:
u0i j∗ = maxj=0,...,J
{δ0j + µ0i j + i j} (3.10)
where δ0j and µ
0
i j are evaluated at the price level under the no CAFE scenario.
Suppose consumer i chooses vehicle model g instead of j∗ under the CAFE pol-
icy such that:
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u1ig = maxj=0,...,J
{δ1j + µ1i j + i j} (3.11)
where δ j and µi j are evaluated at the price level with CAFE. The monetized
welfare loss for consumer i is defined as the difference in the intrinsic utility
between the private optimal choice j∗ with the choice g made under CAFE,
divided by consumer i’s price sensitivity:
∆CS i = (u0i j∗ − u0ig)/
∂ui j
∂p j
, g , j∗ (3.12)
When consumer does not change their optimal choice with the CAFE policy,
the change in consumer surplus is the welfare loss (gain) from the implicit tax
or subsidy he or she receives:
∆CS i = (−α1(lnP1j∗ − lnP0j∗) +
α2
Yi
(lnP1j∗ − lnP0j∗))/
∂ui j
∂p j
, g = j∗ (3.13)
where P0j∗ and P
1
j∗ are the prices for the optimal vehicle choice j
∗ under the
no policy and CAFE policy scenarios respectively. The above consumer surplus
change is evaluated for each i draw and then averaged across all draws to ob-
tain the welfare loss (gain) for consumer i. The total welfare loss due to policy is
obtained by averaging the individual welfare changes and multiplied with the
total market size.
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A policy would result in a higher consumer welfare loss if it makes more
people to choose a model that deviates from their private optimal choice. The
simulation results suggest that the current CAFE with discrete attribute bas-
ing costs $0.77 billion in consumer welfare while the CAFE policy removing
the standard split results in a higher welfare loss, amounting to $1.75 billion.
The uniform standard leads to a higher consumer welfare loss since the mag-
nitude of the implicit tax/subsidy is larger due to a more stringent regulation,
more likely to make consumers deviate from their private optimal choice. This
finding is actually consistent with the implication from the theoretical illustra-
tion that the uniform standard incurs a higher compliance cost, reflected by
the longer length of the compliance vector in Figure 3.5. Reynaert and Sallee
(2017)[83] study the impact of firms’ gaming in carbon emission standards
for automobiles and find gaming in a binding fuel economy regulation could
benefit consumers since it leads to lower prices by reducing firms’ regulatory
costs.19 Analogously, the CAFE standards that feature the discrete attribute bas-
ing could reduce the compliance cost of automakers, especially the firms that
produce a greater amount of light trucks, potentially benefit consumers through
lower prices. However, the compliance burden measured by the loss in con-
sumer private surplus needs to be evaluated against the social benefits from
reduction in externalities that the policy intends to target. With a optimally-set
policy standard, consumers would benefit more from the reduction in external-
ities than they loss in private surplus. Although the uniform standard leads to
a larger consumer welfare loss, much of the policy-induced switching is not a
19Reynaert and Sallee (2017)[83] examine firms’ manipulation of fuel economy ratings in
the case of the carbon emissions regulation for automobiles in Europe. They find the imple-
mentation of aggressive carbon policies coincided with a significant decline of the accuracy of
laboratory-based carbon emission ratings. They show that even gaming causes consumers to
mis-optimize which leads to a loss in consumer surplus, it could benefit consumers through
lower prices as gaming allows firms to reduce their costs.
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distortion but an efficient change because it makes more consumers switch from
the private optimal choice to the socially optimal choice by taking into consid-
eration of the external costs of gasoline consumption. By allowing light trucks
which generally emit more to receive a preferential treatment, the CAFE with
attribute basing fails to make a consumer’s vehicle choice achieve the socially
optimal level. The relative subsidy for light trucks could even result in deviation
from private optimum which is not efficient: consumers might choose vehicle
models which are neither privately optimal nor socially optimal. In contrast,
the uniform standard not only eliminates the loophole of implicitly subsidizing
light trucks, but also encourages a consumer’s vehicle choice towards the social
optimum.
Firm Profits
Table 3.5 summarizes the impact of removing the discrete attribute basing on
firms’ profits. Removing the car-truck standard split decreases the total prof-
its of domestic firms by 1.8% while the European and Asian enjoy a 4.0% and
1.5% boost in total profits respectively. The results imply that discrete attribute
basing favors domestic firms at the expensive of foreign firms, which should
not come as a surprise. Domestic firms have a disproportionately large share of
vehicles that are classified as light trucks (Figure 3.11). The discrete attribute,
which essentially provides a preferential treatment for light trucks, reduces the
compliance burden for domestic firms. Asian firms, on the other hand, produce
relative fuel-efficient vehicles. Even though they also have a relative large pro-
duction presence in SUVs and vans in recent years, their fuel economy is higher
and some are above the fuel economy targets. Asian firms also did not produce
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pickup trucks, which are normally dominated by domestic firms. European
firms are hurt by the ABR the most due to their least production of light trucks.
The changes in firm profits are also in line with the lobbying efforts by differ-
ent firms. Asian firms have been advocating a more uniform standard while
domestic firms tend to support the attribute-based standard.
On one hand, the car-truck standard split leads to a higher relative price of
passenger cars, which puts cars into a position of disadvantage. On the other
hand, by offering light trucks a less-stringent target, firms with a larger share
of passenger cars also lose revenues from selling excess credits to firms who
produce more light trucks and run a credit shortage. Table 3.5 also shows the
total profit of the automobile industry increases, which might be surprising at
first sight. Even though removing the attribute basing increases the stringency
of the regulation and makes firms bear a large compliance burden, it makes
fuel-efficient passenger cars such as electric vehicles, hybrid vehicles and some
fuel-efficient small and mid-sized gasoline cars more affordable, attracting con-
sumers who were not originally planning to purchase a new vehicle to buy those
cars, increasing the market size of new vehicles.20 The results imply that the im-
plementation of the discrete attribute basing under CAFE deters the diffusion
path of alternative fuel vehicle (AFVs) technologies. Due to the technology con-
straint such as the battery constraint, most of the alternative fuel vehicles are
built on passenger car chassis. 21 The ABR puts passenger cars into a disadvan-
tage and indirectly negatively impact the growth of the market size of alterna-
tive fuel vehicles. Especially during the early deployment stage of a new tech-
20As pointed in Section 3.6.2, small car buyers are more price sensitive than truck buyers and
are more likely to switch between the outside option (public transportation and used cars) and
new cars. It is expected that a uniform standard leads to a larger market size from an increasing
number of new car buyers, more than offsetting the loss in the truck segment.
21By the end of May 2017, 12 out of the 13 BEV models are passenger cars, 16 out of the 21
PHEV models are passenger cars, and the only 3 hydrogen vehicles are all passenger cars.
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nology, the car-truck standard split generates externalities in those AFV markets
due to indirect network effects, and the total impact could be significantly large
if taking into account of the feedback loops [70].22
Figure 3.10 presents the impact of removing ABR on the profits of a selected
group of automakers covering different countries of origin. The heterogenous
impact on different firms reflect important heterogeneity that arises from the
differences in firm’s product mix. Firms with a larger production share of fuel-
efficient passenger cars are hurt by the attribute basing the most, while the firms
with a larger production share of fuel-inefficient light trucks benefit more from
ABR. With the removal of standard split between cars and trucks, domestic Big
Three all experience a profit drop with Fiat-Chrysler suffering the largest profit
decrease due to its largest production share of light trucks (about 70%). Ford
and GM also maintain a relatively fuel-efficient passenger car fleet compared
with Fiat-Chrysler, as shown in Figure 4.23 With a uniform standard, the stan-
dard for passenger cars actually becomes looser while the standard for light
trucks becomes more stringent. Many of the vehicles in the passenger car fleet
of both Ford and GM generate abundant credits and their relative prices will be
lower, attracting consumers who were originally planning to buy a light truck
and who were not considering buying a new vehicle. The increase in profits
from the passenger car fleet offsets part of the profit loss from the light truck
segment. Fiat-Chrysler, on the other contrary, does not benefit much from the
uniform standard due to their less-fuel efficient passenger car fleet, and thus the
22For example, a smaller number of EV sales would negatively impact the investment of
charging stations, which would then further decrease the sales of EVs.
23Ford and GM are also more actively involved in the alternative fuel vehicle market. GM’s
Chevrolet Volt has been one of the most popular PHEV models. Ford has introduced many
popular hybrid and PHEV vehicles including Ford Fusion Hybrid, Ford C-Max Hybrid, Ford
C-Max Energi, and Ford Fusion Energi. The uniform CAFE standard will benefit the two firms
from the increase in sales of those AFV models. Chrysler is not an active player in either the
hybrid or the EV segment.
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profit increase from its passenger car fleet is not able to offset much of the profit
loss of their light truck fleet, leading to a larger profit loss. Tesla, which only
produces EVs, benefits from the uniform standard by being able to generate
more revenue from selling regulatory credits to other firms.
Among Asian firms, Toyota and Nissan experience a profit increase around
5%, while Honda suffers a profit loss about 0.6% from removing the discrete
attribute basing. Even though Honda maintains a relatively fuel-efficient fleet
for both passenger cars and light trucks, when the standard split is removed,
the sales increase in the its passenger car fleet is not able to cover the profit loss
from its light truck fleet, due to increased competition from Toyota and Nissan
in the passenger car segment. Honda also has a higher production share of light
trucks (40%) than Toyota (35%) and Nissan (29%) and thus suffer more com-
pliance burden from the uniform standard (Figure 3.11). Among Asian firms,
Honda is also considered as one of the “laggards” in electric vehicle industry
with its minimum effort in investing EVs [82]. Therefore, with a more stringent
regulation, Honda is not able to rely on EVs to generate more credits as other au-
tomakers who lead the EV market. The European firms, however, all experience
a profit increase due to their larger investment in passenger cars and the least
production share of light trucks (about 20%). Combining Figure 3.10 and Fig-
ure 3.11 reveals a general pattern that the distributional effects of the discrete
attribute basing is highly correlated with the production share of light trucks:
firms with a larger light truck fleet suffer more from the removal of attribute
basing.
The empirical findings here are consistent with Ito and Sallee (2016)[52] that
attribute basing could achieve redistribution if policy makers want to shift wel-
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fare across producers based on the secondary attribute. The CAFE regulators
could use the car-truck standard split to redistribute producer surplus from for-
eign firms to domestic firms who produce a larger share of less fuel-efficient
light trucks. However, the benefits of the distributional goals, possibly protec-
tionism, should be evaluated against the potential welfare loss due to the dis-
tortion from the secondary attribute. When policy makers are designing the op-
timal standard difference, they should balance between maximizing the distri-
butional goals (which requires an increase in the standard gap) and minimizing
the welfare loss from the distortion in the secondary attribute (which requires a
reduction in the standard gap).
ABR also decreases the vehicle market size by discouraging some consumers
from buying new vehicles. Those consumers would then switch to the outside
option by buying a used car or choosing public transportation. The implemen-
tation of ABR thus results in a redistribution of producer surplus across indus-
tries from the substitution to the outside option. Evaluating the impact of ABR
across industries is beyond the scope of this paper and this study will evaluate
the welfare impact within the automobile industry without taking account of
the cross-industry profit redistribution.
Externalities
As indicated in the graphic illustration of Figure 3.5, the attribute basing results
in a decrease in emission reduction and an increase in the market share of light
trucks. Therefore, removing the car-truck standard split will reduce both the
emission level and the sales of light trucks. A uniform standard will result in a
market share of light trucks that is even smaller than the level in a no-regulation
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scenario. However, this is an efficient change rather than a distortion, reflect-
ing that consumers internalize the externalities of gasoline consumption when
choosing between a passenger car and a light truck.
Simulation results show that unifying the standards results in total reduc-
tions in vehicle lifetime gasoline consumption up to 1.61 billion gallons (or a
1.92% decrease) and CO2 emissions up to 14.9 million metric tons over vehicle
lifetime for the vehicles sold in 2014. The total external costs that could be saved
from this reduction in CO2 emissions by switching from the ABR to a uniform
standard are estimated to be $0.54 billion. Through burning petroleum, vehi-
cle use also generates certain criteria air pollutants, including volatile organic
compounds (VOC), nitrogen oxides(NOx), fine particulate matter (PM2.5), and
sulfur dioxide (SOx). The consumption of petroleum products also increases the
external costs associated with dependence on oil imports. To quantify the eco-
nomic value of reduction in criteria air pollutants and oil imports, I connect the
changes of the fleet composition due to the uniform standards with the external
costs associated with one gallon of gasoline usage using the estimates adopted
by NHTSA in evaluating the environmental benefits of CAFE standards, con-
verted to 2014 dollars adjusting for inflation. The parameter values and sources
are reported in Table 3.7 and the external cost savings from the removal of the
discrete attribute basing are reported in Table 3.6. All of the numbers of exter-
nality savings reflect total vehicle lifetime changes from annual sales and are
discounted to the model year 2014.24
It is worthwhile noting the caveats underlying those estimates. First, the
24EPA assumes the total vehicle lifetime mileage to be 195,264 for passenger cars and 225,865
for light trucks. I assume a vehicle lifetime of 15 years for both passenger cars and light trucks
and an annual mileage of 13,018 and 15,058 respectively. The annual discount rate is assumed
to be 5%.
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lifetime VMT is assumed to be fixed under the two CAFE scenarios. Under
the uniform standard, consumers choose the fuel efficiency level higher than
in the ABR, which could induce them to drive more due to the decreased cost
of driving per mile for a given gasoline price, resulting in the rebound effects,
which could undermine the policy gain from a more stringent CAFE. However,
stricter fuel economy regulations encourage consumers to choose smaller and
lower-performance vehicles, which reduces the marginal benefits of driving per
mile. Thus, the rebound effects could be weakened by shrinking car size and
the net response of miles could be zero or negative [4, 95]. Second, the out-
side option is assumed not to consume any gasoline. In reality, all the other
transportation methods (subway, buses, biking...) are lumped into the outside
option with each consuming different levels of gasoline. Assessing the substi-
tution with each of the alternative transportation mode in the outside option
and evaluate the respective gasoline consumption change is beyond the scope
of this paper. The simulation results show that removing the discrete attribute
basing makes some consumers switch from the outside option to new cars, and
assuming that the outside option does not consume gasoline would underesti-
mate the gasoline savings from the uniform standard by the amount equaling
to the total gasoline consumption from the outside choices.
Basing the stringency of the regulation on a secondary attribute is likely to
create a undesirable byproduct if the distortion in the secondary attribute is re-
lated to an unwanted outcome or another externalitity that regulation does not
intend to target. In addition to having a higher weight than passenger cars that
impose greater risks to victims in a collision, light trucks are constructed to be
taller implying a higher probability of hitting the head or the upper body of
other road users. Light trucks also have stiffer frames that transfer more force
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to the victims, resulting in a higher probability of fatality [41, 97, 78, 3, 2]. Con-
sumers buy light trucks as a precautionary measure to protect themselves in a
multi-vehicle collisions, while creating an externality to other road users due to
a greater danger that light trucks impose to both other light trucks and passen-
ger cars. This kind of “arms race” results in market share of light trucks larger
than the socially optimal level [69]. The differential treatment of passenger cars
and light trucks under CAFE not only fails to correct for this externality, but
exacerbates the externality by implicitly subsidizing light trucks and creating
additional policy-induced distortion. By estimating consumer’s preference for
reduced fatality risk in vehicle collisions, or the value of a statistical life (VSL), Li
(2012)[69] estimates that the accident externality imposed by a light truck dur-
ing a 10-year discounted vehicle life time is equal to $2,444 in 2006. By updating
parameters using 2014 market conditions, the accident-related externalitity is
estimated to be $2,701 in 2014 dollars. The discrete attribute basing leads to
an additional sales of 354,269 in light trucks. One back-of-the-envelop estimate
implies that the increase in light trucks leads to a welfare loss of $0.96 billion.
However, the uniform standard that removes the standard split between cars
and trucks makes the fuel-efficient passenger cars more affordable, increasing
the market size of new vehicles. Part of the external cost savings from fewer
light trucks are offset by the increased automobile usage. To take account of
this effect, the external cost of increased accidents from the additional cars25 are
subtracted from the accident externality savings from the uniform standard by
assuming all the consumers who switch from the outside option to new cars
were not planning to buy any vehicle. The resulting net-savings in accident
externalities from the uniform standard is estimated to be $0.42 billion.
25The value of accident-related external cost from additional cars used for calculating accident
externality savings from a uniform standard is reported in Table 3.7.
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This estimate provided here is relatively crude, which does not take account
of the heterogeneity of the risks imposed by the vehicles within the light truck
segment. A more accurate estimate would require a more detailed estimate of
the additional probability of fatality that light trucks impose in a multi-vehicle
collision for each of the light truck model, which currently is unavailable. The
externality estimate here also does not include the externality that light trucks
impose to road users other than vehicle occupants.
Figure 3.12 summaries the findings of the welfare consequences discussed
above. Compared with the ABR, although a uniform standard results in larger
loss in consumer surplus by making more consumers’ choices deviate from the
private optima, the changes are rather efficient, resulting in a larger firm profit,
and larger savings in external costs related to gasoline consumption and vehicle
accidents, and eventually a net social welfare improvement up to $2.83 billion
in MY 2014.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the welfare consequences of attribute basing on a dis-
crete characteristic in the context of U.S. fuel economy regulation. Through a
structural model of vehicle demand and supply, I run simulations of remov-
ing the standard split between passenger cars and light trucks and find that
the discrete attribute basing raises the sales of light trucks by 4.9% and reduces
the sales of passenger cars by 8.0%. The policy-induced sales increase of light
trucks leads to increase of externalities associated with vehicle-lifetime pollu-
tant emissions, carbon emissions, and oil imports amounting to $1.09 billion.
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Due to the structural difference of light trucks, the favorable treatment of light
trucks also results in an increase in accident-related externalities equivalent to
$0.42 billion. Although the uniform standard results in a larger deviation in
vehicle choice away from consumer’s private optimum, much of the change is
actually efficient and the uniform standard dominates the attribute basing pol-
icy by $2.83 billion in social welfare taking into account consumer surplus, firm
profits and externalities. ABR redistributes producer surplus between domestic
and foreign firms: the car-truck standard split increases the profits of domestic
firms by 1.8% and reduces the profits of Asian and European firms by 1.5% and
4.0% respectively. However, the benefit of favoring domestic firms should be
evaluated against the additional distortionary cost induced by the discrete at-
tribute basing. Since most of alternative fuel vehicles are built on a passenger
car chassis due to technology constraint, the standard split that puts passenger
cars into disadvantage could potentially deter the diffusion of alternative fuel
technologies and the negative impact could be multiplied due to the existence
of indirect network effects. Results of this paper suggest that any political and
distributional argument in favor of policy differentiation should be carefully
evaluated against the significant distortions created by the difference in regula-
tion stringency or policy incentive.
This paper has several limitations and motivates two lines of possible ex-
tensions. First, the vehicle supply framework is based on a static setup and
assumes away credit banking and borrowing. Since my data sample covers
MY 2012-14, a period when the fuel prices were quite stable and no significant
demand shock occurred, the static solution of this study should approximate
the dynamic solution when firms are allowed to carry credits backward or for-
ward. Future work could model a firm’s dynamic decision in maximizing prof-
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its from vehicle and credit sales by incorporating the credit banking feature to
investigate the impact of attribute basing on the automobile industry in a longer
horizon. Second, this study assumes that automakers choose only price to max-
imize profit from vehicle and compliance credit sales. However, automakers in
reality employ the strategy that is the least costly and might apply a mixture
of strategies to comply with the regulation. When the “sales-mix” strategy is
rather expensive to adopt due to an increase in regulation stringency, automak-
ers might seek alternative methods that result in lower compliance cost such as
increasing fuel economy of existing models. Therefore, by restricting automak-
ers to apply the “sales-mix” strategy, the results presented in this study would
overestimate the policy impact from a more stringent standard. However, as
long as the time horizon is short and the distribution of compliance burdens
across fleets does not change, the qualitative findings in my study would re-
main. Further research that focuses on the long-term impact could estimate the
distortionary cost of the discrete attribute basing by estimating the additional
cost and resources that automakers put in designing light trucks to receive a
more favorable regulatory treatment.
160
Ta
bl
e
3.
1:
Su
m
m
ar
y
of
C
on
su
m
er
Su
rv
ey
D
at
a
20
12
20
13
20
14
A
ll
Ye
ar
s
V
ar
ia
bl
es
M
ea
n
St
d.
D
ev
M
ea
n
St
d.
D
ev
M
ea
n
St
d.
D
ev
M
ea
n
St
d.
D
ev
H
ou
se
ho
ld
in
co
m
e
(1
,0
00
$)
12
1.
38
97
.7
1
12
2.
83
10
8.
31
12
2.
47
97
.7
8
12
2.
26
10
1.
39
H
ou
sh
ol
d
si
ze
2.
67
1.
24
2.
63
1.
22
2.
58
1.
18
2.
62
1.
21
W
it
h
a
co
lle
ge
de
gr
ee
0.
60
0.
49
0.
59
0.
49
0.
59
0.
49
0.
59
0.
49
Li
vi
ng
in
an
ur
ba
n
ar
ea
0.
64
0.
48
0.
61
0.
49
0.
63
0.
48
0.
63
0.
48
A
ve
ra
ge
co
m
m
ut
in
g
ti
m
e
(m
in
s)
25
.6
1
5.
96
25
.5
7
5.
83
25
.4
7
5.
88
25
.5
4
5.
89
A
ve
ra
ge
ga
so
lin
e
pr
ic
e
($
)
3.
51
0.
63
3.
52
0.
64
3.
43
0.
58
3.
48
0.
62
A
ve
ra
ge
pr
ic
e
of
th
e
pu
rc
ha
se
d
ve
hi
cl
e
(1
,0
00
$)
28
.8
9
12
.9
8
29
.6
6
13
.6
8
30
.4
4
13
.9
7
29
.7
1
13
.5
8
Pu
rc
ha
si
ng
a
lig
ht
tr
uc
k
0.
48
0.
50
0.
50
0.
50
0.
52
0.
50
0.
50
0.
50
A
ve
ra
ge
M
PG
of
th
e
pu
rc
ha
se
d
ve
hi
cl
e
25
.0
9
7.
39
25
.8
3
8.
55
26
.3
0
9.
27
25
.7
7
8.
50
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
27
84
30
32
32
59
90
75
161
Table 3.2: Parameter Estimates in Mean Utility
(1) OLS (2) IV
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
constant 8.1667 0.7080 6.3266 0.9295
log(price) -1.2533 0.4987 -4.1081 1.0613
horsepower/weight 1.6455 0.7089 4.0015 1.0496
gallons/mile 1.6460 0.4862 1.2802 0.5161
weight 1.0295 0.2606 1.0167 0.2731
AFV dummy -2.5336 1.0462 -3.0228 1.1280
van dummy -0.1785 0.0323 -0.2166 0.0349
pickup dummy -5.4737 0.5096 -5.3216 0.4880
SUV dummy -0.8165 0.6849 1.4264 1.0017
model year 13 dummy 2.0349 0.1206 2.0104 0.1270
model year 14 dummy 1.5426 0.1031 1.5100 0.1050
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Table 3.3: Parameters Estimates in Heterogeneity Component
Coefficient S.E.
Observed Heterogeneity
log(price)/income -13.2672 0.6879
urban*pickups -0.6819 0.0799
urban*afv 0.4064 0.1014
family size*vehicle weight 0.1067 0.0345
gasoline price*gallons/mile -0.0747 0.0221
Random coefficients
gallons/mile 0.3858 0.0136
horsepower/weight 5.2485 0.1690
light trucks 2.8224 0.2537
Own-price Elasticity -5.51
Note: the number of observations are 9075. log-likelihood at convergence:
-94215.03. 150 Halton draws are used for simulating the unobserved het-
erogeneity. The instrument variables used to estimate the linear parame-
ters are the difference and squared difference in characteristics with other
products in the same firm and in other firms.
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Table 3.4: Market Outcomes of a Uniform Standard
Segment No.of Models Average Price($) Price Change ($) Sales in 2014 Sales Change
cars 260 29,745 -471.0 6,264,019 8.0%
suvs 147 36,773 2215.9 4,736,461 -1.5%
vans 14 27,382 2988.7 106,266 -12.2%
pickup trucks 38 40,622 4317.2 1,780,584 -11.9%
light trucks 199 38,270 2766.2 6,623,311 -4.9%
Note: the average prices reported are sales-weighted. The price changes are sales-weighted average price changes
per model, summarized by segment.
Table 3.5: Firm Profit Impact from Removing Attribute Basing
Firms Profit Change (%)
Domestic -1.77
European 4.03
Asian 1.53
Total 0.89
164
Table 3.6: Welfare Consequences of Removing Attribute Basing
Welfare billion $
∆ Consumer surplus -0.98
∆ Firm profit 2.30
∆ Pollutant emission externality savings 0.24
∆ GHG emission externality savings 0.54
∆ Oil imports externality savings 0.31
∆ Accident externality savings 0.42
∆ Total social welfare 2.83
Note: the external cost savings are vehicle lifetime savings dis-
counted to year 2014. Pollutant emission externality savings in-
clude VOC, NOx, PM2.5 and SO2. The parameters used for ex-
ternal cost calculation are reported in Table 3.7.
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Table 3.7: Parameters for External Cost Calculation
Parameters Value Source
Discount rate 5%
Lifetime VMT for cars 195,264 EPA (2014) [34]
Lifetime VMT for trucks 225,865 EPA (2014) [34]
Emission rates grams/gallon
VOC 24.9 EPA (2008)[32]
NOx 16.7 EPA (2008) [32]
PM2.5 0.1 EPA (2008) [32]
SO2 0.17 EPA (2008)[32]
Emission damage costs $/ton (2014 value)
VOC 1,482 NHTSA (2010) [77]
NOx 6,042 NHTSA (2010) [77]
PM2.5 330,600 NHTSA (2010)[77]
SO2 35,340 NHTSA (2010)[77]
CO2 36 EPA (2016) [35]
External cost of oil imports ($/gallon) 0.17 EPA (2008) [32]
External cost of additional light truck ($/ unit) 2,444 Li (2012) [69]
External cost of additionl car ($/mile) 0.026 NHTSA (2010) [77]
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Figure 3.1: Historic CAFE standard split between passenger cars and light
trucks
Data source: U.S. Department of Transportation
Figure 3.2: GHG emission standard split for passenger cars and light
trucks in MY 2016
Data source: Light-Duty Vehcile Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule. May 2010.
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Figure 3.3: Annual market share of passenger cars and light trucks in the
U.S.
Data source: data on market shares of passenger cars and light trucks are from Ward’s Auto-
motive Reports, and data on annual average fleet fuel economy from 1980 to 2015 are obtained
from U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
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Figure 3.4: GHG emission targets and actual fleet-average emissions
Panel (a) Passenger cars
Panel (b) Light trucks
Note: The blue squares represent the sales-weighted average emission per mile. The green dots
represent the GHG emission standard targets for the corresponding footprint level.
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Figure 3.5: Graphic illustration of discrete attribute basing
Panel (a) Uniform Standard
Panel (b) Discrete Attribute Basing
Note: the horizontal axis represents the market share of light trucks (s), while the vertical axis
represents the emission level (e). The uniform standard assigns an emission mandate at k. The
policy of discrete attribute basing assigns a standard k1 for passenger cars and k2 for light trucks.
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Figure 3.6: Own-price elasticity estimates
Figure 3.7: Estimates of price-cost margins
171
Figure 3.8: Uniform footprint-based standards for MY 2014
Note: the uniform footprint-based standards use the sales-weighted average parameters of the
passenger car and light truck fleets for the emission standard formula.
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Figure 3.9: Price changes due to removal of attribute basing
Panel (a) Price impact on passenger cars
Panel (b) Price impact on light trucks
Note: the figure plots the price changes due to the removal of the car and truck standard split.
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Figure 3.10: Firm profit changes due to removal of attribute basing
Figure 3.11: Production share of light trucks in MY 2014
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Figure 3.12: Welfare changes by removing the discrete attribute basing
Note: The figure shows the welfare impacts from removing the attribute basing. All the welfare
changes are capitalized to 2014 $ and are recorded in billion $. Oil consumption externality
savings include savings of external costs from air pollutant emissions, CO2 emissions and oil
imports.
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APPENDIX A
ENTRY MODEL OF CHARGING STATIONS
The entry model is developed based on [40]. Denote EV owners’ demand for
charging station j by D(p1, ..., pN), where N is the number of charging stations
available in a given market, and p j is the price at charging station j, j = 1, ...,N.
We assume that demands are symmetric in terms of prices at different charging
stations. Furthermore, we assume that the marginal cost is constant, denoted by
c, and that the profit function from each EV owner (p j − c)D(p1, ..., pN) is quasi-
concave in p j. Under these assumptions, there exists an equilibrium in which
all stations charge the same price which depends on N, denoted by p(N). De-
note the equilibrium markup by ϕ(N)(≡ − D(p)[ ∂D(p)
∂p
] ) and assume ϕ′(N) < 0, which is
consistent with most common competition models. Let f (N) = ϕ(N)D(p(N))/N.
Then the per-period profit of a station in market m at time t is pimt = QEVmt f (Nmt).
Now consider a charging station’s entry decision. If a charging station en-
ters market m at time t, it pays the entry cost Fmt and earns the profit streams
(pimt, pi(mt+1)...), generating a discounted profit of −Fmt + pimt + δpimt+1 + ..., where δ
is a discount factor common to all stations. If a station enters market m at time
t+1, it generates a discounted profit of −δFmt+1 +δpimt+1 +δ2pimt+2.... In a free-entry
equilibrium firms must be indifferent between these two options. This implies
Fmt − δFmt+1 = pimt = QEVmt f (Nmt).
Taking the natural logarithms of both sides, we can get
ln(Fmt − δFmt+1) = ln( f (Nmt)) + ln(QEVmt ) (A.1)
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We specify the entry cost as
ln(Fmt − δFmt+1) = ρ0 + ρ1Zmt + τmt, (A.2)
where τmt is the unobserved entry cost, and the vector of covariates Zmt includes
the state-level tax credit given to charging station investors measured as the
percentage of the building cost, a dummy variable indicating whether there ex-
ists public grants or funding to building charging infrastructure, the interaction
term of number of grocery stores in a MSA in 2012 with the lagged number of
charging stations in all MSAs other than own (the instrument in the EV demand
equation), and other control variables.
We specify the profitability of charging station f (N) as follows
ln( f (Nmt)) = λ0 + λ1ln(QEVmt ) + ϑmt, (A.3)
where Nmt is installed base of charging stations by time t which captures the
competition among charging stations, and ϑmt is an error term that captures the
unobserved local demand shocks.
Furthermore, we decompose the local shock as
(τmt − ϑmt)/λ1 = Tt + ϕm + ςmt, (A.4)
where Tt is year-quarter dummies that control for time effects common to all
the MSAs, ϕm is market fixed effects that control for time-invariant and MSA-
specific preferences for charging stations, and ςmt is an term capturing those
idiosyncratic local demand shocks.
From equations (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4), we can obtain the charging
station equation (1.5) in Section 4.2:
ln(Nmt) = γ0 + γ1ln(QEVmt ) + γ2Zmt + Tt + ϕm + ςmt,
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where γ0 = (ρ0 − λ0)/λ1, γ1 = −1/λ1, γ2 = ρ1/λ1.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proposition 1: Where there is compliance trading and the only regulatory goal
is to target the emission externality with no distributional considerations, the optimal
policy should have a uniform standard such that:
σ∗ = 0.
The regulator maximize the welfare W, which is sum of the expected utility
from vehicle purchase and expected revenue from noncompliance fines less the
expected external cost from vehicle emissions, by choosing the policy parame-
ters k, σ and t:
maxW
k,σ,t
= µln(exp(Vc/µ)+(exp(Vt/µ))+ t((1− s)(ec−k)+ s(et−k−σ))−δ((1− s)ec+ set)
To ease exposition, denote the following three terms as the expected con-
sumer utility, the revenue from noncompliance punishment, and the externality
from emissions respectively:
V = µln(exp(Vc/µ) + (exp(Vt/µ))
T = t((1 − s)(ec − k) + s(et − k − σ))
E = δ((1 − s)ec + set)
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First note that ∂Vc
∂σ
= Lc
∂σ
= 0, ∂Vt
∂σ
= Lt
∂σ
= σ by the envelop theorem. The optimal
value for the standard difference σ∗ could be found by setting the first order
condition of W with respect to σ equaling to zero. The first order conditions of
the three terms with respect to σ are:
∂V
∂σ
= µ
1
µ
exp(Vc/µ)∂Vc∂σ +
1
µ
(exp(Vt/µ))∂Vt∂σ
(exp(Vc/µ) + (exp(Vt/µ))
=
exp(Vt/µ)λ
(exp(Vc/µ) + (exp(Vt/µ))
= sλ
∂T
∂σ
= t[
∂(1 − s)
∂σ
(ec − k) + (1 − s)∂(ec − k)
∂σ
+
∂s
∂σ
(et − k − σ) + s∂(et − k − σ)
∂σ
]
= t[− ∂s
∂σ
(ec − k) + ∂s
∂σ
(et − k − σ) + s(∂et
∂σ
− 1)]
= t
∂s
∂σ
(et − ec) − t ∂s
∂σ
σ + ts
∂et
∂σ
− ts
∂E
∂σ
= δ[
∂(1 − s)
∂σ
ec + (1 − s)∂ec
∂σ
+
∂s
∂σ
et + s
∂et
∂σ
]
= δ[− ∂s
∂σ
ec +
∂s
∂σ
et + s
∂et
∂σ
]
= δ
∂s
∂σ
(et − ec) + δs∂et
∂σ
Therefore the first order condition of w with respect to σ is:
∂W
∂σ
=
∂V
∂σ
+
∂T
∂σ
− ∂E
∂σ
= sλ + t
∂s
∂σ
(et − ec) − t ∂s
∂σ
σ + ts
∂et
∂σ
− ts − δ ∂s
∂σ
(et − ec) − δs∂et
∂σ
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An optimal policy requires the regulator to set k∗ such that the equilibrium
regulatory credit price (or the marginal compliance cost) is equal to the marginal
benefit of one unit of emission reduction δ: λ = δ. The regulator is also going
to set the fine payment for one unit of noncompliance at the same price of the
regulatory credit. Otherwise, no firm would comply with regulation but volun-
tarily pays the fine. Therefore, an optimal regulation implies that λ = t = δ. The
above first order condition reduces to:
∂W
∂σ
= −t ∂s
∂σ
σ
Setting the first order condition to zero and solving for σ gives:
σ∗ = 0.
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